دانلود و نمایش مقالات مرتبط با Antitrust::صفحه 1
دانلود بهترین مقالات isi همراه با ترجمه فارسی 2
نتیجه جستجو - Antitrust

تعداد مقالات یافته شده: 7
ردیف عنوان نوع
1 Tailoring critical loss to the competitive process
تطبیق ضررهای بحرانی با فرایند رقابتی-2020
In 1989, Barry Harris & Joseph Simons developed a quantitative method to implement the Horizontal Merger Guidelines’ hypothetical monopolist test with a market-level “critical loss” analysis. The appeal of Harris & Simons’ framework is that it created a simple, intuitive approach to delineating markets—with relatively parsimonious data requirements. After over a decade of use, however, economists began to propose alternative approaches to the classic critical loss analysis—using theory to impose structure on firm-level demand. This allowed researchers to reformulate the critical loss test in terms of diversion ratios. The purpose of this paper is to discuss when the classic, market-level approach to critical loss is more appropriate and when firm-level critical loss offers an important refinement. We illustrate, with a detailed example, that under certain plausible demand scenarios, a diversion-based firm-level analysis could easily reach the wrong answer on market definition. Thus, the analyst needs to carefully study the competitive environment before deciding on the appropriate analysis. As a bottom line, the choice between market-level and firm-level analysis depends on the specific factual situation.
Keywords: Critical loss analysis | Market definition | Hypothetical monopolist test | SSNIP | Unilateral effects | Merger analysis | Antitrust
مقاله انگلیسی
2 Estimating cartel damages with model averaging approaches
برآورد خسارات کارتل با رویکردهای میانگین‌گیری مدل-2020
This research offers an easy-to-implement forecast combination procedure to deal with issues of model uncertainty when evaluating cartel damages. We combine the Mallows model averaging (MMA) method with both the dummy variable (DV) and forecasting approaches to investigate the famous citric acid cartel case during the 1990s. The path of but-for prices generated from the MMA method with DV specification lies in-between those generated from the forecasting and DV methods, supporting the theoretical properties of the MMA method that weights over different forecasts generated from various candidate models. The findings indicate that the but-for prices generated from the MMA method could serve as a useful robustness check for cartel damage estimations.
Keywords: Cartel | Antitrust | Damage estimation
مقاله انگلیسی
3 Reduced Demand Uncertainty and the Sustainability of Collusion: How AI Could Affect Competition
کاهش عدم اطمینان تقاضا و پایداری تبانی: چگونه هوش مصنوعی می تواند بر رقابت تأثیر بگذارد-2020
We model how a technology that perfectly predicts one of two stochastic demand shocks alters the character and sustainability of collusion. Our results show that mechanisms that reduce firms’ uncertainty about the true level of demand have ambiguous welfare implications for consumers and firms alike. An exogenous improvement in firms’ ability to predict demand may make collusion possible where it was previously unsustainable or more profitable where it previously existed. However, an increase in transparency also may make collusion impracticable where it had been possible. The intuition for this ambiguity is that greater clarity about the true state of demand raises the payoffs both to colluding and to cheating. Our findings on the ambiguous welfare implications of reduced uncertainty contribute to the emerging literature on how algorithms, artificial intelligence (AI), and “big data” in market intelligence applications may affect competition.
Keywords: Artificial Intelligence | Uncertainty | Collusion | Price Discrimination | Antitrust
مقاله انگلیسی
4 Taming digital gatekeepers: the ‘more regulatory approach’ to antitrust law
رام کردن دروازه بانان دیجیتال: "رویکرد نظارتی تر" به قانون ضد تراست-2020
Antitrust enforcement and competition policy in the digital economy is high on the agenda of authorities and policymakers. The distinctive features of digital markets and the strategic role played by large platforms apparently require a rethinking of the antitrust regime. Several reform proposals point to the need to integrate the antitrust toolkit with ex ante measures since there is a risk that ex post enforcement would be too slow to successfully keep markets competitive and contestable. The aim of this paper is to investigate whether the invoked regulatory approach reflects the distinctive structural features of digital markets or whether it is just an enforcement short-cut.
Keywords: Online platforms | Digital markets | Antitrust | Regulation | Ex ante prohibitions | New competition tool
مقاله انگلیسی
5 The case against ‘Narrow’ price parity clauses
پرونده علیه شروط برابری قیمت "باریک":-2020
Authors: Price parity clauses have received significant amount of attention from both aca- demics and antitrust agencies. The predominant view is that ‘narrow’ parity clauses are not as pernicious as ‘wide’ parity clauses and they are necessary to restrict free-riding; for instance, free-riding of hotels on Online Travel Agents’ (OTAs) efforts. This paper chal- lenges this understanding. The paper builds upon a recent investigation report from the Bundeskartellamt in Booking.com case that empirically shows the insignificance of free- riding in the market for online hotel intermediation. With explicit reference to these empir- ical findings the German Supreme Court (BGH) has rejected a justification of narrow parity clauses and declared them as illegal. In the absence of a free-riding argument, the theory of harm that ‘narrow’ parity clauses stifle intra-brand competition between different distribu- tion channels and foreclose the market for the brokerage of hotel rooms through OTAs does not meet any justification. Additionally, the paper argues that even in the presence of free- riding, the transfer of wealth from hotels to OTAs is unjustified as ‘narrow’ parity clauses incentivise OTAs more than the risk they undertake.© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Most favoured nation clauses | Price parity clauses | Narrow MFN | Booking.com | Antitrust | Competition law
مقاله انگلیسی
6 Blockchain governance: The missing piece in the competition puzzle
حاکمیت بلاکچین: قطعه گمشده در پازل رقابت-2020
Antitrust law deals with economic matters as if they were all industrial processes, that is, processes through which companies transform inputs into outputs. In this sense, we could say that antitrust law is still a Nineteenth Century law, even when it comes to platforms that transform digital data into services.
For this reason, when we look at blockchains through the lenses of antitrust law, they are either framed as the result of an industrial process (the blockchain as an output) or as a means that allows the development of an industrial process (the blockchain as a tool). However, these two pieces do not complete the puzzle: they do not say much about the competitive impact of blockchains. Studying the operating mechanisms of blockchains and, in particular, their governance, one realizes that the puzzle must acquire a new piece: the information on who controls the blockchain. This piece of information reveals that even dominant blockchains, which are still nowhere to be seen, could be harmless if truly devoid of any central authority and that even strategic exchanges of information via permissioned blockchains should not trigger any antitrust liability, if blockchains’ administrators man- aged to allow the exchange only among non-competing participants.© 2021 Mariateresa Maggiolino and Laura Zoboli. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rightsreserved.
Keywords: Competition law | Blockchain | Blockchain Governance | Market power | Collusion
مقاله انگلیسی
7 نظریه انتخاب عمومی و سیاست ضداعتبار
سال انتشار: 2010 - تعداد صفحات فایل pdf انگلیسی: 21 - تعداد صفحات فایل doc فارسی: 33
ما به بررسی تحقیقات مقدماتی رابرت تولیسون در ارتباط با نظریه و عملکرد اجرای قانون ضداعتبار(مخالفت تشکیل اتحادیه های بزرگ صنایع) می پردازیم. تحت تاثیر دوره خدمتش در زمان دولت اول رونالد ریگان به عنوان رئیس سازمان کمیسیون تجارت فدرال ، تولیسون اولین محققی بود که استدلال مرتبط به انتخاب عمومی را نسبت به این پرسش را که چرا مخالفت تشکیل اعتبار (مخالفت تشکیل اتحادیه های بزرگ صنایع) نمی تواند به اهداف حمایت از مصرف کننده در برابر اجرای تضمین نشده توان بازاری بپردازد، مطرح کرد. با ایجاد شواهدی در این زمینه که نتایج فرایند ضد اعتبار بیشتر بر مبنای منافع خاص نسبت به منافع عمومی شکل می گیرد، او کمکی برای اجرای برنامه تحقیق جدید بوده است.
کلمات کلیدی: سیاست مخالفت تشکیل اعتبار | نظریه نظارت گروه های ذینفع | انتخاب عمومی | کمیسیون تجارت فدرال
مقاله ترجمه شده
rss مقالات ترجمه شده rss مقالات انگلیسی rss کتاب های انگلیسی rss مقالات آموزشی
logo-samandehi