Since accounting conservatism is a measure of biased reporting which may or may not reflect high quality earnings, the relation between managerial ability and accounting conservatism is unclear ex ante. High-ability managers may report conservatively to improve the efficiency of contracts, avoid agency conflicts by the timely reporting of future losses, and build reputations for conservative reporting. Conversely, they may not report conservatively to the extent that conservatism reflects biased, and consequently, low-quality earnings. Motivated by these opposing arguments, we examine the relationship between managerial ability and conservatism for Australian firms for the period 2004 to 2013. Our results show that managerial ability is positively associated with accounting conservatism. These results support the notion that high ability managers apply conservatism in accounting because it benefits the firm and stakeholders. Our results are robust to a wide range of proxies for both managerial ability and conservatism, including the Heckman’s (1976) self-selection bias check. Our study should be of interest to numerous stakeholders, including firms seeking to make managerial appointments.
keywords: توانایی مدیریتی | محافظه کاری حسابداری | کیفیت درآمد | Managerial ability | Accounting conservatism | Earnings quality

Prior studies investigate the determinants and consequences of real earnings management (REM) as a function of firm-specific characteristics. In this study, we examine how managerial ability relates to the use of REM and future firm performance. We find that higher-ability managers engage in less REM. Furthermore, we find that managers with superior ability reduce the negative impact of REM on future firm performance. This is consistent with prior studies, which link higher-ability managers to better management of firm resources and more positive outcomes.
keywords: Managerial ability |Real earnings management |Abnormal production costs |Abnormal discretionary expenses |Future firm performance

We investigate the effect of managerial ability versus luck on bank loan contracting. Borrowers showing a persistently superior managerial ability over previous years (more likely due to ability) enjoy a lower loan spread, while borrowers showing a temporary superior managerial ability (more likely due to luck) do not enjoy any spread reduction. This finding suggests that banks can discern ability from luck when pricing a loan. Firms with high-ability managers are more likely to continue their prior lower loan spread. The spread-reduction effect of managerial ability is stronger for firms with weak governance structures or poor stakeholder relationships, corroborating the notion that better managerial ability alleviates borrowers’ agency and information risks. We also find that well governed banks are better able to price governance into their borrowers’ loans, which helps explain why good governance enhances bank value.
keywords: Managerial ability |The cost of debt |Agency and information risk |Corporate governance |Stakeholder relationship