با سلام خدمت کاربران در صورتی که با خطای سیستم پرداخت بانکی مواجه شدید از طریق کارت به کارت (6037997535328901 بانک ملی ناصر خنجری ) مقاله خود را دریافت کنید (تا مشکل رفع گردد).
ردیف | عنوان | نوع |
---|---|---|
1 |
What makes the bonding stick? A natural experiment testing the legal bonding hypothesis
چه چیزی پیوند را محکم می کند؟ یک بررسی تجربی طبیعی روی فرضیه های قانونی پیوندسازی-2018 We use a US Supreme Court case, Morrison v. National Australia Bank (2010), as a natural experiment to test the legal bonding hypothesis. By decreasing the potential liability of US-listed foreign firms, particularly due to class action lawsuits, Morrison arguably eroded their legal bonding to compliance with disclosure duties. Nevertheless, we find evidence of an increase or insignificant change in share values. Tests of longer-run effects of the legal event indicate that foreign firms’ disclosure quality and likelihood of facing enforcement actions remained stable, as did investors’ revealed preferences for trading on US markets. These results go against the legal bonding hypothesis but are consistent with reputational bonding and with market-based accounts of US cross-listing. Our results may contribute to ongoing debate about civil enforcement of securities laws through class actions.
keywords: Bonding |Class actions |Cross-listing |Corporate governance |Civil liability |Reputation |
مقاله انگلیسی |
2 |
Does bonding really bond? Liability of foreignness and cross-listing of Chinese firms on international stock exchanges
آیا رهن واقعا ضمانت دارد؟ مسئولیت خارجی و لیستی از شرکت های چینی در بورس اوراق بهادار بین المللی-2017 This study examines the relationship between cross-listing and firm valuation in the context of
Chinese firms cross-listed on major international exchanges, such as the NASDAQ, New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE), Hong Kong Main Board, Hong Kong Growth Enterprise Market (GEM),
Singapore Stock Exchange, and London Alternative Investment Market (LAIM). Through the
lenses of bonding theory and liability of foreignness-based multinational enterprise theories, two
sets of alternative hypotheses are developed and tested using panel data over a period of twelve
years during 2001–2012. Contrary to the bonding theory, the results reveal that the firms listed in
Mainland China recorded better valuation than the firms cross-listed on the international stock
exchanges. The more sophisticated corporate governance mechanisms applied in international
stock exchanges do not always entail better firm valuation. Institutional distance, cultural
distance and the distance in economic freedom between China and the cross-listing location
countries interact with governance variables negatively affecting performance of cross-listed
firms. The direct negative impact of the three distance variables on the firm valuation is also
statistically significant. The outcome of Chinese firms’ cross-listing behaviours appears to
contradict the general bonding theory.
Keywords: Corporate governance | Chinese cross-listing | Bonding hypothesis | Liability of foreignness | Institutional distance | Economic freedom | Cultural distance |
مقاله انگلیسی |
3 |
Accounting fraud, auditing, and the role of government sanctions in China
تقلب حسابداری، حسابرسی، و نقش تحریم دولت در چین-2015 We use the unique economic, legal, and political landscape of China to examine the impact of auditors on the incidence of accounting fraud. In particular, we examine whether large auditfirms reduce the incidence offinancial
statement fraud in China, an emerging market in which auditors face strong government sanctions but low litigation risk associated with audit failures. Wefind that companies audited by large auditfirms are less likely to
commitfinancial statement fraud. This effect is stronger for regulated industries and for revenue-related frauds.
Our results are robust to considering the severity of fraud, excludingfirms cross-listing in other jurisdictions,
using alternative measures of fraud, accounting for the self-selection of auditors, and controlling for other corporate governance mechanisms. Our results highlight the role of government sanctions in assuring audit quality and
have important practical implications to help international auditfirms–and businesses more generally–successfully compete in China.
Keywords:
Auditor size
Financial statement fraud
Government sanction
Corporate governance |
مقاله انگلیسی |