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No luck for moral luck
بدون شانس برای شانس اخلاقی-2019 Moral philosophers and psychologists often assume that people judge morally lucky and morally unlucky agents differently, an assumption that stands at the heart of the Puzzle of Moral Luck. We examine whether the asymmetry is found for reflective intuitions regarding wrongness, blame, permissibility, and punishment judg- ments, whether people’s concrete, case-based judgments align with their explicit, abstract principles regarding moral luck, and what psychological mechanisms might drive the effect. Our experiments produce three findings: First, in within-subjects experiments favorable to reflective deliberation, the vast majority of people judge a lucky and an unlucky agent as equally blameworthy, and their actions as equally wrong and permissible. The philosophical Puzzle of Moral Luck, and the challenge to the very possibility of systematic ethics it is frequently taken to engender, thus simply do not arise. Second, punishment judgments are significantly more outcome- dependent than wrongness, blame, and permissibility judgments. While this constitutes evidence in favor of current Dual Process Theories of moral judgment, the latter need to be qualified: punishment and blame judgments do not seem to be driven by the same process, as is commonly argued in the literature. Third, in between-subjects experiments, outcome has an effect on all four types of moral judgments. This effect is mediated by negligence ascriptions and can ultimately be explained as due to differing probability ascriptions across cases. Keywords: Moral luck | Moral judgment | Outcome effect | Dual process theory of moral judgment | Hindsight bias |
مقاله انگلیسی |
2 |
When morality opposes the law: An fMRI investigation into punishment judgments for crimes with good intentions
هنگامی که اخلاق با قانون مخالف است: تحقیق در مورد fMRI به قضاوت مجازات برای جرایم با نیت خوب-2019 In judicial practice, morally right but legally wrong instances usually pose significant challenges for legal decision
makers. To examine the cognitive and neural foundations of legal judgments in criminal cases involving
apparent moral conflicts, we scanned 30 female participants during punishment judgments for crimes committed
with good intentions. The behavioral results confirmed that moral acceptability was significantly correlated with
the punishment ratings only in the good-intentioned crimes. The fMRI data mainly revealed that the right
temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) plays special roles in processing criminal offenders’ state of mind and that the
right dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex (rDLPFC) plays roles in resolving moral conflicts involved in legal judgments.
Specifically, we found that compared to the bad-intentioned scenarios, the good-intentioned scenarios
evoked greater activities during the postreading stage in the brain area of the rTPJ and that a signal increase in
the rTPJ was associated with more lenient penalty judgments in the good-intentioned scenarios. Furthermore,
reading crime scenarios with good intentions elicited stronger activation in the rdlPFC, which showed enhanced
functional connectivity with the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). Overall, our study sheds some light on the
neurocognitive underpinnings of legal judgments in special criminal cases and enhances our understanding of
the relationship between legal and moral judgments. Keywords: Legal judgments | Moral judgments | Intentions | Temporoparietal junction | Prefrontal cortex |
مقاله انگلیسی |
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How climate change risk perceptions are related to moral judgment and guilt in China
چگونه مشاهدات خطر تغییرات آب و هوایی به قضاوت اخلاقی و جرم در چین مربوط می شوند -2018 China has experienced many serious impacts of climate change as the result of greenhouse gas emissions. Because climate change risk perceptions and moral principles are country- and culture-specific, we need to conduct additional research to understand how the Chinese’s risk perceptions are associated with their moral attitudes and emotions (i.e., anticipated guilt). Based on a survey of 569 Chinese respondents, results revealed that both impersonal risks (i.e., risk to the remote environment and others) and personal/ingroup risks predicted moral attitudes toward climate mitigation behaviors. Furthermore, personal/ingroup risks positively predicted anticipated guilt for not performing mitigation behaviors, whereas impersonal risks negatively predicted anticipated guilt. Moral attitudes, anticipated guilt, and efficacy, but not injunctive norms, in turn predicted intentions to perform personal behaviors to mitigate climate change. Theoretical implications related to climate morality and practical implications for intervention programs were discussed.
keywords: Impersonal risks |Personal and ingroup risks |Climate change |Moral judgment |Guilt |Mitigation behaviors |
مقاله انگلیسی |
4 |
Moral Learning: Conceptual foundations and normative relevance
یادگیری اخلاقی: پایه های مفهومی و ارتباطات هنجاری-2017 What is distinctive about a bringing a learning perspective to moral psychology? Part of the answer lies in
the remarkable transformations that have taken place in learning theory over the past two decades,
which have revealed how powerful experience-based learning can be in the acquisition of abstract causal
and evaluative representations, including generative models capable of attuning perception, cognition,
affect, and action to the physical and social environment. When conjoined with developments in neuro
science, these advances in learning theory permit a rethinking of fundamental questions about the acqui
sition of moral understanding and its role in the guidance of behavior. For example, recent research
indicates that spatial learning and navigation involve the formation of non-perspectival as well as ego
centric models of the physical environment, and that spatial representations are combined with learned
information about risk and reward to guide choice and potentiate further learning. Research on infants
provides evidence that they form non-perspectival expected-value representations of agents and actions
as well, which help them to navigate the human environment. Such representations can be formed by
highly-general mental processes such as causal and empathic simulation, and thus afford a foundation
for spontaneous moral learning and action that requires no innate moral faculty and can exhibit substan
tial autonomy with respect to community norms. If moral learning is indeed integral with the acquisition
and updating of casual and evaluative models, this affords a new way of understanding well-known but
seemingly puzzling patterns in intuitive moral judgment—including the notorious ‘‘trolley problems.”
Keywords: Moral judgment | Moral development | Causal model | Evaluation | Simulation | Empathy | Bayesian | Reinforcement learning | Dual-process | Model-free and model-based learning and | control | Trolley problem |
مقاله انگلیسی |
5 |
How ‘‘ought” exceeds but implies ‘‘can”: Description and encouragement in moral judgment
چگونه باید فراتر از "اما " دلالت " می تواند " : شرح و تشویق در قضاوت اخلاقی-2017 This paper tests a theory about the relationship between two important topics in moral philosophy and
psychology. One topic is the function of normative language, specifically claims that one ‘‘ought” to do
something. Do these claims function to describe moral responsibilities, encourage specific behavior, or
both? The other topic is the relationship between saying that one ‘‘ought” to do something and one’s abil
ity to do it. In what respect, if any, does what one ‘‘ought” to do exceed what one ‘‘can” do? The theory
tested here has two parts: (1) ‘‘ought” claims function to both describe responsibilities and encourage
people to fulfill them (the dual-function hypothesis); (2) the two functions relate differently to ability,
because the encouragement function is limited by the person’s ability, but the descriptive function is
not (the interaction hypothesis). If this theory is correct, then in one respect ‘‘ought implies can” is false
because people have responsibilities that exceed their abilities. But in another respect ‘‘ought implies
can” is legitimate because it is not worthwhile to encourage people to do things that exceed their ability.
Results from two behavioral experiments support the theory that ‘‘ought” exceeds but implies ‘‘can.”
Results from a third experiment provide further evidence regarding an ‘‘ought” claim’s primary function
and how contextual features can affect the interpretation of its functions.
Keywords: Responsibility | Ability | Blame | Moral psychology| Speech acts |
مقاله انگلیسی |