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دسته بندی:
مدیریت مالی - Financial Management
سال انتشار:
2018
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله:
Anticorruption regulation and firm value: Evidence from a shock of mandated resignation of directors in China
ترجمه فارسی عنوان مقاله:
مقررات ضد فساد و ارزش شرکت: شواهدی از یک شوک استعفای تسلیم شده مدیران در چین
منبع:
Journal of Banking & Finance Volume 92, July 2018, Pages 67-80
نویسنده:
Yongxin Xu
چکیده انگلیسی:
Chinas broad anti-corruption campaign includes a regulation that requires bureaucrats to resign from director positions in listed companies. Using this particular event to test the effect of the anticorruption regulation, we find that this regulation costs firms with banned directors on average 4%. This cost cannot be explained by the typical cost of losing a director or by damage from a political vendetta conducted by the leadership. We further show that the anticorruption regulation impedes firm value not only through political connections but also through the anticorruption disincentive, the incentive to act passively for fear of being accused of corruption. Finally, affected firms reduce their investments, hire more employees and have poor performance afterwards.
keywords: Anticorruption regulation |Firm value |Political connection |Anticorruption disincentive
قیمت: رایگان
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