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عنوان انگلیسی مقاله:
Information sharing vs: privacy: A game theoretic analysis
ترجمه فارسی عنوان مقاله:
اشتراک اطلاعات در مقابل حریم خصوصی: تجزیه و تحلیل نظریه بازی
Sciencedirect - Elsevier - Expert Systems With Applications, 88 (2017) 327-337. doi:10.1016/j.eswa.2017.06.042
Mansooreh Ezhei, Behrouz Tork Ladani
Article history:Received 9 June 2016Revised 29 June 2017Accepted 30 June 2017Available online 1 July 2017Keywords:Information security economics Information sharingPrivacySecurity knowledge growth Security investment Differential gameSharing cyber security information helps ﬁrms to decrease cyber security risks, prevent attacks, and in- crease their overall resilience. Hence it affects reducing the social security cost. Although previously cyber security information sharing was being performed in an informal and ad hoc manner, nowadays through development of information sharing and analysis centers (ISACs), cyber security information sharing has become more structured, regular, and frequent. This is while, the privacy risk and information disclosure concerns are still major challenges faced by ISACs that act as barriers in activating the potential impacts of ISACs.This paper provides insights on decisions about security investments and information sharing in con- sideration of privacy risk and security knowledge growth. By the latest concept i.e. security knowledge growth, we mean fusing the collected security information, adding prior knowledge, and performing ex- tra analyses to enrich the shared information. The impact of this concept on increasing the motivation of ﬁrms for voluntarily sharing their sensitive information to authorities such as ISACs has been analytically studied for the ﬁrst time in this paper. We propose a differential game model in which a linear fusion model for characterizing the process of knowledge growth via the ISAC is employed. The Nash equilibrium of the proposed game including the optimized values of security investment, and the thresholds of data sharing with the price of privacy are highlighted. We analytically ﬁnd the threshold in which the gain achieved by sharing sensitive information outweighs the privacy risks and hence the ﬁrms have natural incentive to share their security information. Moreover, since in this case the threshold of data shar- ing and the security investment levels chosen in Nash equilibrium may be lower than social optimum, accordingly we design mechanisms which would encourage the ﬁrms and lead to a socially optimal out- come. The direct impact of the achieved results is on analyzing the way ISACs can convince ﬁrms to share their security information with them.© 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Information security economics | Information sharing | Privacy | Security knowledge growth | Security investment | Differential game