عنوان انگلیسی مقاله:
Tax evasion on a social network
ترجمه فارسی عنوان مقاله:
فرار مالیاتی در یک شبکه اجتماعی
Sciencedirect - Elsevier - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 169 (2020) 79-91: doi:10:1016/j:jebo:2019:11:001
Duccio Gamannossi degl’Innocenti a , c , Matthew D. Rablen b , c , ∗
We relate tax evasion behavior to a substantial literature on social comparison in judge- ments. Taxpayers engage in tax evasion as a means to boost their expected consumption relative to others in their social network. The unique Nash equilibrium of the model re- lates optimal evasion to a (Bonacich) measure of network centrality: more central taxpay- ers evade more. Given that tax authorities are now investing heavily in big-data tools that aim to construct social networks, we investigate the value of acquiring network informa- tion. We do this using networks that allow for celebrity taxpayers, whose consumption is seen widely, and who are systematically of higher wealth. We show that there are pro- nounced returns to the initial acquisition of network information, especially in the pres- ence of celebrity taxpayers.
Keywords: Tax evasion | Social networks | Network centrality | Optimal auditing | Social comparison | Relative consumption