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دسته بندی:
مدیریت بحران - Crisis Management
سال انتشار:
2018
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله:
The financial crisis, acquisition premiums and the moderating effect of CEO power
ترجمه فارسی عنوان مقاله:
بحران مالی، دریافت حق بیمه و اثر تعدیل کننده از قدرت مدیر عامل شرکت
منبع:
Sciencedirect - Elsevier - Long Range Planning, 51 (2018) 204-218. doi:10.1016/j.lrp.2017.08.004
نویسنده:
Russell Fralich a, *, Andrew Papadopoulos b
چکیده انگلیسی:
The recent financial crisis brought upon a period of increased information uncertainty for firms and market agents and in the context of
mergers and acquisitions, increased information asymmetry between bidders and targets. This led to an overall increase in average
acquisition premiums. However, the final realized premium can be moderated through CEO characteristics in dealing with such issues as
uncertainty and asymmetry. Bidder CEOs can reduce these premiums through their expertise, networks and control: powerful CEOs will
tend to pay smaller premiums than weaker CEOs because they are better equipped to deal with the increased information uncertainty and
asymmetry, either through risk-averse behavior or better assessment of target quality. Our results based on a six-year sample of S&P500
firms engaged in M&A activity, and centered on the onset of the recent financial crisis, largely support our predictions. While earlier
research suggested that CEO power could lead to higher premiums, our study points to the opposite conclusion: during times of financial
crisis, CEO power effectively constrains premiums. This extends our understanding of why bidder CEOs overpay beyond the role of bidder
anchoring bias, hubris, and target resistance by considering the role of macro-environmental conditions and power.
قیمت: رایگان
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