Who will take on green product development in supply chains? Manufacturer or retailer
چه کسی توسعه محصول سبز را در زنجیره های تامین به عهده خواهد گرفت؟ تولید کننده یا خرده فروش-2021
: This paper investigates the optimal decisions, profits and social welfare in a green supply chain (GSC) when the manufacturer or retailer conducts green product development. Two Stackelberg game models are constructed here: the manufacturer-led green product development model (MD model) and retailer-led green product development model (RD model), and it is assumed that the green product developer is risk-averse. Then the optimal decisions and members’ profits under two models are obtained. Through comparing them, the results show that the product greenness and leader’s profit are always higher in MD model, but in which model the retail price, wholesale price and follower’s profit are higher/lower is related to the cost coefficient of green product development, the leaders’ risk aversion, and demand uncertainty. Moreover, the risk aversion and demand uncertainty have a negative impact on most decisions and profits, but their impact on followers’ profits under two models and the wholesale price of RD model are still affected by the cost coefficient of green product development. Finally, numerical experiments are used to compare the total profits and social welfare under two models. The results indicate that in most cases, the GSC’s total profit under RD model is higher, but the social welfare under MD model is higher.
Keywords: Green product development | Green supply chain management | Stackelberg game | Risk aversion
Pricing decisions in a decentralized biofuel supply chain with RIN mechanism considering environmental impacts
تصمیمات قیمت گذاری در زنجیره تأمین سوخت زیستی غیرمتمرکز با مکانیسم RIN با در نظر گرفتن تأثیرات زیست محیطی-2021
This study develops pricing models in a decentralized biofuel supply chain focusing on both economic and environmental aspects. Environmental impacts are used as a measure to reflect the environmental objective function calculated based on ReCiPe method. A bi-level multi-objective stackelberg game model considering farmers and biorefineries as followers and the blender as leader is proposed. An ε-constraint method is utilized to convert the multi-objective model to a single-objective one. The bi-level model is then transformed to a solvable integrated model. Finally, a real case study of switchgrass bioethanol is presented to illustrate the performance of the proposed model. Results show that focusing on environmental goals results in the increasement of selling prices and profits of farmers and biorefineries and decreasment of about %7 in economic profit of the blender. Therefore, tradeoff analyses are performed for objective functions leading to 10 Pareto optimal solutions which give managerial insights to the blender. Moreover, sensitivity analyses are provided with respects to price elasticity and final fuel’s price and results show logical trends in selling prices.
Keywords: Biofuel supply chain | Pricing | Decentralized decision making | Environmental impacts | Multi-objective optimization
Price and quality decisions in a vertically-differentiated supply chain with an “Online-to-Store” channel
تصمیمات قیمت و کیفیت در یک زنجیره تأمین کاملاً متمایز با کانال «فروشگاه از طریق فروشگاه»-2021
Because of the prevalence of “Online-to-Store (OS)” channel, customers can purchase differentiated products online and pick up in-store. We develop a Stackelberg game-theoretic model to study the impact of an OS channel on quality levels, demands, prices, and profits of a manufacturer and a retailer in a supply chain. We assume that the retailer acts as a Stackelberg leader, and the manufacturer acts as a Stackelberg follower. The manufacturer produces and sells two products with vertically-differentiated quality levels to the retailer who in turn sells the products to customers through a Store channel, an Online channel, or an OS channel. The retailer incurs a handing cost if the OS channel is available, and consumers bear a shipping cost and a transaction cost when the products are purchased from the Online and Store channels, respectively. We find that the manufacturer should reduce both products’ quality levels and wholesale prices, whereas the retailer can increase the selling prices for a relatively small shipping cost and a not too small handling cost. When the products are available both online and in-store, however, the quality levels, wholesale prices and selling prices might increase for a small shipping cost and a not too small handling cost. Compared to the case in which both products are available online only with the OS channel, adding the Store channel is always beneficial for both parties. The intuition behind these results hinges on the trade-off between the handling cost and the increased market demand for the retailer. Moreover, the quality levels, the wholesale prices of both products, and the selling price of the low-quality product would decrease, while the selling price of the high-quality product increases for a sufficiently low transaction cost and a not too small shipping cost.
Keywords: Game theory | Online-to-store | Vertically-differentiated supply chain | Pricing | Quality
Analyzing a closed-loop sustainable supply chain with duopolistic retailers under different game structures
تجزیه و تحلیل یک زنجیره تامین حلقه بسته پایدار با خرده فروشان دوپولیستی تحت ساختارهای مختلف بازی-2021
This article investigates a closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, two suppliers and two competitive retailers. One retailer sells manufactured products whereas the other retailer sells remanufactured products and takes up corporate social responsibility (CSR). One supplier supplies used products or cores for remanufacturing while the other supplier supplies fresh raw materials for manufacturing new product. The manufacturer sells both new and remanufactured products with different wholesale prices. The paper analyzes the two competitive retailers different game strategies when the manufacturer acts as the Stackelberg leader. It is shown that remanufacturing is a good policy to adopt for the whole supply chain, not only for economical beneﬁts but also for environmental sustainability. Optimal decisions of the proposed closed-loop supply chain and its members are also supported by a numerical example. Finally, sensitivity analysis is carried out with respect to key model- parameters.© 2021 CIRP.
Keywords: Closed-loop supply chain | Stackelberg game | Remanufacturing | Pricing | Sustainability | Corporate social responsibility
Biomass supply chain coordination for remote communities: A game-theoretic modeling and analysis approach
هماهنگی زنجیره تأمین زیست توده برای جوامع از راه دور: رویکرد مدل سازی و تحلیل نظری بازی-2021
Biomass, as one of the most available renewable energies, could reduce dependency on fossil fuels and the consequent environmental impacts. There is a need for biomass supply chain management, which is managing bioenergy production from harvesting feedstock to energy conversion facilities. In case of remote communities, bioenergy adoption requires dealing with dispersed geographies of suppliers and places of consumption with small scales of energy demand. As such, coordination plays a key role in increasing the efficiency of the biomass supply chain network through bundling of demand and thus improving the economy of scale. This paper employs a game-theoretic approach to formulate a coordinated biomass supply chain with three echelons including suppliers, hubs, and energy convertors. To investigate the strategic interactions of participants, three decision making structure scenarios have been considered under Stackelberg game providing insights into the impact of power distribution, the role of side payments in enforcing the flow of decisions, and the resulting efficiency and performance improvements. In doing so, a case study bioenergy supply chain for three northern Canadian communities is explored to demonstrate the application of the proposed formulation, solution methods, and the practicality and significance of the adopted approach and outcomes for remote communities.
Keywords: Bioenergy | Supply chains | Coordination | Remote communities | Game theory | Mathematical Program with Equilibrium | Constraints (MPEC)
Multi-party coordination in sustainable supply chain under consumer green awareness
هماهنگی چند جانبه در زنجیره تأمین پایدار تحت آگاهی سبز مصرف کننده-2021
The rapid growth of the green market in recent years has motivated manufacturing companies to operate carbon abatement schemes for better sustainability. This paper investigates sustainability coordination among three major supply chain parties in the context of consumer green awareness by applying a Stackelberg game model. Instead of considering the manufacturer as the only party to operate carbon management schemes, this paper examines a model in which both the supplier and the manufacturer embark on green investment under make-to-order production. Meanwhile, the retailer considers the influence of green consumers on the demand rate and determines the order quantity for the manufacturer. This paper analyses the sustainability and profitability performance of the supply chain under centralised and decentralised scenarios, and applies the quantity discount and cost-sharing contracts to improve supply chain performance. It is shown that greener markets are more profitable and Pareto improvement can be achieved for all parties under a quantity discount contract. High investment cost hinders the company from achieving a higher emission reduction level. Further, increased consumer green awareness can motivate companies to achieve a higher emission reduction level, but not always lead to improved total carbon emission reductions resulting from the increase in product demand caused by green awareness. It also shows the importance of involving suppliers in green investment, due to their high carbon emission during the component production processes. The findings of this research provide theoretical support for supply chain parties to achieve better coordination in balancing profitability and carbon abatement.
Keywords: Multi-party supply chain | Newsvendor model | Stackelberg game | Consumer green awareness | Sustainability development
Matching-game approach for green technology investment strategies in a supply chain under environmental regulations
رویکرد بازی تطبیقی برای استراتژی های سرمایه گذاری فناوری سبز در یک زنجیره تأمین تحت مقررات زیست محیطی-2021
Facing increasingly severe environmental problems, green technology (GT) innovation has become an effective way to achieve the sustainable development of firms. Many manufacturers often choose and invest in appropriate GTs from GT-suppliers to improve the environmental impact of production. But others abandon GTs because they are too expensive to invest in. This paper thereby studies the dynamic investment strategy of GT in a manufacturer-supplier supply chain and explores the optimal government subsidy incentive and its impact on investment and sustainable production decisions. Firstly, an original two-sided matching game model (including two-sided matching analysis and Nash equilibrium analysis) is presented to study the matching process between a manufacturer with a limited investment budget and a GT-supplier with GTs and to determine the optimal GT investment-production strategy. Then, a government-manufacturer Stackelberg game model integrating differential game is constructed to determine the optimal government subsidy strategy and to investigate the effect of government subsidy on investment-production decisions. The results show that stable matching between the manufacturer and GT-supplier can be obtained. Numerical simulations verify the feasibility and rationality of the proposed matching game mechanism and demonstrate that GT investment profit is higher than non-investment profit, and subsidy profit is better than non-subsidy profit. The increase in the carbon price leads to an increase in the GT investment intensity. The increase in the carbon price can cause an increase in product greenness and green demand. The contributions of this paper are in providing an infrastructure for studying how managers can obtain the optimal GT investment-production strategy in the supply chain, and how the government formulates the optimal subsidy strategy to stimulate managers’ GT innovation behavior.
Keywords: Two-sided matching | Game theory | Green technology investment | Government regulation | Sustainable supply chain
Optimal production and pricing strategies in auto supply chain when dual credit policy is substituted for subsidy policy
استراتژی های تولید و قیمت گذاری بهینه در زنجیره تأمین خودکار هنگامی که سیاست اعتبار دوگانه جایگزین سیاست یارانه شود-2021
The Chinese government has proposed a dual credit policy (DCP) as a substitute for electric vehicle (EV) subsidies, which ﬂuctuates the auto market. To investigate the policy substitution inﬂuences for the production and pricing strategies, we use Stackelberg game paradigms to model a two-stage auto supply chain. The manufacturer regulated by the DCP produces both EV and internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEV). The retailer sells them to heterogeneous consumers. By backward induction, the optimal pro- duction and pricing strategies are derived for the subsidy policy only (scenario B) and with a joint subsidy policy and DCP (scenario DS). Our ﬁndings show, 1) different with only one case in scenario B, the manufacturer and the retailer have three corresponding optimal production and pricing strategies in scenario DS, according to the manufacturer’s Corporate Average Fuel Consumption credit (CAFC credit);2) the demand for the ICEV may also decline like EV as the subsidies are phased out in scenario DS when the manufacturer’s CAFC credit is in balance case; 3) the changes of DCP rules may have different effects on the optimal production and pricing strategies in different CAFC cases.© 2021 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Auto supply chain | Stackelberg game paradigms | Dual credit policy | Subsidy policy | Production and pricing
Perishable material sourcing and final product pricing decisions for two-echelon supply chain under price-sensitive demand
تصمیم گیری برای تهیه مواد فاسدشدنی و تصمیمات قیمت نهایی محصول برای زنجیره تأمین دو طبقه تحت تقاضای حساس به قیمت-2021
This paper considers a single product supply chain involving a producer/processor and a retailer. The producer/ processor procures and processes perishable materials such as fruits and milk whose demand are often price- sensitive. We model the dyadic relationship as a Stackelberg game to understand how product perishability and the price-sensitive demand of such products can influence the procurement, production, and sale. The producer/processor is the leader and decides on the processing time of the materials and the wholesale price of the product to maximize profit. The retailer as the follower decides on the sale price of the product and order quantity to maximize profit under a price-sensitive demand setting. Propositions and lemmas for optimality are posed, and the model is validated numerically. Our results suggest that the retailer’s profit cannot be worse than the producer/processor under a price elastic demand. With a high deterioration rate or shrinkage, the producer/ processor should improve the storage conditions or processing capacity within certain constraints for better overall supply chain profitability. Finally, both the producer/processor and the retailer need to consider the price sensitivity of consumers when making pricing decisions.
Keywords: Two-echelon supply chain | Perishable inventory | Deterioration rate | Price-sensitive demand | Stackelberg game
Joint finance and order decision for supply chain with capital constraint of retailer considering product defect
تصمیم مشترک مالی و سفارش برای زنجیره تامین با محدودیت سرمایه خرده فروش با توجه به نقص محصول-2021
Small retailers usually face difficulties in obtaining bank loans due to inadequate credit history. Traditional commercial loan can be very costly or even unavailable to such retailers. In order to promote the collaboration of the supply chain to gain the mutual interest of all the parties, larger suppliers are generally willing to inter- mediate between retailers and commercial institutions. In this paper, the proper scheme and its efficiency of supplier intermediation in retailer financing are carefully investigated for the case of existing unreliable prod- ucts. By building a Stackelberg game model, we show that the supplier intermediated financing scheme can significantly improve the supply chain partners’ profits. Furthermore, with an elaborate numerical analysis, we demonstrate that the retailer will be motivated to choose the financing strategy only when the loan interest rate is less than a certain threshold. Finally, we explore how the compensation for product defect influences the supply chain partners’ optimal strategies and profits, which show that the proper compensation can realize Pareto improvement of the supply chain.
Keywords: Capital constraints | Supply chain finance | Stackelberg game