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نتیجه جستجو - Asymmetric information

تعداد مقالات یافته شده: 8
ردیف عنوان نوع
1 Buyer selection and service pricing in an electric fleet supply chain
انتخاب خریدار و قیمت گذاری خدمات در زنجیره تأمین ناوگان الکتریکی-2021
Much attention has been focused on supplier selection in operations. There has been less research on the supplier selecting buyers in a two-echelon supplier-buyer chain, which we study for downstream taxicab vehicle fleets. We consider the problem of pricing infrastructure services by an electric vehicles (EVs) service provider (SP), which determines the group of taxicab companies (TCs) that will adopt EVs. We study SP’s pricing decisions in a decentralized supply chain under a general infrastructure cost function, multiple TCs, and symmetric information. We extend the modeling to the case with (i) endogenous demand and EV-taxicab end-consumer pricing and (ii) asymmetric information between SP and TC. We analyze the factors that influence SP’s profits and the set of participating TCs who adopt EVs. We find that when the fleet size of TCs increases, SP prefers to serve more low-mile TCs than the high-mile TCs and even removes some high-mile TCs in exchange for low-mile TCs, where low and high-miles correspond to average miles driven in a time period (shift). When the coefficient of variation of miles driven increases, SP prefers to serve more high-mile TCs than the low-mile TCs. In general, the set of TCs that adopt EVs cannot be simply characterized using inputs such as average miles driven by different TCs. This study provides a modeling framework and managerial implications for TC selection and pricing contracts by an EV infrastructure service provider.
Keywords: Supply chain management | Buyer selection | Electric Vehicles | Service pricing | Submodular infrastructure cost
مقاله انگلیسی
2 Asymmetric solutions to asymmetric information problems
راه حل های نامتقارن برای مشکلات اطلاعات نامتقارن-2020
This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In Akerlof’s setting, sellers are better informed than buyers. In contrast, we examine cases where buyers are better informed than sellers. This creates an inverse adverse selection problem: the market tends to disappear from the bottom rather than from the top. In contrast to the traditional model, it is the high-value goods (gems) that are traded on the market, rather than the low-value goods (lemons). We refer to this asymmetric information scenario as the “market for gems.” We investigate the consequences of this undisclosed knowledge of hidden qualities — which we refer to as inverse adverse selection — and the reasons why legal theorists have given this form of asymmetric information substantially less consideration. Conventional legal and contractual solutions to the lemons problem are often ineffective in the gems case: the uninformed buyer in a traditional market for lemons experiences the quality of the good he purchased; in a market for gems, instead, the uninformed seller may never know the quality of the good that he sold. We study three alternative solutions to the gems problem — auctions, suppression of information, and inverse warranties — and identify the condition under which each of them is feasible. We then show how the theory sheds light on real-life gems problems arising in the multi-million dollar transactions involving soccer players, artworks, M&As, Hollywood movies, and diamonds.
Keywords: Lemons | Gems | Adverse selection | Asymmetric information | Auction | Warranty | Block-booking
مقاله انگلیسی
3 The nature of the Artificially Intelligent Firm : An economic investigation into changes that AI brings to the firm
ماهیت شرکت هوش مصنوعی : یک تحقیق اقتصادی در مورد تغییراتی که هوش مصنوعی در شرکت ایجاد می کند-2020
With the arrival of Artificial Intelligence (AI), the nature of the firm is changing and economic theory can provide guidance to businesses as well as to politics when formulating adequate strategies for this unknown terrain. By interpreting AI as a new type of agent within the firm, the theory of the firm can serve as a lingua franca to connect computer sciences and social sciences when dealing with the interdisciplinary phenomenon of AI. To achieve this, this paper adopts the perspective of the economic theory of the firm to systematically explore the changes that AI brings to the institution of the firm. In total, five interrelated propositions are discussed that are rooted in the traditional theory but trace the nature of the Artificially Intelligent Firm: AI intensifies the effects of economic rationality on the firm (1). AI introduces a new type of information asymmetry (2). AI can perforate the boundaries of the firm (3). AI can create triangular agency relationships (4) and AI has the potential to remove traditional limits of integration (5)
Keywords: Artificial intelligence | Machine learning | Theory of the firm | Asymmetric information | Principal-agent problem
مقاله انگلیسی
4 Bank size and market value: The role of direct monitoring and delegation costs
اندازه بانک و ارزش بازار: نقش نظارت مستقیم و هزینه های اعزام نماینده-2018
Recent studies have presented evidence of scale economies for large banks, providing a rationale for some very large banks seen worldwide. In this study, we focus on the negative side of bank size which relates to monitoring costs. In particular, we show that the relationship between size and banks market to book value of assets is contained by the cost of the manager to directly monitor the borrowers and by the (delegation) cost of the owner to monitor the bank manager. Using a sample of US bank holding companies from 2001 to 2015, we provide evidence that the relationship between size and banks market to book value of assets is inverse U-shaped and that monitoring costs offset the benefits from economies of scale.
keywords: Bank size |Market value |Asymmetric information |Monitoring
مقاله انگلیسی
5 Closed-loop supply chains under reward-penalty mechanism: Retailer collection and asymmetric information
زنجیرهای تامین حلقه بسته تحت مکانیزم پاداش: خرده فروشان و اطلاعات نامتقارن-2017
Being motivated by the issue of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) collection, we consider a contract design problem for a manufacturer with entrusting the collection of WEEE to a retailer. However, the manufacturer has asymmetric information on the collection effort level of the retailer. This paper designs an information screening contract for the manufacturer to obtain the information of collection effort level, and the optimal decision-making with several properties of contract parameters are derived. The results indicate that the manufacturer would offer lower wholesale price and higher buy-back price for the H-type retailer while charge more franchise fee to the H-type retailer. Considering the government intervention, reward-penalty mechanism (RPM) is developed to stimulate the asym metric information closed-loop supply chain (CLSC). We also analyze the impacts of RPM by comparing the cases whether or not RPM is implemented. The comparison results show that the RPM can lower the wholesale price and retail price meanwhile raise buy-back price and collection quantity. Finally, several numerical studies are conducted for more managerial insights.
Keywords:Information screening contract|Closed-loop supply chain (CLSC)|Reward-penalty mechanism (RPM)|Waste electrical and electronic equipment| (WEEE)
مقاله انگلیسی
6 Full adoption of IFRSs in Brazil_ Earnings quality and the cost of equity capital
پذیرش کامل IFRS در برزیل -کیفیت درامد و هزینه سرمایه متعلق به ان -2017
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of IFRS adoption on the earnings quality and the cost of equity capital of Brazilian companies. It is assumed that an increase in information contributes to a reduction in asymmetric information. A conjecture is that more efficient allo cation of resources will result in a reduction in the cost of capital. The results show that the hypothesis of an increase in earnings quality after IFRS adoption holds true. The models used to analyze the equity cost of capital suggest a reduction in the cost of capital of around 7 basis points.
Keywords: Brazil | International Financial Reporting Standards | Cost of equity capital | Earnings quality | Capital market
مقاله انگلیسی
7 Relationship banking and bankruptcy resolution in Spain: The impact of size
رابطه بانکداری و حل ورشکستگی در اسپانیا: تاثیر اندازه-2017
Within the framework of asymmetric information, the present work has the aim of analysing the influence of relationship banking in bankruptcy resolution, with particular reference to firm size. The obtained results, from a sample of 622 micro- and small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) non-financial and unlisted firms that filed for bankruptcy in 2010 (resolved by the end of 2014), allow us to conclude that: (1) SMEs are more likely to survive than micro firms; (2) the number of relationships banking is not relevant; (3) maintaining relations with one of the big banks, especially the largest bank in a country, increases the likelihood of reorganization, as opposed to liquidation.
Keywords: Bankruptcy resolution | Banking relationship | Firm size
مقاله انگلیسی
8 Don’t ask, don’t tell: Sharing revenues with a dishonest retailer
نپرس، نگو: به اشتراک گذاری درآمد با یک فروشنده متقلب-2016
When different supply chain parties have private information, some form of information sharing is required to improve supply chain performance. However, it might be difficult to ensure truthful information transfer when firms can benefit from distorting their private information. To investigate the impact of dishonest information transfer, we consider a single-supplier single-retailer supply chain that operates under a contract with a revenue sharing clause, providing the retailer incentive to underreport sales revenues. In practice, suppliers utilize audits based on statistical tools that, for example, compare the retailers’ sales reports and order quantities to limit, but not necessarily eliminate, cheating. We investigate the impact of such limited cheating on the different supply chain constituents. We show that when the retailer can exert sales effort, a supplier might benefit from the retailer’s dishonesty. Our findings also suggest that if the retailer’s negotiation power is high or if retailer effort is effective, the supplier should reduce the retailer’s revenue share and absorb some of the demand risk to increase retailer participation. When facing a less powerful or less capable retailer, the supplier might be better off extracting profitability upfront through a higher wholesale price.
Keywords: Supply chain management | Information sharing | Asymmetric information | Dishonesty | Revenue-sharing contracts
مقاله انگلیسی
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