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CEO attributes, compensation, and firm value: Evidence from a structural estimation
ویژگی های CEO، غرامت و ارزش شرکت: شواهدی از یک تخمین ساختاری-2018 I present and estimate a dynamic model of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and effort provision. I find that variation in CEO attributes explains the majority of variation in compensation (equity and total) but little of the variation in firm value. The primary drivers of cross-sectional compensation are risk aversion and influence on the board. Additionally, I estimate the magnitude of CEO agency issues. Removing CEO influence increases shareholder value in the typical firm by 1.74%, making CEOs risk neutral increases shareholder value by 16.12%, and removing all agency frictions increases shareholder value by 28.99%.
keywords: CEO compensation |Dynamic principal-agent model |Structural estimation |
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