عنوان انگلیسی مقاله:
Optimal innovation investment: the role of subsidy schemes and supply chain channel power structure
ترجمه فارسی عنوان مقاله:
سرمایه گذاری نوآوری بهینه: نقش طرح های یارانه و ساختار قدرت کانال زنجیره تامین
Sciencedirect - Elsevier - Computers & Industrial Engineering, 157 (2021) 107291: doi:10:1016/j:cie:2021:107291
We investigate the impact of government subsidy schemes and channel power structure on the level of inno- vation in a two-tier supply chain. Our results indicate that consumer subsidies are more effective than producer subsidies in promoting innovation investment for a given channel power structure. Regardless of the power structure, supply chain members, consumers and society benefit more from consumer subsidies. If government subsidies are absent, innovation investment is higher when neither member of the supply chain dominates, and consumer surplus and social welfare are also higher in the Nash game. Under the consumer subsidy scheme, although government expenditures are higher in the manufacturer-led game, innovation investment is the same under different power structures, and consumer surplus and social welfare are also, in turn, the same. Under the producer subsidy scheme, the manufacturer invests more in innovation, and government expenditure is also higher when the retailer dominates the supply chain. Under producer subsidies, consumers and society benefit from the presence of powerful retailers when the investment cost is lower, and consumer surplus and social welfare have an inverted U-shaped relationship with the retailer’s power otherwise.
Keywords: Innovation investment | Subsidy schemes | Channel power | Game theory