رابطه بین قدرت مدیریتی و حقوق مدیرعامل
سال انتشار: 2020 - تعداد صفحات فایل pdf انگلیسی: 22 - تعداد صفحات فایل doc فارسی: 38
ما بررسی می کنیم که هیئت مدیره های دوستانه (موافق، صمیمی، همگام) چطور ساختار قراردادهای بهینه پاداش را به نفع مدیرعامل های قدرتمند تنظیم می کنند. مطالعه ما نتایج غیرمنتظره ای به همراه دارد. اولاً، مدیران قدرتمند حقوق بالاتری دریافت می کنند و قراردادی با حساسیت بالاتر پرداخت بر اساس عملکرد (PPS) دارند اگر عملکرد شرکت پایین باشد، و بالعکس. بعلاوه، ما شرایطی را مشخص می کنیم که حقوق یا پرداختی مورد انتظار و PPS مورد انتظار هر دو در صورت وجود هیئت مدیره دوستانه، افزایش می یابند. دوماً، ما نشان می دهیم که هیئت مدیره های دوستانه، حقوق بالاتر، سهام بیشتر، اما گزینه های مالی کمتری در اختیار مدیرعامل ها قرار می دهند. سوماً، هیئت مدیره های دوستانه ای که قراردادهایی با PPS بالاتر تنظیم می کنند استفاده بیشتری از ارزیابی عملکرد نسبی (RPE) دارند. در کل، نتایج ما نشان می دهند که شاخص های بیشتر مورد استفاده در روشهای ضعیف (یا درست) تعیین پاداش، باید با دقت زیادی تفسیر شوند. ما با تعمیم مدل اولیه مان به دو مدل توسعه یافته، نشان می دهیم که مدیران قدرتمند، سرمایه گذاری نقدی کمی دارند اما مشوق کمی نیز برای مدیریت درآمدها دارند.
واژگان کلیدی: پاداش مدیرعامل | قرارداد بهینه | نظریه قدرت مدیریتی | حکمرانی شرکتی
|مقاله ترجمه شده|
Improving high-tech enterprise innovation in big data environment: A combinative view of internal and external governance
بهبود نوآوری شرکتهای پیشرفته در محیط داده های بزرگ: نمای ترکیبی از حاکمیت داخلی و خارجی-2020
The emergence of big data brings both opportunities and challenges to high-tech enterprises. How to keep competitive advantages and improve innovation performance is important for enterprises in big data environment. Except from organizational learning ability and the use of advanced technology, the corporate governance also plays an important role in the process of enterprise’s innovation practice. This article creatively combines with the insights of internal and external governance, and explores how the managerial power and network centrality affects enterprise’s innovation performance in big data environment. Considering about the differences among distinct regional big data environment (strong/weak), this paper also takes classification research on it. The research findings show that managerial power has a significant positive impact on innovation performance, managerial power could enhance enterprise’s centrality in network, and the enterprise which located in network central position has more advantages in obtaining resources and significantly improves firm’s innovation performance. Network centrality plays a mediating role on managerial power and innovation performance. Further research finds that the positive effects of managerial power and network centrality are more significantly in the strong big data environment. These findings enrich the research of high-tech enterprise innovation from a combinative governance view, and contribute to the literatures on enterprise innovation in big data environment
Keywords: Big data environment | High-tech enterprises | Innovation performance | Managerial power | Network centrality
A non-parametric index of corporate governance in the banking industry: An application to Indian data
فهرست غیر پارامتری حاکمیت شرکتها در صنعت بانکداری: برنامه ای برای داده های هندی-2019
This paper presents a methodological framework for constructing a non-parametric index of corporate gov- ernance for banks. The index is constructed by aggregating six distinct dimensional indices capturing different dimensions of corporate governance, namely board effectiveness, audit function, risk management, remunera- tion, shareholder rights and information, and disclosure and transparency. For aggregation, a tailored version of data envelopment analysis (DEA) approach which is popularly known as constrained ‘Benefit-of-the-Doubt (BoD)’ model is employed. This approach is unique and distinctive in the sense that it requires no a priori knowledge of weights, and assigns endogenous weights obtained from actual data to individual dimensions of bank governance in order to construct a composite index of corporate governance. This methodological fra- mework has illustrated by applying it for a data set of 40 Indian banks operating in the year 2017. The data set has been compiled using 58 governance regulations as defined by relevant jurisdictions.
Keywords: Corporate governance index | Data envelopment analysis | Benefit-of-the-doubt model | Indian banks | Composite indicators
Auditor choice and bank risk taking
انتخاب حسابرس و ریسک بانکی-2019
We investigate the importance of auditor choice on bank risk-taking in a cross-country setting for 5498 banks from 116 emerging and developed countries. Using the Z-score as our main proxy for bank risk, we report evidence that hiring a Big Four auditing firm reduces bank-risk even after controlling for bank and country variables. The reported evidence is valid for banks outside the United States and is robust to concerns relating to endogeneity and alternative banking risk measures. The results are economically meaningful. All else constant, the Z-score of a bank audited by a Big Four firm is 10.4% higher than a similar bank with a non-BIG Four auditor. Moreover, consistent with the view that Big Four auditors serve a corporate governance mechanism in emerging markets, we find that Big Four auditors maintain the ability to curb bank risk in countries characterized by weak institutions. Finally, our results suggest that while audit quality is associated with bank safety, its impact is reduced in countries that require audit-oversigh
Keywords: Banking | Audit quality | Corporate governance | Risk taking
Nassim Taleb heads international banking’s first Grey/Black Swan Committee
ناسیم طالب رئیس اولین کمیته خاکستری و سیاه بانکی بین المللی است-2019
tThis Article queries what if a Systemically Important Financial Institution (SIFI) placed Professor NassimTaleb on its Board and empowered him to set up its long-term risk committee so its corporate gover-nance would then be more concerned with avoiding disaster than with short-term profits, especiallyif of a speculative nature whose true risk was underestimated due to a faulty reality paradigm (Gaus-sian). More pertinent than asking if the bank is making a profit, the long-term risk committee shouldbe asking how antifragile the bank is if a certain event occurs. In enabling banking corporate gover-nance to better spot Grey/Black Swans, this Article asks why bank directors took such a false comfortfrom their regulatory capital ratios. In other words, regulatory compliance too often acts as a substituteto effective risk-management. Rather than taking the position of effectuating evermore compliance inlieu of effective long-term large bank risk management, corporate governance for banks should entailavoiding Grey/Black Swans by incessantly assessing the Pareto assumptive givens of the banking world.And banking corporate governance should also include learning when to utilize a bit of lateral thinking,imagination and prudent risk-taking instead of leaning so heavily on models, particularly Gaussian-basedmodels.
Keywords:Nassim Taleb | Black swans | Dragon Kings | Gaussian |Pareto| Bayes theorem | Risk management | International banking | Corporate governance | Complexity theory | Emergent phenomena
Shareholder protection and bank executive compensation after the global financial crisis
حمایت سهامداران و غرامت اجرایی بانک پس از بحران مالی جهانی-2019
tWe use a hand-collected international database to analyze the change in the risk-taking incentivesembedded in bank executive compensation after the onset of the global financial crisis. Our results reveala reduction in both the risk sensitivity of stock option grants (vega) and total and cash pay-risk sensi-tivities in countries suffering systemic banking crises. This reduction is greater in countries with strongshareholder protection, especially in banks with good corporate governance, solvent banks, and banksthat suffered a reduction in their specific investment opportunity set. The regressions control for govern-ment intervention, banking development, and crisis intensity. Our results confirm that the contractinghypothesis is more relevant in countries with stronger shareholder protection, and provide support formeasures improving shareholder rights in the approval of bank executive compensation.
Keywords:Executive compensation | Banking crises | Bank risk | Bank performance | Shareholder protection
Transparency and bank risk-taking in GCC Islamic banking
شفافیت و ریسک پذیری بانکی در GCC بانکداری اسلامی-2019
This study examines the impact of corporate transparency on bank risk for a sample of 29 Islamic banks operating in five Gulf Cooperation Council countries over the period 2013e2016. We construct a transparency index based on several international regulatory documents and we measure the index using content analysis on the banks annual reports. The results reveal wide variation in terms of disclosure among Islamic banks. Only two countries, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, have a higher level of transparency. We also find a lack of transparency related to corporate governance, Sharia governance and management risk dimensions. Our regression findings using the random-effect GLS technique show that an increase in the transparency of Islamic banks has a significant impact on banks’ stability. Finally, we identify several internal and external variables that impact bank risk, namely size, efficiency, level of deposit, growth of assets, GDP growth, depth of credit information risk and concentration.
Keywords: Corporate transparency | Bank risk | Disclosure | Islamic banks | GCC countries
The consequences of managerial indiscretions: Sex, lies, and firm value
پیامدهای بی احتیاطی های مدیریتی: جنسیت، دروغ ها و ارزش شرکت-2018
Personal managerial indiscretions are separate from a firms business activities but provide information about the managers integrity. Consequently, they could affect counterparties’ trust in the firm and the firms value and operations. We find that companies of accused executives experience significant wealth deterioration, reduced operating margins, and lost business partners. Indiscretions are also associated with an increased probability of unrelated shareholder-initiated lawsuits, Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission investigations, and managed earnings. Further, chief executive officers and boards face labor market consequences, including forced turnover, pay cuts, and lower shareholder votes at re-election. Indiscretions occur more often at poorly governed firms where disciplinary turnover is less likely.
keywords: Managerial indiscretions |Management quality |Integrity |Class action lawsuits |Fraud |Earnings management |Corporate governance |Managerial labor markets |Director elections |CEO turnover |Poor monitoring index
Capital gains lock-in and governance choices
درونی بودن بهره های سرمایه ای و انتخاب های نظارتی-2018
Differences in accrued gains and investors’ tax-sensitivity induce variation in a capital gains lock-in effect across mutual funds even for the same stock at the same time. Exploiting this variation, we show this effect influences funds’ governance decisions: higher capital gains decrease the likelihood a fund exits prior to contentious votes and increase the likelihood a fund votes against management. Consistent with tax motivation, these findings are concentrated among funds with tax-sensitive investors. Further, high aggregate capital gains across funds holding a stock predict a higher likelihood management loses a vote and a lower likelihood a contentious vote is proposed.
keywords: Mutual fund |Proxy voting |Corporate governance |Capital-gains tax |Lock-in effect
Pay me now (and later): Pension benefit manipulation before plan freezes and executive retirement
همین الان به من پرداخت کن (و بعدا"): اجرای سود بازنشستگی قبل از سرد شدن برنامه و بازنشستگی اجرایی-2018
Large US firms modify top executives’ compensation before pension-related events. Top executives receive one-time increases in pensionable earnings through higher annual bonuses one year before a plan freeze and one year before retirement. Firms also boost pension payouts by lowering plan discount rates when top executives are eligible to retire with lump-sum benefit distributions. Increases in executive pensions do not appear to be an attempt to improve managerial effort or retention and are more likely to occur at firms with poor corporate governance. These findings suggest that in some circumstances managers are able to extract rents through their pension plans.
keywords: Corporate governance |Executive annual bonuses |Defined benefit pension plans |Pension freezes |Executive retirement