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ردیف | عنوان | نوع |
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1 |
Supply chain coordination with customer returns and retailers store brand product
هماهنگی زنجیره تامین با بازگشت های مشتری و حفظ نشان تجاری محصول توسط خرده فروش-2018 We examine a retailers Stackelberg supply chain, in which the retailer sells a product in the two brands: its own store brand (SB) and a national brand (NB) supplied by a well-established manufacturer. The two brands both face customer returns, and they differ in product quality. We examine the retailers decision on returns policies for the two brands (either Money Back Guarantee (MBG) or No Refund) and the effects of returns policies on the competition between the two brands. We identify the condition when the retailer should offer MBGs for both brands and we show that MBGs mitigate price competition between the two brands. MBGs are found to enhance the retailers profit and reduce the NB manufacturers profit. We examine coordination mechanisms and find that a centralized supply chain intensifies the competition and pushes the NB to reduce its retail price. A simple coordination contract that can achieve supply chain coordination to ensure a win-win for both the retailer and the NB manufacturer is proposed.
keywords: Supply chain management |Customer returns policy |Store brand |
مقاله انگلیسی |
2 |
The impact of customer returns in a supply chain with a common retailer
تأثیر بازده مشتری در یک زنجیره تامین با خرده فروش معمولی-2017 Efficient distribution of the product in a supply chain is a critical issue in supply chain management. In
the paper, we study a manufacturer Stackelberg supply chain in which a retailer can sell either or both of
two brands, a well-known brand and a new brand, in a market supplied by two manufacturers. The two
brands are differentiated by customer satisfaction rate. The supply chain involves both vertical competi
tion between the retailer and manufacturers, and horizontal competition between the two manufacturers.
We identify the conditions under which the retailer should choose one or both of the two manufacturers,
and we show that in certain circumstances, the retailer will prefer to work with both manufacturers, even
though one brand of product may have no sales. We find that whether a money-back guarantee (MBG)
returns policy should be offered for the supply chain depends only on whether or not the retailer can re
cover the value of the returned product efficiently, even when the retailer incurs a net cost by accepting
returns. We also show that an MBG enhances the profit of the manufacturer with low satisfaction rate,
resulting in an increase in both the wholesale price and demand, but it has an opposite impact on the
manufacturer with high satisfaction rate. In addition, an MBG enhances the retailer’s profit and expands
the overall market. Numerical examples are included to illustrate the major results.
Keywords: Customer returns policy | Game theory | Pricing | Money-back guarantee | Supply chain management |
مقاله انگلیسی |
3 |
The impact of customer returns in a supply chain with a common retailer
تأثیر بازده مشتری در یک زنجیره تامین با خرده فروش معمولی-2017 Efficient distribution of the product in a supply chain is a critical issue in supply chain management. In
the paper, we study a manufacturer Stackelberg supply chain in which a retailer can sell either or both of
two brands, a well-known brand and a new brand, in a market supplied by two manufacturers. The two
brands are differentiated by customer satisfaction rate. The supply chain involves both vertical competi
tion between the retailer and manufacturers, and horizontal competition between the two manufacturers.
We identify the conditions under which the retailer should choose one or both of the two manufacturers,
and we show that in certain circumstances, the retailer will prefer to work with both manufacturers, even
though one brand of product may have no sales. We find that whether a money-back guarantee (MBG)
returns policy should be offered for the supply chain depends only on whether or not the retailer can re
cover the value of the returned product efficiently, even when the retailer incurs a net cost by accepting
returns. We also show that an MBG enhances the profit of the manufacturer with low satisfaction rate,
resulting in an increase in both the wholesale price and demand, but it has an opposite impact on the
manufacturer with high satisfaction rate. In addition, an MBG enhances the retailer’s profit and expands
the overall market. Numerical examples are included to illustrate the major results.
Keywords: Customer returns policy | Game theory | Pricing | Money-back guarantee | Supply chain management |
مقاله انگلیسی |