دانلود مقاله انگلیسی رایگان:آیا تنظیم تاکتیک های دفاعی با قوانین اجباری به نفع سهامداران است؟ شواهدی از مطالعات رویدادی در چین - 2020
بلافاصله پس از پرداخت دانلود کنید
دانلود مقاله انگلیسی حقوق جرم و جزا رایگان
  • Does regulation of defensive tactics with mandatory rules benefit shareholders? Evidence from event studies in China Does regulation of defensive tactics with mandatory rules benefit shareholders? Evidence from event studies in China
    Does regulation of defensive tactics with mandatory rules benefit shareholders? Evidence from event studies in China

    سال انتشار:

    2020


    عنوان انگلیسی مقاله:

    Does regulation of defensive tactics with mandatory rules benefit shareholders? Evidence from event studies in China


    ترجمه فارسی عنوان مقاله:

    آیا تنظیم تاکتیک های دفاعی با قوانین اجباری به نفع سهامداران است؟ شواهدی از مطالعات رویدادی در چین


    منبع:

    Sciencedirect - Elsevier - International Review of Law & Economics, 66 (2021) 105988: doi:10:1016/j:irle:2021:105988


    نویسنده:

    James Si Zeng


    چکیده انگلیسی:

    Scholars have long debated whether defensive tactics increase or reduce firm value and how to regulate them. This article conducts event studies to examine the impacts of the regulation of a common defensive tactic in China that requires shareholders to hold shares for a certain period before they can nominate directors (“the holding-period requirement”). The Chinese Securities Investors Service Center (CSISC), which is a quasi-government organization under the charge of the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission, initiated regulatory actions against this type of defensive tactic claiming that it violates mandatory rules in Chinese corporate law, which caused on average a -0.31% abnormal return to stocks of over two hundred corporations that had adopted similar tactics. The impact of the first event on the sample stocks was statistically significant, suggesting that the defensive tactics were beneficial to firm value and the regulatory decisions had negative impacts on firm value. Corporations with similar defensive tactics also experienced a -0.25% abnormal return on average after the court ruled that this type of defensive tactic violated Chinese corporate law. Evidence suggests that the events had a larger impact on corporations with dispersed ownership structures and small market capitalization. These results suggest that employing mandatory rules to regulate the holding-period requirements in China is likely to harm shareholders’ interests.
    Keywords: Defensive tactics | Holding-period requirement | Shareholder protection | Event study | Mandatory rules


    سطح: متوسط
    تعداد صفحات فایل pdf انگلیسی: 13
    حجم فایل: 1436 کیلوبایت

    قیمت: رایگان


    توضیحات اضافی:




اگر این مقاله را پسندیدید آن را در شبکه های اجتماعی به اشتراک بگذارید (برای به اشتراک گذاری بر روی ایکن های زیر کلیک کنید)

تعداد نظرات : 0

الزامی
الزامی
الزامی
rss مقالات ترجمه شده rss مقالات انگلیسی rss کتاب های انگلیسی rss مقالات آموزشی
logo-samandehi