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Buyer selection and service pricing in an electric fleet supply chain
انتخاب خریدار و قیمت گذاری خدمات در زنجیره تأمین ناوگان الکتریکی-2021 Much attention has been focused on supplier selection in operations. There has been less research on the
supplier selecting buyers in a two-echelon supplier-buyer chain, which we study for downstream taxicab
vehicle fleets. We consider the problem of pricing infrastructure services by an electric vehicles (EVs) service provider (SP), which determines the group of taxicab companies (TCs) that will adopt EVs. We study
SP’s pricing decisions in a decentralized supply chain under a general infrastructure cost function, multiple TCs, and symmetric information. We extend the modeling to the case with (i) endogenous demand
and EV-taxicab end-consumer pricing and (ii) asymmetric information between SP and TC. We analyze
the factors that influence SP’s profits and the set of participating TCs who adopt EVs. We find that when
the fleet size of TCs increases, SP prefers to serve more low-mile TCs than the high-mile TCs and even
removes some high-mile TCs in exchange for low-mile TCs, where low and high-miles correspond to average miles driven in a time period (shift). When the coefficient of variation of miles driven increases,
SP prefers to serve more high-mile TCs than the low-mile TCs. In general, the set of TCs that adopt EVs
cannot be simply characterized using inputs such as average miles driven by different TCs. This study
provides a modeling framework and managerial implications for TC selection and pricing contracts by an
EV infrastructure service provider. Keywords: Supply chain management | Buyer selection | Electric Vehicles | Service pricing | Submodular infrastructure cost |
مقاله انگلیسی |
2 |
Asymmetric solutions to asymmetric information problems
راه حل های نامتقارن برای مشکلات اطلاعات نامتقارن-2020 This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In
Akerlof’s setting, sellers are better informed than buyers. In contrast, we examine cases where buyers
are better informed than sellers. This creates an inverse adverse selection problem: the market tends
to disappear from the bottom rather than from the top. In contrast to the traditional model, it is the
high-value goods (gems) that are traded on the market, rather than the low-value goods (lemons). We
refer to this asymmetric information scenario as the “market for gems.” We investigate the consequences
of this undisclosed knowledge of hidden qualities — which we refer to as inverse adverse selection —
and the reasons why legal theorists have given this form of asymmetric information substantially less
consideration. Conventional legal and contractual solutions to the lemons problem are often ineffective
in the gems case: the uninformed buyer in a traditional market for lemons experiences the quality of the
good he purchased; in a market for gems, instead, the uninformed seller may never know the quality of
the good that he sold. We study three alternative solutions to the gems problem — auctions, suppression
of information, and inverse warranties — and identify the condition under which each of them is feasible.
We then show how the theory sheds light on real-life gems problems arising in the multi-million dollar
transactions involving soccer players, artworks, M&As, Hollywood movies, and diamonds.
Keywords: Lemons | Gems | Adverse selection | Asymmetric information | Auction | Warranty | Block-booking |
مقاله انگلیسی |
3 |
The nature of the Artificially Intelligent Firm : An economic investigation into changes that AI brings to the firm
ماهیت شرکت هوش مصنوعی : یک تحقیق اقتصادی در مورد تغییراتی که هوش مصنوعی در شرکت ایجاد می کند-2020 With the arrival of Artificial Intelligence (AI), the nature of the firm is changing and economic
theory can provide guidance to businesses as well as to politics when formulating adequate
strategies for this unknown terrain. By interpreting AI as a new type of agent within the firm, the
theory of the firm can serve as a lingua franca to connect computer sciences and social sciences
when dealing with the interdisciplinary phenomenon of AI. To achieve this, this paper adopts the
perspective of the economic theory of the firm to systematically explore the changes that AI
brings to the institution of the firm. In total, five interrelated propositions are discussed that are
rooted in the traditional theory but trace the nature of the Artificially Intelligent Firm: AI intensifies
the effects of economic rationality on the firm (1). AI introduces a new type of information
asymmetry (2). AI can perforate the boundaries of the firm (3). AI can create triangular
agency relationships (4) and AI has the potential to remove traditional limits of integration (5) Keywords: Artificial intelligence | Machine learning | Theory of the firm | Asymmetric information | Principal-agent problem |
مقاله انگلیسی |
4 |
Bank size and market value: The role of direct monitoring and delegation costs
اندازه بانک و ارزش بازار: نقش نظارت مستقیم و هزینه های اعزام نماینده-2018 Recent studies have presented evidence of scale economies for large banks, providing a rationale for some very large banks seen worldwide. In this study, we focus on the negative side of bank size which relates to monitoring costs. In particular, we show that the relationship between size and banks market to book value of assets is contained by the cost of the manager to directly monitor the borrowers and by the (delegation) cost of the owner to monitor the bank manager. Using a sample of US bank holding companies from 2001 to 2015, we provide evidence that the relationship between size and banks market to book value of assets is inverse U-shaped and that monitoring costs offset the benefits from economies of scale.
keywords: Bank size |Market value |Asymmetric information |Monitoring |
مقاله انگلیسی |
5 |
Closed-loop supply chains under reward-penalty mechanism: Retailer collection and asymmetric information
زنجیرهای تامین حلقه بسته تحت مکانیزم پاداش: خرده فروشان و اطلاعات نامتقارن-2017 Being motivated by the issue of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) collection, we consider
a contract design problem for a manufacturer with entrusting the collection of WEEE to a retailer.
However, the manufacturer has asymmetric information on the collection effort level of the retailer. This
paper designs an information screening contract for the manufacturer to obtain the information of
collection effort level, and the optimal decision-making with several properties of contract parameters
are derived. The results indicate that the manufacturer would offer lower wholesale price and higher
buy-back price for the H-type retailer while charge more franchise fee to the H-type retailer. Considering
the government intervention, reward-penalty mechanism (RPM) is developed to stimulate the asym
metric information closed-loop supply chain (CLSC). We also analyze the impacts of RPM by comparing
the cases whether or not RPM is implemented. The comparison results show that the RPM can lower the
wholesale price and retail price meanwhile raise buy-back price and collection quantity. Finally, several
numerical studies are conducted for more managerial insights.
Keywords:Information screening contract|Closed-loop supply chain (CLSC)|Reward-penalty mechanism (RPM)|Waste electrical and electronic equipment| (WEEE) |
مقاله انگلیسی |
6 |
Full adoption of IFRSs in Brazil_ Earnings quality and the cost of equity capital
پذیرش کامل IFRS در برزیل -کیفیت درامد و هزینه سرمایه متعلق به ان -2017 The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of IFRS adoption on the earnings quality
and the cost of equity capital of Brazilian companies. It is assumed that an increase in information
contributes to a reduction in asymmetric information. A conjecture is that more efficient allo
cation of resources will result in a reduction in the cost of capital. The results show that the
hypothesis of an increase in earnings quality after IFRS adoption holds true. The models used to
analyze the equity cost of capital suggest a reduction in the cost of capital of around 7 basis
points.
Keywords: Brazil | International Financial Reporting Standards | Cost of equity capital | Earnings quality | Capital market |
مقاله انگلیسی |
7 |
Relationship banking and bankruptcy resolution in Spain: The impact of size
رابطه بانکداری و حل ورشکستگی در اسپانیا: تاثیر اندازه-2017 Within the framework of asymmetric information, the present work has the aim of analysing the influence
of relationship banking in bankruptcy resolution, with particular reference to firm size. The obtained
results, from a sample of 622 micro- and small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) non-financial and
unlisted firms that filed for bankruptcy in 2010 (resolved by the end of 2014), allow us to conclude that:
(1) SMEs are more likely to survive than micro firms; (2) the number of relationships banking is not
relevant; (3) maintaining relations with one of the big banks, especially the largest bank in a country,
increases the likelihood of reorganization, as opposed to liquidation.
Keywords: Bankruptcy resolution | Banking relationship | Firm size |
مقاله انگلیسی |
8 |
Don’t ask, don’t tell: Sharing revenues with a dishonest retailer
نپرس، نگو: به اشتراک گذاری درآمد با یک فروشنده متقلب-2016 When different supply chain parties have private information, some form of information sharing is required
to improve supply chain performance. However, it might be difficult to ensure truthful information transfer
when firms can benefit from distorting their private information. To investigate the impact of dishonest information transfer, we consider a single-supplier single-retailer supply chain that operates under a contract
with a revenue sharing clause, providing the retailer incentive to underreport sales revenues. In practice, suppliers utilize audits based on statistical tools that, for example, compare the retailers’ sales reports and order
quantities to limit, but not necessarily eliminate, cheating. We investigate the impact of such limited cheating
on the different supply chain constituents. We show that when the retailer can exert sales effort, a supplier
might benefit from the retailer’s dishonesty. Our findings also suggest that if the retailer’s negotiation power
is high or if retailer effort is effective, the supplier should reduce the retailer’s revenue share and absorb some
of the demand risk to increase retailer participation. When facing a less powerful or less capable retailer, the
supplier might be better off extracting profitability upfront through a higher wholesale price.
Keywords: Supply chain management | Information sharing | Asymmetric information | Dishonesty | Revenue-sharing contracts |
مقاله انگلیسی |