سال انتشار:

2020

---

عنوان انگلیسی مقاله:

Law or strategic calculus? Abstention in the Argentine Supreme Court

---

ترجمه فارسی عنوان مقاله:

قانون یا حساب استراتژیک؟ رای ممتنع در دیوان عالی آرژانتین

---

منبع:

Sciencedirect - Elsevier - International Review of Law & Economics, 62 (2020) 105889: doi:10:1016/j:irle:2020:105889

---

نویسنده:

Sergio Muro, Alejandro Chehtman

---

چکیده انگلیسی:

tAbstention theory suggests that self-interest leads voters to abstain. While this theory has been studiedin different settings, abstention in courts has received scant attention. Jacobi and Kontorovich (2014)hypothesize that stare decisis renders abstention theory inapplicable to courts. We test this predictionempirically using data from the Argentine Supreme Court. Consistent with abstention theory, we showthat Justices whose vote is pivotal have a lower probability of abstention than non-pivotal ones. In con-trast, we fail to find evidence in support of the probability of abstention being positively related to appealswithout stare decisis implications.
Keywords:High court | Abstention | Rational choice | Strategic | Precedent

---

---

قیمت: رایگان

---

توضیحات اضافی:

---

---

---