Managerial ability and accounting conservatism
توانایی مدیریتی و محافظه کاری حسابداری-2021
Since accounting conservatism is a measure of biased reporting which may or may not reflect high quality earnings, the relation between managerial ability and accounting conservatism is unclear ex ante. High-ability managers may report conservatively to improve the efficiency of contracts, avoid agency conflicts by the timely reporting of future losses, and build reputations for conservative reporting. Conversely, they may not report conservatively to the extent that conservatism reflects biased, and consequently, low-quality earnings. Motivated by these opposing arguments, we examine the relationship between managerial ability and conservatism for Australian firms for the period 2004 to 2013. Our results show that managerial ability is positively associated with accounting conservatism. These results support the notion that high ability managers apply conservatism in accounting because it benefits the firm and stakeholders. Our results are robust to a wide range of proxies for both managerial ability and conservatism, including the Heckman’s (1976) self-selection bias check. Our study should be of interest to numerous stakeholders, including firms seeking to make managerial appointments.
keywords: توانایی مدیریتی | محافظه کاری حسابداری | کیفیت درآمد | Managerial ability | Accounting conservatism | Earnings quality
Skill or effort? Institutional ownership and managerial efficiency
مهارت یا تلاش؟ مالکیت سازمانی و کارآمدی مدیریتی-2018
Using a sample of U.S. firms during the 1989–2015 period, we study whether the efficiency with which managers generate revenue is sensitive to monitoring by institutional shareholders. We find that institutional ownership is positively related to managerial efficiency. Our identification relies on a discontinuity in ownership around the Russell 1000/2000 Index threshold and suggests that the positive effect of institutional ownership on managerial efficiency is causal. Furthermore, we document that monitoring by institutions helps improve managerial efficiency, and that an exogenous increase in institutional ownership leads to higher pay-for-performance sensitivity. Finally, we find consistent results after excluding from our sample forced CEO turnovers, suggesting that institutional shareholders force incumbent managers to exert greater effort rather than influence the replacement of less efficient CEOs. Taken together, our findings highlight the important role played by institutional shareholders in getting the most out of corporate executives.
keywords: Managerial efficiency |Managerial ability |Institutional investors |Agency conflict
Managerial ability and real earnings management
توانایی مدیریتی و مدیریت درآمدهای واقعی-2018
Prior studies investigate the determinants and consequences of real earnings management (REM) as a function of firm-specific characteristics. In this study, we examine how managerial ability relates to the use of REM and future firm performance. We find that higher-ability managers engage in less REM. Furthermore, we find that managers with superior ability reduce the negative impact of REM on future firm performance. This is consistent with prior studies, which link higher-ability managers to better management of firm resources and more positive outcomes.
keywords: Managerial ability |Real earnings management |Abnormal production costs |Abnormal discretionary expenses |Future firm performance
CEO managerial ability and the marginal value of cash
توانایی مدیریتی CEO و ارزش حاشیه ای نقدینگی-2018
This study examines whether the managerial ability of a chief executive officer (CEO) is associated with a marginal value of cash. We predict that more talented CEOs make better use of cash, creating the marginal value of cash. Using the managerial ability measures of Demerjian et al. (2012) and the cash value model developed by Faulkender and Wang (2006), we find that CEO managerial ability significantly increases the marginal value of cash. We also find that the effect of managerial ability on the marginal value of cash is generally greater for financially constrained firms. We further show that that the positive impact of managerial ability on the marginal value of cash is more evident for firms with higher levels of free cash flows and lower management entrenchment. Overall, our findings suggest that the market places a higher value on cash if the cash is managed by more able CEOs, which is consistent with the view that shareholders consider the ability of a CEO when they evaluate cash.
keywords: Managerial ability |Value of cash |Cash |Free cash flow |Leverage
Can lenders discern managerial ability from luck? Evidence from bank loan contracts
آیا قرض دهنده ها توانایی مدیریتی را از شانس تشخیص می دهند؟ شواهدی از قراردادهای وام بانکی-2018
We investigate the effect of managerial ability versus luck on bank loan contracting. Borrowers showing a persistently superior managerial ability over previous years (more likely due to ability) enjoy a lower loan spread, while borrowers showing a temporary superior managerial ability (more likely due to luck) do not enjoy any spread reduction. This finding suggests that banks can discern ability from luck when pricing a loan. Firms with high-ability managers are more likely to continue their prior lower loan spread. The spread-reduction effect of managerial ability is stronger for firms with weak governance structures or poor stakeholder relationships, corroborating the notion that better managerial ability alleviates borrowers’ agency and information risks. We also find that well governed banks are better able to price governance into their borrowers’ loans, which helps explain why good governance enhances bank value.
keywords: Managerial ability |The cost of debt |Agency and information risk |Corporate governance |Stakeholder relationship