با سلام خدمت کاربران در صورتی که با خطای سیستم پرداخت بانکی مواجه شدید از طریق کارت به کارت (6037997535328901 بانک ملی ناصر خنجری ) مقاله خود را دریافت کنید (تا مشکل رفع گردد).
ردیف | عنوان | نوع |
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61 |
Peer performance and earnings management
عملکرد همتا و مدیریت درآمدها-2018 This paper studies how peer performance affects firms’ earnings management decisions. Using peer firms’ idiosyncratic returns as an exogenous peer performance measure and the instrumental variable approach, we find that higher peer performance leads to higher discretionary accruals. This effect is salient for both industry leaders and followers and is robust to alternative discretionary accrual measures and alternative peer definitions. We examine two mechanisms through which peer performance affects firms’ earnings management. We find that analysts revise their earnings forecasts according to peer performance and that when peer performance is higher, firms are less likely to meet or beat analyst consensus without managing earnings. This evidence suggests a capital market pressure mechanism. In addition, the effect of peer performance is more pronounced in firms using relative performance evaluation, suggesting a compensation pressure mechanism. In sum, our evidence suggests that managers report opportunistically to match peer performance.
keywords: Peer performance |Earnings management |Capital market pressure |Relative performance evaluation |
مقاله انگلیسی |
62 |
Bank monitoring and CEO risk-taking incentives
نظارت بانکی و انگیزه های خطرپذیری CEO-2018 This paper investigates whether monitoring by bank lenders affects CEO incentives of borrowing firms. We find that an increase in bank monitoring incentives significantly reduce the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock return volatility (Vega). The results are more profound when bank lenders are more powerful and reputable and have a prior lending relationship with the borrowing firms. Additionally, Vega decreases after financial covenant violations and increases when bank lenders have offsetting equity stakes in borrowing firms. The reduction in Vega due to bank monitoring has some real effects on borrowing firms’ corporate policies. These results together suggest banks have a unique role in monitoring and shaping CEO incentives to mitigate the risk-shifting incentives of firm managers.
keywords: Banks |Syndicated loans |Monitoring |CEO compensation |Corporate governance |Loan covenants |Agency cost of debt |
مقاله انگلیسی |
63 |
Do players perform for pay? An empirical examination via NFL players’ compensation contracts
آیا بازیکنان پرداخت انجام می دهند؟ یک بررسی تجربی ازطریق قراردادهای غرامت بازیکنان NFL-2018 How to properly compensate and incentivize players is an important question in the realm of professional sports, and more broadly, is a central question in contract design. With the increasing use of performance-based compensation packages and tax law favoring such compensation design, a natural question arises as to whether workers do indeed perform for pay. We examine this question in a setting that is not fraught with the typical measurement and identification problems found in many pay-performance settings. Specifically, we examine changes in a NFL players Win Probability Added (WPA) and Expected Points Added (EPA) in response to his compensation-contract design. Overall, our paper provides evidence that players do indeed perform for (properly designed) pay, and has important implications for future work on compensation and incentive-based contract design.
keywords: Pay-performance sensitivity |Incentive-based compensation |NFL / sports compensation |Win Probability Added (WPA) |Expected Points Added (EPA) |Sports analytics |
مقاله انگلیسی |
64 |
The unintended consequences of divestment
پیامدهای ناخواسته بی بهره سازی-2018 A divestment campaign aims to depress share prices to induce managers to change firm behavior. Assuming that managers make profit-maximizing decisions in the absence of a campaign, firms that accede to divestors’ demands raise short-run share prices but depress long-run profits. Managers who are more interested in short-run prices are therefore more motivated by divestment than managers who care about long-run profits. We show that, as most managerial compensation contracts reward long-run profitability and stock returns, divestment can be ineffective at best, and perhaps counterproductive, rewarding managers who attract divestment campaigns. In a quantification exercise, we show that the wealth of most executives running likely divestment targets in 2015 would be unaffected by even large movements in share prices. Of those affected, a substantial majority would benefit from divestment.
keywords: Divestment |Exclusionary investment |Socially responsible investment |Executive compensation |
مقاله انگلیسی |
65 |
CEO attributes, compensation, and firm value: Evidence from a structural estimation
ویژگی های CEO، غرامت و ارزش شرکت: شواهدی از یک تخمین ساختاری-2018 I present and estimate a dynamic model of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and effort provision. I find that variation in CEO attributes explains the majority of variation in compensation (equity and total) but little of the variation in firm value. The primary drivers of cross-sectional compensation are risk aversion and influence on the board. Additionally, I estimate the magnitude of CEO agency issues. Removing CEO influence increases shareholder value in the typical firm by 1.74%, making CEOs risk neutral increases shareholder value by 16.12%, and removing all agency frictions increases shareholder value by 28.99%.
keywords: CEO compensation |Dynamic principal-agent model |Structural estimation |
مقاله انگلیسی |
66 |
Optimal pay regulation for too-big-to-fail banks
مقررات پرداخت بهینه برای بانک های نزدیک به شکست بزرگ-2018 This paper considers optimal executive pay regulations for banks that are too-big-to-fail. Theoretically, we
map the consequences of a series of commonly-used pay schemes, describing their relative optimality and
ultimate societal consequences. We argue that in a world of too-big-to-fail policy, simple equity-linked
remuneration schemes maximise shareholder value by incentivising executives to choose excessively risky
projects at the expense of the taxpayer. We find that paying the executive partly in debt fails to mitigate
the project choice distortion when debt markets are informed. By contrast, both clawback rules and link
ing pay to interest rates can incentivise the executive to make socially optimal risk choices, but only
if they are accompanied by appropriate restrictions on the curvature of pay with respect to the bank’s
market value. Pay curvature can be generated by tools such as equity options and promotion policy. The
policy implication is that unless regulators can enforce restrictions on pay curvature, bank shareholders
can undermine the effectiveness of these pay regulations.
Keywords: Clawback ، Executive compensation ، Bankers’ bonuses ، Too-big-to-fail ، Risk taking ، Financial regulation |
مقاله انگلیسی |
67 |
Supply chain coordination with information sharing: The informational advantage of GPOs
هماهنگی زنجیره تامین با به اشتراک گذاری اطلاعات: مزیت اطلاعاتی GPO ها-2017 This paper explores the potential of group purchasing organizations (GPOs) in facilitating information
sharing and coordinating horizontal competition. We consider a supply chain composed of one GPO and
two manufacturers competing in quantity. The GPO sources and prices a common component for the
manufacturers. Each manufacturer has some private information about the uncertain demand, and can
choose a part to share with the GPO. Through benchmark analysis, we identify the manufacturers’ hori
zontal competition and information incompletion as two determinants of supply chain inefficiency under
individual purchasing. Then, we investigate the impacts of the GPO on the supply chain with whole
sale price contracts and show that double marginalization induced by the GPO is another determinant
of inefficiency. For this, both manufacturers have no incentive to share information and group purchas
ing damages the supply chain. We also show that under group purchasing, information sharing partially
from the lower-precision manufacturer rather than both can benefit the supply chain. Next, we present a
forecast-sharing-based compensation contracting scheme, under which, the GPO can make perfect supply
chain coordination in both quantities and information sharing, and all members in the supply chain can
reach win–win results. Finally, we illustrate the GPO’s informational advantage by numerical examples.
Keywords: Supply chain management | Purchasing | Information sharing | Coordination |Quantity competition |
مقاله انگلیسی |
68 |
Does social network site use buffer against well-being loss when older adults face reduced functional ability?
Does social network site use buffer against well-being loss when older adults face reduced functional ability?-2017 We examine the role of the Internet in dealing with problems in later life by analyzing whether direct
and buffering models of social support can be applied to social network site (SNS) use. Whereas the
direct model implies a positive effect of time spent using SNSs on subjective well-being, and a negative
effect on social loneliness, the buffering model suggests that SNS use should reduce the (negative)
consequences of stressors. Using a large, longitudinal survey from the Netherlands, we find evidence for
the buffering model but not for the direct-effects model. Functional disability had a negative impact on
(changes in) well-being and this effect was smaller when older individuals used SNSs more. Furthermore,
we found a similar buffering effect of making online purchases, which we interpret as support for the
idea that replacing offline with online activities may be a compensation strategy. This implies that
Internet use may play a role in coping with health-related problems connected to later stages of the life
course.
Keywords: Internet use | Aging | Health | Subjective well-being | Loneliness |
مقاله انگلیسی |
69 |
Multi-style learning with denoising autoencoders for acoustic modeling in the internet of things (IoT)
یادگیری چند منظوره با استفاده از دستگاه های خودکار رمزکننده برای مدل سازی صوتی در اینترنت اشیاء-2017 We propose a multi-style learning (multi-style trainingCdeep learning) procedure that relies on deep denoising autoencoders
(DAEs) to extract and organize the most discriminative information in a training database. Traditionally, multi-style training pro
cedures require either collecting or artificially creating data samples (e.g., by noise injection or data combination) and training a
deep neural network (DNN) with all of these different conditions. To expand the applicability of deep learning, the present study
instead adopts a DAE to augment the original training set. First, a DAE is utilized to synthesize data that captures useful structure
in the input distribution. Next, this synthetic data is combined and mixed within the original training set to exploit the powerful
capabilities of DNN classifiers to learn the complex decision boundaries in heterogeneous conditions. By assigning a DAE to syn
thesize additional examples of representative variations, multi-style learning makes class boundaries less sensitive to corruptions
by enforcing back-end DNNs to emphasize on the most discriminative patterns. Moreover, this deep learning technique mitigates
the cost and time of data collection and is easy to incorporate into the internet of things (IoT). Results showed these data-mixed
DNNs provided consistent performance improvements without even requiring any preprocessing on the test sets.
Keywords: Deep learning | Deep neural networks | Multi-style training | Deep denoising autoencoders | Mixed training | Representation learning | Data combination | Data synthesis | Noise injection theory | Feature compensation | Automatic speech recognition | Internet of things (IoT) |
مقاله انگلیسی |
70 |
سیستم های تشویقی برای تصمیمات سرمایه گذاری مخاطره آمیز تحت نظر تنظیمات ناشناخته
سال انتشار: 2017 - تعداد صفحات فایل pdf انگلیسی: 8 - تعداد صفحات فایل doc فارسی: 28 این مقاله به بررسی چگونگی طراحی سیستم هایی برای ایجاد انگیزه در مدیران برای تصمیم گیری سرمایه گذاری خطرناک چندین ساله می پردازد. ما نشان می دهیم که جبران کارکرد و کارایی عملکردی باید طراحی گردد تا مدیران در مجموعه پروژه ها برای به حداکثر رساندن ارزش مورد انتظار را اجرا اطمینان حاصل کنند. طرح ۱ (RBCA) و گسترش آن در مقالات مربوط به تنظیمات زمانی ناشناخته، به طور کلی در زمان های ناشناخته و ریسک پذیری به کار خود ادامه نمی دهند. ما نشان می دهیم که در مواجهه با چنین تنظیم های نامعلومی در یک محیط خطرناک، یک قانون تخصیص وابسته به حالت خاص مورد نیاز است. ما چنین طرح تخصیصی را معرفی می کنیم، که از ان به عنوان طرح RBCA مشروح دولت یاد می کنیم و نشان می دهیم؛ که دانش خاصی از زمان و ساختار ریسک جریان های نقدی برای اعمال آن لازم است.
کلمات کلیدی: حسابداری تعهدی | سازگاری | تخصیص هزینه | سیستم تشویقی | اندازه گیری عملکرد | RBCA |
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