عنوان انگلیسی مقاله:
The optimal timing of CEO compensation
ترجمه فارسی عنوان مقاله:
زمان بندی بهینه غرامت CEO
Finance Research Letters Volume 24, March 2018, Pages 90-94
We extend a standard principal-agent model of CEO compensation by modeling the progressive attenuation of information asymmetries about firm value by shareholders in continuous time. The dynamics of the stock price process are affected by the continuous accumulation of exogenous shocks, and by the progressive resolution of information asymmetries. The optimal timing of compensation is the point in time at which the stock price is most informative about the manager’s action. When exogenous shocks accumulate at a constant rate over time and information asymmetries are resolved at a decreasing rate, the optimal timing of compensation is the point in time at which these two rates coincide.
keywords: Deferred compensation| Executive compensation| Principal-agent model
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