دانلود مقاله انگلیسی رایگان:توالی مذاکره ، قیمت گذاری و تصمیمات سفارش در یک زنجیره تأمین سه پله ای: تجزیه و تحلیل بازی مشارکتی - 2021
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  • Negotiation-sequence, pricing, and ordering decisions in a three-echelon supply chain: A coopetitive-game analysis Negotiation-sequence, pricing, and ordering decisions in a three-echelon supply chain: A coopetitive-game analysis
    Negotiation-sequence, pricing, and ordering decisions in a three-echelon supply chain: A coopetitive-game analysis

    سال انتشار:

    2021


    عنوان انگلیسی مقاله:

    Negotiation-sequence, pricing, and ordering decisions in a three-echelon supply chain: A coopetitive-game analysis


    ترجمه فارسی عنوان مقاله:

    توالی مذاکره ، قیمت گذاری و تصمیمات سفارش در یک زنجیره تأمین سه پله ای: تجزیه و تحلیل بازی مشارکتی


    منبع:

    Sciencedirect - Elsevier - European Journal of Operational Research, 294 (2021) 1096-1107: doi:10:1016/j:ejor:2021:02:020


    نویسنده:

    Feimin Zhong


    چکیده انگلیسی:

    We investigate a three-echelon supply chain in which a distributor at the middle echelon negotiates two wholesale price contracts with his upstream manufacturer and downstream retailer. In the first stage, the distributor decides on whether to first negotiate with the manufacturer or with the retailer; in the second (combined, noncooperative-cooperative, game) stage, the two negotiations are conducted sequentially. We find that the supply chain can be coordinated if the distributor first negotiates with the retailer. The distributor should choose the negotiation sequence for supply chain coordination, if he has a sufficiently large (small) relative bargaining power in the negotiation with the manufacturer (the retailer). We also extend our analysis to the cases in which the distributor and the manufacturer negotiate a buyback or two-part tariff contract, and draw similar outcomes when the distributor first negotiates with the retailer. In addition, under the two-part tariff contract, the distributor prefers to first negotiate with the retailer if the manufacturer has a sufficiently high disagreement payoff whereas, under the buyback contract, the distributor always prefers to first negotiate with the firm with a stronger bargaining power. Moreover, the two-part tariff (buyback) contract cannot (can) always coordinate the supply chain.
    Keywords: Supply chain management | Negotiation sequence | Pricing | Coopetitive game | Generalized Nash bargaining solution


    سطح: متوسط
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    قیمت: رایگان


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