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1 |
Escalation of negative social exchange: Reflexive punishment or deliberative deterrence?
افزایش تبادل منفی اجتماعی: مجازات بازتابی یا بازدارندگی تعمدی؟-2019 Negative escalation of social exchange exacts significant costs on both individuals and society. Instead of in-kind
reciprocity—an eye for an eye—negative reciprocity may escalate, taking two eyes for an eye. We tested two
competing mechanisms for negative escalation using a modified dictator game that reliably produces escalating
reciprocity to others negative actions but not to positive actions. According to one mechanism, escalation is
strategic: a deliberate attempt to deter future harm. According to another mechanism, escalation is reflexive: an
impulsive act of retribution without consideration of future consequences. In seven experiments, we find clear
evidence consistent with a reflexive mechanism. Encouraging deliberation reduced negative escalation in oneshot
interactions as well as in repeated interactions. Focusing on future consequences decreased escalation
whereas disabling deliberation increased escalation. Finally, the explicit goal to punish anothers negative behavior
increased escalation while the goal of deterring future transgressions did not. These experiments suggest
that escalation is a reflexive form of punishment rather than a deliberate act of strategic deterrence.
Encouraging, enabling, or training deliberative processes may effectively reduce costly escalation in everyday
life. |
مقاله انگلیسی |
2 |
Thou shalt not steal: Taking aversion with legal property claims
دزدی نکن: نفرت گریزی با ادعای مالکیت قانونی-2019 Do people have an innate respect for property? In the literature, there is controversy about
whether human subjects are taking averse. We implemented a dictator game with a symmetric
action space to address potential misconceptions and framing and demand effects that may be
responsible for the contradictory findings. Misconceptions can occur as a result of unclear
property rights, while framing and demand effects can occur if anonymity is not preserved. Our
paper is the first to implement both a strict double-blind anonymity protocol and clear property
rights. We established clear property claims by asking subjects in our legal treatment to bring
their own property to the experiment. In the effort treatment, the experimenter transferred the
property publicly to subjects after they completed a real effort task. Our data suggest that without
social enforcement, respect for property is low. Yet, the taking rate significantly differs from the
theoretically predicted maximum. Consistent with the Lockean theory of property, respect for
property grows when the entitlement is legitimized by the labor the owner had to invest to
acquire it. Keywords: Property rights | Taking aversion | Dictator game | Symmetric action space | Double-blind anonymity | Earned entitlements | Tangibility |
مقاله انگلیسی |