با سلام خدمت کاربران در صورتی که با خطای سیستم پرداخت بانکی مواجه شدید از طریق کارت به کارت (6037997535328901 بانک ملی ناصر خنجری ) مقاله خود را دریافت کنید (تا مشکل رفع گردد).
ردیف | عنوان | نوع |
---|---|---|
1 |
Delay determinants of European Banking Union implementation
تعیین کننده های تأخیر در اجرای اتحادیه بانکداری اروپا-2019 Most countries in the European Union (EU) delay the transposition of European Commission (EC)
directives, which aim at reforming banking supervision, resolution, and deposit insurance. We
compile a systematic overview of these delays to investigate if they result from strategic considerations
of governments conditional on the state of their financial, regulatory, and political systems.
Transposition delays pertaining to the three Banking Union directives differ considerably
across the 28 EU members. Bivariate regression analyses suggest that existing national bank
regulation and supervision drive delays the most. Political factors are less relevant. These results
are qualitatively insensitive to alternative estimation methods and lag structures. Multivariate
analyses highlight that well-stocked deposit insurance schemes speed-up the implementation of
capital requirements, banking systems with many banks are slower in implementing new bank
rescue and resolution rules, and countries with a more intensive sovereign-bank nexus delay the
harmonization of EU deposit insurance more Keywords: Single Rulebook | Political economy | Transposition delays |
مقاله انگلیسی |
2 |
Fear, deposit insurance schemes, and deposit reallocation in the German banking system
ترس ، برنامه های بیمه سپرده گذاری و توزیع مجدد سپرده ها در سیستم بانکی آلمان-2019 Recent regulatory initiatives such as the European Deposit Insurance Scheme propose a change in the coverage and backing of deposit insurances. An assessment of these proposals requires a thorough un- derstanding of what drives depositors’ withdrawal decisions. We show that Google searches for ‘deposit insurance’ and related strings reflect depositors’ fears and help to predict deposit shifts in the German banking sector from private banks to fully guaranteed public banks. After the introduction of blanket state guarantees for all deposits in the German banking system this fear-driven reallocation of deposits stopped. Our findings highlight that a heterogeneous insurance of deposits can lead to a sudden, fear- induced reallocation of deposits endangering the stability of the banking sector even in absence of rede- nomination risks. Keywords: Depositor expectations | Google | Deposit insurance | Competition for depositors | Bank runs |
مقاله انگلیسی |
3 |
How do regulatory ability and bank competition affect the adoption of explicit deposit insurance scheme and banks’ risk-taking behavior?
چگونه توانایی نظارتی و رقابت بانکی بر تصویب طرح صریح بیمه سپرده و رفتار ریسک پذیری بانکها تأثیر دارد؟-2019 In this study, we investigates how regulatory ability and bank competition affect the adoption of
explicit deposit insurance scheme (eDIS) and banks risk taking behavior under the scheme. We
build a regulator-bank dynamic game model to explain why the implicit deposit insurance scheme
is not the optimal choice when the regulators regulatory ability is high. We also find that excessive
competition makes banks take extreme risk and in such case eDIS is ineffective in preventing the
occurrence of banking crises. Otherwise, eDIS can prevent the occurrence of banking crises
effectively although banks take excessive risk under the scheme. Our model identifies that the
effects of bank competition and regulatory ability on the banks risk incentives created by eDIS are
interdependent. Empirical analysis on 190 countries worldwide confirms that: (1) higher regulatory
ability increases the probability of eDIS adoption. (2) Under the eDIS, less bank competition
and higher regulatory ability could reduce the risk of banking during normal times. In addition,
increased regulatory ability significantly weakens the positive effect of banking competition on
banking risk. (3) Under the eDIS, more bank competition increases the probability of banking
crisis occurrence. Keywords: Deposit insurance scheme | Regulatory ability | Bank competition | Banks risk-taking behavio |
مقاله انگلیسی |
4 |
Systemic banking panics, liquidity risk, and monetary policy
هراس سیستمیک بانکی، ریسک نقدینگی، و سیاست های پولی-2019 I present a general equilibrium monetary model of banking with multiple equilibria. In the good equilibrium, all banks are solvent. In the bad equilibrium, a fraction of banks in the economy are insolvent and subject to runs. The bad equilibrium is also characterized by deflation and a flight to liquidity, and matches other stylized facts of systemic financial crises. The multiplicity of equilibria arises from a strategic complementarity in the decision to fly to liquidity. A sufficiently large monetary injection eliminates the bad equilibrium. However, the size of the monetary injection required to eliminate the equilibrium is smaller if the central bank provides loans to banks, in comparison to using an asset purchase policy. This is because loans to banks are equivalent to asset purchases coupled with partial deposit insurance. Keywords: Bank runs | Multiple equilibria | Monetary injections | Flight to liquidity |
مقاله انگلیسی |
5 |
Banking crises and crisis dating: Disentangling shocks and policy responses
بحران های بانکی و قدمت بحران: شوک های متلاشی کننده و واکنش های سیاسی-2019 tWe construct theory-based measures of systemic bank shocks. These measures complement bankingcrisis indicators employed in many empirical studies, which we show capture (lagged) policy responsesto systemic bank shocks. To illustrate the importance of disentangling shocks and policy responses tothese shocks, we assess the impact of deposit insurance and safety net guarantees on both the probabilityof a systemic bank shock and that of a policy response. We find that deposit insurance and safety netguarantees do not affect the probability of a systemic bank shock, but increase the probability of a policyresponse to such a shock, consistent with the results of the previous literature. The joint use of measures ofsystemic bank shocks and policy responses may lead to a policy-relevant re-interpretation of the findingsof a large empirical literature. Keywords:Banking crises | Bank fragilitya |
مقاله انگلیسی |
6 |
Corruption in bank lending: The role of timely loan loss recognition
فساد در وام های بانکی: نقش به موقع و تشخیص زیان وام-2017 Building on the recent literature on corruption in bank lending, we examine the effect of
country-level timely loan loss recognition by banks on lending corruption using a unique
World Bank dataset that covers more than 3,600 firms across 44 countries. We find evi
dence consistent with timely loan loss recognition constraining lending corruption
because it increases the likelihood of problem loans being uncovered earlier. In further
analysis, we find timely loan loss recognition to be less associated with reduced corrup
tion in countries where there is significant government ownership in the banking system
and deposit insurance schemes. This evidence is consistent with timely loan loss recog
nition being less of a deterrent to lending corruption when banks are less disciplined by
their capital providers.
Keywords: Timeliness | Loan loss recognition | Corruption | Banks |
مقاله انگلیسی |
7 |
Political institutions and bank risk-taking behavior
نهادهای سیاسی و رفتار ریسک پذیرانه بانک-2017 This paper examines the impact of political institutions on bank risk-taking behavior. Using an interna
tional sample of banks from 98 countries over the period 1998–2007, I document that sound political
institutions stimulate higher bank risk-taking. This is consistent with the hypotheses that better politi
cal institutions increase banks’ risk by boosting the credit market competition from alternative sources
of finance and generating the moral hazard problems due to the expectation of government bailouts
in worst economic conditions. While it is contrary to the hypotheses that better political institutions
decrease banks’ risk by lowering the government expropriation risk and the information asymmetries
between banks and borrowers. The results are robust to a number of sensitivity tests, including alternative
proxies of bank risk-taking and political institutions, cross-sectional bank- and country-level regressions,
endogeneity concerns of political institutions, country income levels, explicit deposit insurance schemes
and sample extension from 1998 to 2014. I also examine the interdependence between political and
legal institutions and find that political and legal institutions complement each other to influence bank
risk-taking behavior.
Keywords: Political institutions | Political constraints | Bank risk-taking | Legal institutions | Moral hazard problems |
مقاله انگلیسی |
8 |
Shadow-banking entrusted loan management, deposit insurance premium, and capital regulation
سایه بانکداری مدیریت وام سپرده حق بیمه سپرده، سرمایه و مقررات-2016 This paper studies bank interest margin, i.e., the spread between the loan rate and the deposit
rate of a bank, when the bank conducts regular lending and shadow-banking entrusted lending
activities under capital regulation. We show that an increase in the entrusted loans increases
the bank's interest margin, equity risk, and the liability of deposit insurer. Entrusted loans
can help spur bank equity return, but there is a trade-off in terms of reduced banking stability.
We also find that the reduced margin and the increased equity risk by capital regulation are
reinforced when the bank additionally conducts entrusted lending activities. Relaxing regulatory capital requirements may produce superior return performance and greater safety for the
bank carrying on shadow-banking entrusted loans.
Keywords: Shadow banking | Entrusted loans | Bank interest margin | Capital regulation |
مقاله انگلیسی |
9 |
قیمتگذاری بیمهی سپرده در حضور ریسک سیستماتیک
سال انتشار: 2015 - تعداد صفحات فایل pdf انگلیسی: 11 - تعداد صفحات فایل doc فارسی: 30 بر اساس چارچوب گزینهی قرار مرتون (1977)، یک مدل قیمتگذاری بیمهی سپرده توسعه دادیم که همبستگیهای دارایی را به عنوان معیاری برای ریسک سیستماتیک یک بانک، برای به حساب آوردن ریسک ورشکستگی بانکی مشترک به کار میگیرد. برآورد مدل ما نشان میدهد که بیمهی سپردهی مبتنی بر ریسک عادلانه از لحاظ آماری که تنها ریسک ورشکستگی بانکی تکی را در نظر میگیرد، زیر قیمت بوده و موجب میشود ارائهدهندگان بیمه در معرض ضرر و زیان خالص قرار بگیرند. برآورد ما همچنین اندازهی حق بیمه را ضبط میکند که در آن بانکهای بزرگ سپردهای با قیمت بالاتر نسبت به بانکهای کوچکتر دارند. این نتیجه به ویژه مربوط به نگرانیهای تنظیمی کنونی در بانکهای بزرگی است که برای ورشکستگی بسیار بزرگ هستند. مهمتر از همه، رویکرد ما یک چارچوب یکی کننده برای ادغام بیمهی سپردهی مبتنی بر ریسک با الزامات سرمایهای بازال مبتنی بر ریسک ارائه میکند.
کلمات کلیدی: بیمهی سپرده، ریسک سیستماتیک، همبستگی دارایی، اندازهی بانک
|
مقاله ترجمه شده |
10 |
چگونه بیمه سپرده بر خطرات احتمالی بانک تاثیر می گذارد؟ شواهد برگرفته از بحران های اخیر
سال انتشار: 2014 - تعداد صفحات فایل pdf انگلیسی: 10 - تعداد صفحات فایل doc فارسی: 29 بیمه سپرده تا اندازه زیادی در برخی از کشورها به عنوان بخشی از یک شبکه امنیتی سیستم مالی برای ارتقای پایداری ارائه می شود. پیامدهای از قبل برنامه ریزی نشده بیمه سپرده انگیزه سپرده گذاران را برای نظارت بر بانک ها کاهش می دهد که منجر به خطرپذیری زیادی می شود.ارتباط بین بیمه سپرده و خطرات احتمالی بانک و شکنندگی سیستمیک را در سالهایی که منتهی به بحرانهای مالی شد را بررسی می کنیم. دریافتیم که سیستم های امنیتی مالی متعددی خطرات احتمالی بانک و شکنندگی سیستمیک را در سالهایی که منجر به بحران های مالی جهانی شدند افزایش می دهند.به هر حال در طول این بحران ها خطرات بانک کمتر و ثبات سیستمیک در کشورهایی با پوشش بیمه سپرده بیشتر است. یافته هایمان نشان می دهد که "تاثیر خطر اخلاقی" بیمه سپرده در زمان های مناسب حکمفرما می شوند در صورتی که " تاثیرات پایداری" بیمه سپرده در زمان های آشفتگی حکمفرما می شوند. تاثیر کلی بیمه سپرده در طول زمان های عادی در اندازه نسبت به تاثیر بی ثباتی در طول آشفتگی جهانی بزرگتر است. به علاوه، دریافتیم که نظارت خوب بر بانک می تواند پیامدهای برنامه ریزی نشده بیمه سپرده را در مورد خطر سیستمیک بانک در زمان های مناسب کم کند،پیشنهاد می کنیم که ایجاد چارچوب محرک مناسب برای تضمین ثبات سیستمیک بسیار مهم است.
کلید واژه ها: خطرات بانکی | خطرات سیستماتیک | بیمه سپرده | مقررات و نظارت بر بانک | بحران های مالی. |
مقاله ترجمه شده |