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نتیجه جستجو - Security investment

تعداد مقالات یافته شده: 3
ردیف عنوان نوع
1 Snatched secrets: Cybercrime and trade secrets modelling a firms decision to report a theft of trade secrets
اسرار ربوده شده: جرایم سایبری و اسرار تجاری مدل سازی تصمیم یک شرکت برای گزارش سرقت اسرار تجاری-2019
Cybercrime and economic espionage are increasing problems for firms. We build on US FBI policy to frame the interaction between a cybercrime victim firm and a government security agency. We bring together several strands in the literature to model the strategies of the firm, which has suffered a cy- ber breach and theft of trade secrets, and the government security agency, which must investigate and prosecute crimes. We investigate the interactions between these two players, in which the firm has pri- vate information about its cybersecurity investment. This investment level is unknown to the security agency, which must nonetheless decide how to prioritize reported crime. We model this asymmetric in- formation problem within a game theoretic signaling framework derived from Becker’s work in crime and punishment. We suggest that such a framework can inform policy to encourage security investments by firms and more efficient resource utilization by security agencies. We particularly focus on an illustrative stylized example to highlight how our modelling approach can be helpful. In this example we compare two worlds; one where all security breaches become public knowledge and another where only reported breaches become public knowledge. We then formulate two potentially testable Hypotheses and several implications of these Hypotheses. Case studies and a policy analysis further highlight how our framework plays out in reality
Keywords: Cyber security | Cybercrime | Trade secrets | Economic espionage | Cyber breaches
مقاله انگلیسی
2 A framework for secure IT operations in an uncertain and changing environment
یک چارچوب برای عملیات IT ایمن در محیط نامطمئن و در حال تغییر-2017
Article history:Received 5 February 2016Revised 2 March 2017Accepted 17 April 2017Available online 18 April 2017Keywords:Information securityIT security management Decision support framework Security investment decisions Combinatorial optimizationIn this paper, a quantitative approach is proposed that addresses various decision making challenges within the IT security process of an organization. The approach serves as a framework that facilitates multiple applications to optimize the security of IT systems in different environmental settings. Address- ing this problem is a critical challenge for almost all organizations and it still lacks a comprehensive and consistent quantitative treatment. The key question of the corresponding decision problem is which safeguards to select in order to achieve sufficient security. The proposed framework addresses this by establishing a generally applicable problem structure and by reusing existing knowledge in order to re- duce implementation costs of the approach. Based on this foundation, efficient MILP models are applied to support the establishment of an effective IT security strategy. Depending on the knowledge an organi- zation is able to provide, decisions take uncertainty and even dynamic aspects into account. As a result, deployed safeguards are robust against uncertain security threats and remain stable over several plan- ning periods even if the system or the threat environment changes. This is a significant advancement that results in higher security in the short-term and lower costs in the mid- and long-term.© 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Information security | IT security management | Decision support framework | Security investment decisions | Combinatorial optimization
مقاله انگلیسی
3 Information sharing vs: privacy: A game theoretic analysis
اشتراک اطلاعات در مقابل حریم خصوصی: تجزیه و تحلیل نظریه بازی-2017
Article history:Received 9 June 2016Revised 29 June 2017Accepted 30 June 2017Available online 1 July 2017Keywords:Information security economics Information sharingPrivacySecurity knowledge growth Security investment Differential gameSharing cyber security information helps firms to decrease cyber security risks, prevent attacks, and in- crease their overall resilience. Hence it affects reducing the social security cost. Although previously cyber security information sharing was being performed in an informal and ad hoc manner, nowadays through development of information sharing and analysis centers (ISACs), cyber security information sharing has become more structured, regular, and frequent. This is while, the privacy risk and information disclosure concerns are still major challenges faced by ISACs that act as barriers in activating the potential impacts of ISACs.This paper provides insights on decisions about security investments and information sharing in con- sideration of privacy risk and security knowledge growth. By the latest concept i.e. security knowledge growth, we mean fusing the collected security information, adding prior knowledge, and performing ex- tra analyses to enrich the shared information. The impact of this concept on increasing the motivation of firms for voluntarily sharing their sensitive information to authorities such as ISACs has been analytically studied for the first time in this paper. We propose a differential game model in which a linear fusion model for characterizing the process of knowledge growth via the ISAC is employed. The Nash equilibrium of the proposed game including the optimized values of security investment, and the thresholds of data sharing with the price of privacy are highlighted. We analytically find the threshold in which the gain achieved by sharing sensitive information outweighs the privacy risks and hence the firms have natural incentive to share their security information. Moreover, since in this case the threshold of data shar- ing and the security investment levels chosen in Nash equilibrium may be lower than social optimum, accordingly we design mechanisms which would encourage the firms and lead to a socially optimal out- come. The direct impact of the achieved results is on analyzing the way ISACs can convince firms to share their security information with them.© 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Information security economics | Information sharing | Privacy | Security knowledge growth | Security investment | Differential game
مقاله انگلیسی
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