رابطه بین قدرت مدیریتی و حقوق مدیرعامل
سال انتشار: 2020 - تعداد صفحات فایل pdf انگلیسی: 22 - تعداد صفحات فایل doc فارسی: 38
ما بررسی می کنیم که هیئت مدیره های دوستانه (موافق، صمیمی، همگام) چطور ساختار قراردادهای بهینه پاداش را به نفع مدیرعامل های قدرتمند تنظیم می کنند. مطالعه ما نتایج غیرمنتظره ای به همراه دارد. اولاً، مدیران قدرتمند حقوق بالاتری دریافت می کنند و قراردادی با حساسیت بالاتر پرداخت بر اساس عملکرد (PPS) دارند اگر عملکرد شرکت پایین باشد، و بالعکس. بعلاوه، ما شرایطی را مشخص می کنیم که حقوق یا پرداختی مورد انتظار و PPS مورد انتظار هر دو در صورت وجود هیئت مدیره دوستانه، افزایش می یابند. دوماً، ما نشان می دهیم که هیئت مدیره های دوستانه، حقوق بالاتر، سهام بیشتر، اما گزینه های مالی کمتری در اختیار مدیرعامل ها قرار می دهند. سوماً، هیئت مدیره های دوستانه ای که قراردادهایی با PPS بالاتر تنظیم می کنند استفاده بیشتری از ارزیابی عملکرد نسبی (RPE) دارند. در کل، نتایج ما نشان می دهند که شاخص های بیشتر مورد استفاده در روشهای ضعیف (یا درست) تعیین پاداش، باید با دقت زیادی تفسیر شوند. ما با تعمیم مدل اولیه مان به دو مدل توسعه یافته، نشان می دهیم که مدیران قدرتمند، سرمایه گذاری نقدی کمی دارند اما مشوق کمی نیز برای مدیریت درآمدها دارند.
واژگان کلیدی: پاداش مدیرعامل | قرارداد بهینه | نظریه قدرت مدیریتی | حکمرانی شرکتی
|مقاله ترجمه شده|
The economic impact of right-to-work laws: Evidence from collective bargaining agreements and corporate policies
تأثیر اقتصادی قوانین کار درست : شواهدی از توافق نامه های جمعی و سیاست های شرکت ها-2020
We analyze the economic and financial impact of right-to-work (RTW) laws in the US. Using data from collective bargaining agreements, we show that there is a decrease in wages for unionized workers after RTW laws. Firms increase investment and employment but reduce financial leverage. Labor-intensive firms experience higher profits and labor-to- asset ratios. Dividends and executive compensation also increase post-RTW. Our results are consistent with a canonical theory of the firm augmented with an exogenous bargaining power of labor and suggest that RTW laws impact corporate policies by decreasing that bargaining power.
Keywords: Right to work | Collective bargaining | Unions | Wage growth | Investment
Effects of superiors’ compensation structures on psychophysiological responses and real earnings management decisions of subordinate managers
تأثیر ساختارهای جبران خسارت فوقانی بر پاسخهای روانشناختی و تصمیمات مدیریت واقعی درآمد مدیران فرعی-2020
This study examines the effects of executive compensation structures and research and development (R&D) reporting methods on subordinate managers’ psychophysiological responses and decisions to engage in real earnings management. Results from one 2×2 between-participants experiment indicate that when R&D expenditures are capitalized, relative to expensed, managers are less willing to abandon a failing project in favor of a superior project. Importantly, executive compensation structures can effectively reduce this form of real earnings management by subordinates. When executives are paid with restricted stock, relative to when executives are compensated with unrestricted stock, their subordinate managers are less willing to continue a failing R&D project when R&D expenses are capitalized. A second experiment that employs pupillometry, eye tracking and facial analysis in order to capture participants’ psychophysiological responses to incentive structures reveals that subordinates exhibit increased arousal and more intense negative emotions when they encounter supervisor pay structures that conflict with their personal incentives. Increases in negative emotion lead to reductions in earnings management behavior. The results indicate that compensation structures for superiors, such as executives, can significantly mitigate subordinate managers’ tendency to engage in real earnings management. In addition, from a methodological perspective, the second experiment indicates that hypothetical incentives are internalized by experiment participants, and hypothetical incentives lead to predictable psychophysiological responses and related decisions.
Keywords: Executive compensation | Emotion | Eye tracking | Facial expression | Incentives | Pupillometry | Real earnings management
Deferred cash compensation and risk-taking: Evidence from the Chinese banking industry
جبران خسارت معوق و ریسک پذیری: شواهدی از صنعت بانکی چین-2019
Starting in 2010, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) mandated that between 40% and 50% of the annual variable compensation of senior commercial bank managers be paid over the subsequent 3 years or longer. We examine the implications of the CBRC deferred compensation regulation for bank risk-taking using a sample of 156 bank executives from 14 listed Chinese commercial banks. We find that before the 2010 regulation, high-risk banks deferred executive compensation less than low-risk banks. We also find that banks reduced their risktaking after the 2010 regulation, and the reduction was greater for banks with higher pre-regulation risk. Unlike prior research which examines equity compensation, we provide evidence on the use of deferred executive cash compensation and its implications for bank risk-taking in an emerging market
Keywords: Deferred executive compensation | Bank risk-taking | Compensation regulation | Multi-period agency
Shareholder protection and bank executive compensation after the global financial crisis
حمایت سهامداران و غرامت اجرایی بانک پس از بحران مالی جهانی-2019
tWe use a hand-collected international database to analyze the change in the risk-taking incentivesembedded in bank executive compensation after the onset of the global financial crisis. Our results reveala reduction in both the risk sensitivity of stock option grants (vega) and total and cash pay-risk sensi-tivities in countries suffering systemic banking crises. This reduction is greater in countries with strongshareholder protection, especially in banks with good corporate governance, solvent banks, and banksthat suffered a reduction in their specific investment opportunity set. The regressions control for govern-ment intervention, banking development, and crisis intensity. Our results confirm that the contractinghypothesis is more relevant in countries with stronger shareholder protection, and provide support formeasures improving shareholder rights in the approval of bank executive compensation.
Keywords:Executive compensation | Banking crises | Bank risk | Bank performance | Shareholder protection
Taxation and executive compensation: Evidence from stock options
مالیات و غرامت اجرایی: شواهدی از گزینه های بورس-2018
Understanding the effects of taxes on executive compensation provides insight into the process determining this compensation and is a key input to top income tax rate policy. A 2010 tax reform in Canada, which greatly increased the effective tax rate on stock option compensation for a subset of firms, provides a natural experiment with which to address this issue. Difference-in-differences estimates suggest that this tax increase resulted in an immediate reduction in both stock option grants and the fraction of total compensation made up of stock options with limited, if any, substitution towards other components of compensation.
keywords: Executive compensation |Taxation |Stock options
The optimal timing of CEO compensation
زمان بندی بهینه غرامت CEO-2018
We extend a standard principal-agent model of CEO compensation by modeling the progressive attenuation of information asymmetries about firm value by shareholders in continuous time. The dynamics of the stock price process are affected by the continuous accumulation of exogenous shocks, and by the progressive resolution of information asymmetries. The optimal timing of compensation is the point in time at which the stock price is most informative about the manager’s action. When exogenous shocks accumulate at a constant rate over time and information asymmetries are resolved at a decreasing rate, the optimal timing of compensation is the point in time at which these two rates coincide.
keywords: Deferred compensation| Executive compensation| Principal-agent model
The effectiveness of clawback adoptions in mitigating over-investments – Does board governance play a role?
مفید بودن بازپرداخت هزینه دادرسی در کاهش سرمایه گذاری های بیش از حد - آیا نظارت بر هیئت ایفای نقش می کند؟-2018
The adoption of clawbacks purports to mitigate harmful behavior to firms operation induced by incentive-based executive compensation contracts. While strong corporate governance is necessary to maximize the utility of clawback provisions, the current clawback literature does not sufficiently consider the impact of board governance on the effectiveness of clawback adoptions in improving corporate conduct (Addy, Chu, & Yoder, 2014). In this study, we examine the effect of board governance on the relation between firm-initiated clawback adoptions and firms propensity to over-invest. We first show that the presence of clawback provisions is significantly associated with a decreased level of corporate over-investments. More importantly, we find that the decrease in over-investments for clawback adopters is materially diluted in the presence of a weak board governance structure. Overall, our findings suggest that strong board governance is necessary to ensure the effectiveness of clawback provisions in mitigating over-investments.
keywords: Clawback| Over-investment(s)| Investment efficiency| Compensation| Board governance
Unanticipated effects of restricted stock on managers risky investment decisions
تاثیرات غیرقابل انتظار سهام محدود شده روی تصمیمات سرمایه گذاری مخاطره آمیز مدیران-2018
We conduct a laboratory experiment to examine whether holding periods for stock compensation affect managers willingness to take large risks for their firms in order to pursue personal gains. The theoretical lens through which we examine these issues involves the concepts of current-self (the person you are now) and future-self (the person you will be in the future). Results indicate that long holding requirements can decrease managers feelings of connectedness to their future selves. This change in decision perspective increases managers willingness to accept risks for their firms when the potential personal rewards of risk taking are high. The findings call into question the current view held by regulators and academics that long holding requirements will consistently reduce adverse consequences of performance-based executive compensation. We find that long holding requirements can actually increase managers willingness to pursue investments with very low chances of success when large performance incentives are available.
keywords: Compensation |Current-self |Future-self |Holding requirement |Incentives |Restricted stock
Stock options and credit default swaps in risk management
گزینه های سهام و مبادلات اعتباری پیش فرض در مدیریت ریسک-2018
The use of stock options and credit default swaps (CDS) in banks is not uncommon. Stoc options can induce risk-taking incentives, while CDS can be used to hedge against cred risk. Building on the existing literature on executive compensation and risk managemen our study contributes novel empirical support for the role of stock options in restrainin the use of CDS for hedging purposes. Based on data of CEO stock options and CDS hel by 60 European banks during the period 2006–2011, we find a negative relationshi between option-induced risk-taking incentives (vega) and the proportion of CDS held fo hedging. However, the extent of CDS held for hedging is found to be positively related t default risk in the period leading to the financial crisis that erupted in 2007. The finding imply that restraining the use of stock options can incentivize hedging with CDS, but th risk management strategy will not necessarily produce lower default risk in times of sys temic credit crisis.
Keywords: Stock options ، Credit default swaps ، Risk management ، Vega ، Bank risk-taking ، Credit crisis