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دسته بندی:
مدیریت پروژه - Project Management
سال انتشار:
2020
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله:
Tournament incentive mechanisms based on fairness preference in large-scale water diversion projects
ترجمه فارسی عنوان مقاله:
مکانیسم های تشویقی مسابقات بر اساس عدالت در پروژه های بزرگ انتقال آب
منبع:
Sciencedirect - Elsevier - Journal of Cleaner Production, 265 (2020) 121861. doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.121861
نویسنده:
Han Han a, Zhuofu Wang a, Bo Liu b, *
چکیده انگلیسی:
Large-scale water diversion project has the characteristics of linear distribution and is usually conducted
simultaneously by multiple contractors. A typical principal-agent relationship exists between the project
owner and each contractor involved in executing the project. Due to the asymmetry of information and
the different interest goals of the owner and contractors, the contractors are likely to engage in
opportunistic behavior. This can have a seriously negative effect on the interests of the project owner and
the public. In order to solve this problem and optimize contractors’ effort levels, this paper establishes a
tournament incentives model operating under the existence of contractors’ fairness preferences, based
on the principle-agent theory in the large-scale water diversion project. Also, a tournament incentives
compensation distribution scheme is designed. The scheme is based on each agent’s ranking and degree
of fairness preference. The results show that multiple contractors will be more inclined to put forth
optimal effort after tournament incentives mechanism is introduced. Moreover, contractors’ optimal
effort levels will increase as the degree of the incentive compensation gap between the two contractors
increases. The study finds that the incentive coefficient for both top-ranked and second-ranked contractors
should increase in line with corresponding increases in fairness preference degrees. This method
will help to ensure that contractors put forward their optimal effort level, indirectly causing an increase
in the total output performance of a large-scale water diversion project, thus achieving a win-win situation.
Finally, the study’s conclusions are verified through a research study. The findings offer new
insights for the development of stakeholder management between the owner and multi-contractor in
large-scale water diversion projects.
Keywords: Tournament incentives | Fairness preference | Large-scale water diversion project | Principle-agent theory
قیمت: رایگان
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