با سلام خدمت کاربران در صورتی که با خطای سیستم پرداخت بانکی مواجه شدید از طریق کارت به کارت (6037997535328901 بانک ملی ناصر خنجری ) مقاله خود را دریافت کنید (تا مشکل رفع گردد).
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1 |
Bank development, competition, and entrepreneurship: International evidence
توسعه بانک ، رقابت و کارآفرینی: شواهد بین المللی-2020 This paper uses a panel database for 84 countries over the 2002–2017 period to analyze the
importance of bank development and bank market competition for enhancing new business
creation. The results show that less bank market competition facilitates the creation of new
businesses. Bank development, however, is not associated with a higher entry rate of new
businesses. Less bank market competition and lending relationships appear to be a main
channel for reducing the cost of debt and overcoming traditional adverse selection and
moral hazard problems between banks and newly created firms. The global financial crisis
did not modify the positive effect of less bank market competition on new firm registration.
The results are robust to controls for equity market development, the ability of banks to hold
equity positions in nonfinancial firms, the costs and days required for starting a business,
and any other omitted time-invariant variables at country level.
Keywords: Entrepreneurship | Bank development | Bank competition | Bank crisis |
مقاله انگلیسی |
2 |
Chinas “Mercantilist” Government Subsidies, the Cost of Debt and Firm Performance
کمک های مالی توازن اقتصادی دولت چین، هزینه بدهی و عملکرد شرکتی-2018 China has been adopting a “mercantilist” policy by lavishing massive government subsidies on Chinese firms. Using hand-collected subsidy data on Chinese listed companies, we find that firms receiving more subsidies tend to have a lower cost of debt. However, such firms fail to have superior financial performance. Instead, firms with more subsidies tend to be overstaffed, which demonstrates higher social performance. These results are mainly driven by non-tax-based subsidies rather than tax-based subsidies. Overall, our results suggest that the Chinese government uses non-tax-based subsidies to achieve its social policy objectives at the expense of firms’ profitability.
keywords: Government subsidies| Cost of debt| Firm performance |
مقاله انگلیسی |
3 |
Financial synergies and systemic risk in the organization of bank affiliates
هم افزایی های مالی و خطر سیستمیک در سازمان متعلقات بانکی-2018 We analyze theoretically banks’ choice of organizational structures in branches, subsidiaries or stand-alone banks, in the presence of public bailouts and default costs. These structures are characterized by different arrangements for internal rescue of affiliates against default. The cost of debt and leverage are endogenous. For moderate bailout probabilities, subsidiary structures, wherein the two entities provide mutual internal rescue under limited liability, have the highest group value, but also the highest risk taking as measured by leverage and expected loss. We explore the effect of constraints on leverage and policy implications. The conflict of interests between regulators, who minimize systemic risk, and banks, who maximize their own value, is mitigated when capital requirements are effective.
keywords: Bank organization |Bank risk |Financial synergies |Endogenous leverage in banking |Default costs |Bailouts |
مقاله انگلیسی |
4 |
Can lenders discern managerial ability from luck? Evidence from bank loan contracts
آیا قرض دهنده ها توانایی مدیریتی را از شانس تشخیص می دهند؟ شواهدی از قراردادهای وام بانکی-2018 We investigate the effect of managerial ability versus luck on bank loan contracting. Borrowers showing a persistently superior managerial ability over previous years (more likely due to ability) enjoy a lower loan spread, while borrowers showing a temporary superior managerial ability (more likely due to luck) do not enjoy any spread reduction. This finding suggests that banks can discern ability from luck when pricing a loan. Firms with high-ability managers are more likely to continue their prior lower loan spread. The spread-reduction effect of managerial ability is stronger for firms with weak governance structures or poor stakeholder relationships, corroborating the notion that better managerial ability alleviates borrowers’ agency and information risks. We also find that well governed banks are better able to price governance into their borrowers’ loans, which helps explain why good governance enhances bank value.
keywords: Managerial ability |The cost of debt |Agency and information risk |Corporate governance |Stakeholder relationship |
مقاله انگلیسی |
5 |
Employee stock ownership and the cost of capital
مالکیت سهام کارکنان و هزینه سرمایه-2017 This paper investigates the relationship between employee stock ownership and the cost of
capital, the main determinant of shareholder value creation computed through economic value
added (EVA). By reducing agency conflicts within the firm, we hypothesize that employee share
ownership reduces the firm’s cost of capital by affecting its two components, i.e. the cost of equity
and the cost of debt. We test this hypothesis in France, a leading country in terms of employee
ownership, based on a panel of the 120 largest listed companies for the 2000–2011 period. We
find: (i) no significant relationship between employee stock ownership and the cost of equity; (ii)
a negative curvilinear relationship between employee stock ownership and the cost of debt; (ii) a
negative curvilinear relationship between employee stock ownership and the weighted average
cost of capital. These results suggest debtholders regard ESO as positive as long it is moderate
because it shifts risk from them to employees and that this effect is still perceptible in the
weighted average cost of capital.
Keywords: Shared capitalism employee ownership | Corporate governance | Cost of equity | Cost of debt | Cost of capital | Agency conflicts |
مقاله انگلیسی |
6 |
چگونه فرصت طلبی مدیریتی بر هزینه منبع یابی برای بدهی اثر می گذارد؟
سال انتشار: 2017 - تعداد صفحات فایل pdf انگلیسی: 50 - تعداد صفحات فایل doc فارسی: 42 این مقاله با استفاده از سنگربندی مدیریتی و فعالیتهای مدیریت درآمدها به نمایندگی از فرصت طلبی مدیران تاثیر رفتار مدیران بر روی هزینه منبع یابی برای بدهی را بررسی می کند. این مطالعه نشان می دهد که سطوح پایین فرصت طلبی مدیریتی منجر به بهره مند شدن شرکتها از هزینه های شرکتی پایین تر و نرخ های اعتبار بالاتر می شود. به علاوه، یافته ها بیان می کنند که هزینه ها بالای شرکتی و نرخ های پایین اعتبار به طور کلی با فعالیتهای درآمد افرای مدیریت درآمدها همراه هستند.
من همچنین تاثیر تغییرات عمده در قانون گذاری درمورد "نقش نظارتی" دست اندرکاران بازار بدهی (یعنی ضمانت داران و آژانس های رتبه بندی) را برسی می کنم. من با استفاده از اقدام ساربانس – اوکسلی به عنوان جابجایی مهم در قانونگذاری آمریکا شواهد قوی پیدا کردم که نشان می دهد تغییرات چشمگیر مورد نیاز برای این اقدام، این "نقش نظارتی" را ارتقا داده است چراکه فرصت طلبی مدیریتی به نظر می رسد که شدیدا" فقط پس ازتصویب این اقدام تنبیه شود.
واژه های کلیدی: فرصت طلبی مدیریتی | ارتقا، مدیریت درآمد | هزینه های بدهی و رتبه بندی | تغییر مقررات |
مقاله ترجمه شده |