دانلود و نمایش مقالات مرتبط با Agency conflict::صفحه 1
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نتیجه جستجو - Agency conflict

تعداد مقالات یافته شده: 9
ردیف عنوان نوع
1 Managerial ability and accounting conservatism
توانایی مدیریتی و محافظه کاری حسابداری-2021
Since accounting conservatism is a measure of biased reporting which may or may not reflect high quality earnings, the relation between managerial ability and accounting conservatism is unclear ex ante. High-ability managers may report conservatively to improve the efficiency of contracts, avoid agency conflicts by the timely reporting of future losses, and build reputations for conservative reporting. Conversely, they may not report conservatively to the extent that conservatism reflects biased, and consequently, low-quality earnings. Motivated by these opposing arguments, we examine the relationship between managerial ability and conservatism for Australian firms for the period 2004 to 2013. Our results show that managerial ability is positively associated with accounting conservatism. These results support the notion that high ability managers apply conservatism in accounting because it benefits the firm and stakeholders. Our results are robust to a wide range of proxies for both managerial ability and conservatism, including the Heckman’s (1976) self-selection bias check. Our study should be of interest to numerous stakeholders, including firms seeking to make managerial appointments.
keywords: توانایی مدیریتی | محافظه کاری حسابداری | کیفیت درآمد | Managerial ability | Accounting conservatism | Earnings quality
مقاله انگلیسی
2 Management sub-advising in the mutual fund industry
توصیه فرعی مدیریتی در صنعت سرمایه گذاری دوطرفه-2018
This is a study of how contractual mechanisms can mitigate agency conflicts in sub-advised mutual funds. Sub-advising contracts allow fund families to expand their product offerings to include new investment styles and thereby gain market share. We show that costly contractual arrangements, such as co-branding, multi-advising, and performance-based compensation, can mitigate agency conflicts in outsourcing and protect investors from potential underperformance. Fund families will find it cost-effective to implement such incentive mechanisms only when investors are sophisticated in assessing manager skill. The findings help to explain why a large percentage of fund families outsource their funds to advisory firms.
keywords: Outsourcing |Sub-advisor |Mutual funds |Management company |Incentive contracts |Fund performance |Market share |Agency issue
مقاله انگلیسی
3 Employee representation and financial leverage
نمایندگی کارکنان و اهرم بندی مالی-2018
We analyze how direct employee voice affects financial leverage. German law mandates that firms’ supervisory boards consist of an equal number of employees’ and owners’ representatives. This requirement, however, applies only to firms with more than two thousand domestic employees. We exploit this discontinuity and the law’s introduction in 1976 for identification and find that direct employee power increases financial leverage. This is explained by a supply side effect: as banks’ interests are similar to those of employees, higher employee power reduces agency conflicts with debt providers, leading to better financing conditions. These findings reveal a novel mechanism of direct employee influence.
keywords: Capital structure |Financial leverage |Employee representation |Labor rights |Bank ownership
مقاله انگلیسی
4 Skill or effort? Institutional ownership and managerial efficiency
مهارت یا تلاش؟ مالکیت سازمانی و کارآمدی مدیریتی-2018
Using a sample of U.S. firms during the 1989–2015 period, we study whether the efficiency with which managers generate revenue is sensitive to monitoring by institutional shareholders. We find that institutional ownership is positively related to managerial efficiency. Our identification relies on a discontinuity in ownership around the Russell 1000/2000 Index threshold and suggests that the positive effect of institutional ownership on managerial efficiency is causal. Furthermore, we document that monitoring by institutions helps improve managerial efficiency, and that an exogenous increase in institutional ownership leads to higher pay-for-performance sensitivity. Finally, we find consistent results after excluding from our sample forced CEO turnovers, suggesting that institutional shareholders force incumbent managers to exert greater effort rather than influence the replacement of less efficient CEOs. Taken together, our findings highlight the important role played by institutional shareholders in getting the most out of corporate executives.
keywords: Managerial efficiency |Managerial ability |Institutional investors |Agency conflict
مقاله انگلیسی
5 Fair value accounting and corporate cash holdings
حسابداری ارزش کالا و حفظ نقدینگی شرکت-2018
A trade-off often exists between relevance and reliability of accounting numbers. Prior research suggests that fair value accounting increases the relevance and decreases the reliability. The reduced reliability may lead to more agency conflicts. We predict a positive relation between the use of fair value inputs and the level of corporate cash holdings because prior research links more agency conflicts to a higher level of cash. We find that increased use of fair value inputs is associated with a higher level of cash holdings, and the results are mainly driven by Level 1 and Level 2 fair value inputs. In addition, we find that our results are stronger for firms with more-able managers.
keywords: Fair value accounting| Accounting Standards Codification 820|Fair value inputs|Corporate cash holdings
مقاله انگلیسی
6 Employee stock ownership and the cost of capital
مالکیت سهام کارکنان و هزینه سرمایه-2017
This paper investigates the relationship between employee stock ownership and the cost of capital, the main determinant of shareholder value creation computed through economic value added (EVA). By reducing agency conflicts within the firm, we hypothesize that employee share ownership reduces the firm’s cost of capital by affecting its two components, i.e. the cost of equity and the cost of debt. We test this hypothesis in France, a leading country in terms of employee ownership, based on a panel of the 120 largest listed companies for the 2000–2011 period. We find: (i) no significant relationship between employee stock ownership and the cost of equity; (ii) a negative curvilinear relationship between employee stock ownership and the cost of debt; (ii) a negative curvilinear relationship between employee stock ownership and the weighted average cost of capital. These results suggest debtholders regard ESO as positive as long it is moderate because it shifts risk from them to employees and that this effect is still perceptible in the weighted average cost of capital.
Keywords: Shared capitalism employee ownership | Corporate governance | Cost of equity | Cost of debt | Cost of capital | Agency conflicts
مقاله انگلیسی
7 واقع گرایی، مهارت، و مشوق ها: روندهای حاضر و آتی در مدیریت سرمایه گذاری و عملکرد سرمایه گذاری
سال انتشار: 2016 - تعداد صفحات فایل pdf انگلیسی: 10 - تعداد صفحات فایل doc فارسی: 43
هدف از مقاله حاضر، مروری بر گرایش های اخیر در تحقیقات عملکرد و مدیریت سرمایه گذاری و مشخص کردن زمینه هایی است که انتظار می رود تا در اینده بیشتر توسعه یابند. بنظر می رسد گرایش به سمت اتخاذ مدل های عامل و CAPM کلاسیک، با بکار گرفتن عوامل واقع گرایانه (که بهترین پروکسی محرک های عملکرد سرمایه گذاری نقش اصلی را بازی می کند) ادامه یابد. همچنین تحقیق درمورد مهارت، براساس معیارهای پیشرفته، و بوسیله مفاهیم جدید پیش رو در مورد شناسایی و تائید، حوزه ای از تحقیقات درحال پیشرفت است. دسترسی به مقادیر زیادی از داده های کیفی، امکان بررسی موضوعات مالی شرکت ها مانند درگیری آرژانس و شناسایی عوامل مشوق را فراهم نموده است. این ها بعضی از حوزه هایی هستند که در سال های اخیر شاهد پیشرفت های عمده ای برای ان ها بوده ایم و انتظار داریم پیشرفت و توسعه در این ناحیه ادامه داشته باشد.
کلمات کلیدی: مدیریت سرمایه گذاری | عملکرد سرمایه گذاری | صندوق سرمایه گذاری مشترک | مدل های عامل | مهارت | مشخصات | انگیزه ها
مقاله ترجمه شده
8 Value-based management as a tailor-made management practice? A literature review
آیا مدیریت مبتنی بر ارزش به عنوان یک عمل مدیریت بازساخته است؟ بررسی ادبیات-2015
Value-based management is largely discussed as fundamental tool to manage organizations successfully. However, it is often criticized for its alleged incentive to maximize short-term profits. Thus, it is the aim of this study to shed more light on the role of value-based management for organizational success and discuss which firms seemingly benefit from the adoption of value-based manage- ment systems. Since adoption rates vary among firms, the implementation and its effect on organizational performance may be a matter of systematic circumstances. In particular, the extent of agency conflicts and arrangements to alleviate those conflicts designate where value-based management potentially serves as an effective monitoring instrument. Additionally, a more reactive strategic orientation and low growth opportunities imply a need for more efficient capital management as one lever to increase organizational performance. These conditions are accompanied by managerial characteristics and industry pressure that determine the use of value- based management systems, and do not undermine its incentive for efficient capital management. Hence, value-based management seems to be tailor-made for these specific circumstances. keywords: Value-based management | Corporate governance | Contingency theory | Shareholder value | Literature review
مقاله انگلیسی
9 حسابرسی قیمت گذاری و ماهیت سهامداران کنترل کننده: شواهدی از فرانسه
سال انتشار: 2013 - تعداد صفحات فایل pdf انگلیسی: 14 - تعداد صفحات فایل doc فارسی: 30
این مطالعه بررسی می کند که آیا حسابرسان، بعنوان یک مکانیزم کنترل کننده برای کاهش مسائل در شرکت ها بکار گرفته می شوند که از انواع مختلف سهامداران کنترل کننده ناشی می شوند. در یک محیط مالکیت متمرکز و حفاظت ضعیف از سرمایه گذاران، سهامداران کنترل کننده می توانند براحتی ثروت را از سهامداران اقلیت مصادره کنند و از منافع خصوصی کنترل بهره ببرند. به هرحال این تعارض شرکت ها بندرت مورد مطالعه قرار گرفته است چون اکثر تعارض ها فرضی در شرکت ها بین مدیران و سهامداران رخ می دهد. با استفاده از یک مدل مبالغ حسابرسی که از Simunic (1980) گرفته شده ما تاثیر ماهیت سهامداران کنترل کننده بر مبالغ حسابرسی را در فرانسه مطالعه می کنیم . نتایج ما نشان می دهند (1) یک رابطه منفی بین مبالغ حسابرسی و سهامداری دولتی وجود دارد (2) یک رابطه مثبت بین مبالغ حسابرسی و سهامداری نهادی وجود دارد و (3) هیچگونه رابطه ای بین مبالغ حسابرسی و سهامداری خانوادگی وجود ندارد. این نتایج اثرات مخلوط شده ماهیت مالکیت بر مبالغ حسابرسی را نشان می دهد.
کلیدواژه ها: حقوق حسابرس | هویت سهامداران کنترل کننده | نظارت سلب مالکیت | اختلاف دلالی
مقاله ترجمه شده
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