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1 |
Negotiation-sequence, pricing, and ordering decisions in a three-echelon supply chain: A coopetitive-game analysis
توالی مذاکره ، قیمت گذاری و تصمیمات سفارش در یک زنجیره تأمین سه پله ای: تجزیه و تحلیل بازی مشارکتی-2021 We investigate a three-echelon supply chain in which a distributor at the middle echelon negotiates two
wholesale price contracts with his upstream manufacturer and downstream retailer. In the first stage, the
distributor decides on whether to first negotiate with the manufacturer or with the retailer; in the second
(combined, noncooperative-cooperative, game) stage, the two negotiations are conducted sequentially. We
find that the supply chain can be coordinated if the distributor first negotiates with the retailer. The
distributor should choose the negotiation sequence for supply chain coordination, if he has a sufficiently
large (small) relative bargaining power in the negotiation with the manufacturer (the retailer). We also
extend our analysis to the cases in which the distributor and the manufacturer negotiate a buyback or
two-part tariff contract, and draw similar outcomes when the distributor first negotiates with the retailer.
In addition, under the two-part tariff contract, the distributor prefers to first negotiate with the retailer
if the manufacturer has a sufficiently high disagreement payoff whereas, under the buyback contract, the
distributor always prefers to first negotiate with the firm with a stronger bargaining power. Moreover,
the two-part tariff (buyback) contract cannot (can) always coordinate the supply chain. Keywords: Supply chain management | Negotiation sequence | Pricing | Coopetitive game | Generalized Nash bargaining solution |
مقاله انگلیسی |
2 |
Coordinating a closed loop supply chain with fairness concern by a constant wholesale price contract
هماهنگی یک زنجیره تامین حلقه بسته با رعایت انصاف توسط یک قرارداد ثابت قیمت عمده فروشی-2021 The literature on closed loop supply chains (CLSCs) has ignored advantageous inequality aversion while
modelling the fairness concern of channel partners and demonstrated that coordinating a decentralised
channel requires complex price contracts. In this paper, we show that a constant wholesale price contract
can coordinate a decentralised channel in a manufacturer-led CLSC if the retailer’s advantageous inequality aversion is sufficiently strong. The result is valid for a range of equitable shares of the channel profit,
such that the allocated share of the manufacturer is larger than that of the retailer, and the retailer’s
share is greater than a minimum threshold. Used product collection rate and channel profit are higher
when the retailer is inequality averse compared to when she is a profit maximiser. The results are independent of whether the end-of-use products are collected by the manufacturer or the retailer. We also
show that the collection rate is higher, and both channel partners are better-off, under the manufacturer
collection model. To obtain these results, we solve multistage sequential move games under the two collection models. We apply Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions for constrained optimisation, to determine the
boundaries for the existence of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Keywords: Pricing | Channel coordination | Fairness | Inequality aversion | Wholesale price contract |
مقاله انگلیسی |
3 |
Coordinating manufacturers innovation and retailers promotion and replenishment using a compensation-based wholesale price contract
هماهنگ سازی نوآوری سازنده و تبلیغ و تجدید تدارکات خرده فروش با استفاده از یک قرارداد قیمت عمده فروشی مبتنی بر غرامت-2018 In this paper, coordination of a manufacturer-retailer chain is investigated where the manufacturer innovates in manufacturing process and the retailer applies promotional efforts. The market demand is assumed to be stochastic dependent on the retailers promotional and the manufacturers innovation efforts. The retailer uses a periodic review inventory system for replenishing items and decides on order-up-to level, review period and promotional efforts level. On the other hand, it is possible for the manufacturer to boost the market demand by innovation in manufacturing process. The retailers promotional and manufacturers innovation efforts not only affect their profits, but also impress their mutual profits and the supply chain performance in an indirect manner. Firstly, we develop the decentralized and centralized decision-making models along with solution procedures and concavity analysis to solve the models. Although the centralized model improves the profitability of the whole supply chain, it may reduce the profitability of either the retailer or the manufacturer. Therefore, we propose a new compensation-based wholesale price contract for encouraging actors to take part in the joint decision-making scheme. Moreover, a profit sharing strategy based on the bargaining power of members is proposed for distributing the surplus profit between members. Finally, the results of the decentralized, centralized and coordination models are compared using test problems and some sensitivity analyses are presented.
keywords: Supply chain coordination |Promotional and innovation |Periodic review |Inventory system |Compensation |Wholesale price contract |Profit sharing |
مقاله انگلیسی |
4 |
Dual-fairness supply chain with quantity discount contracts
زنجیره تامین دو برابر عدالت با قراردادهای تخفیف کم-2017 This paper investigates quantity discount contracts in a dyadic supply chain that consists of one supplier
and two retailers. We consider a setting in which two retailers sell a homogeneous product procured
from the same supplier. The supplier sequentially offers the retailers similar quantity discount contracts
by determining the optimal wholesale prices that maximize the total profits of the two games, whereas
the retailers must choose the optimal retail prices to maximize their own utilities. The first retailer solely
exhibits distributional fairness concern (i.e., when the payoff he receives is disproportionately smaller
than that of the supplier) because he may not be aware of the second retailer’s existence. The second
retailer simultaneously concerns over two types of fairness: peer-induced fairness concern (i.e., when his
payoff is less than that of a peer retailer interacting with the same supplier) and distributional fairness
concern; and he observes a noisy signal by which the retailer can infer the wholesale price that the
supplier offered to the first retailer. This information may affect the second retailer’s decision. Equilibrium
solutions under different conditions are subsequently derived. We demonstrate that this supply chain
under behavioral concerns cannot be coordinated with quantity discount contracts in which the price
breakpoints are dependent on the wholesale prices. Therefore, a coordination mechanism that combines
quantity discount contracts with fixed fees is proposed. Furthermore, several interesting results derived
from the wholesale price contracts cannot be applied to the quantity discount contracts.
Keywords: Behavioral OR | Peer-induced fairness concern | Distributional fairness concern | Quantity discount contract |
مقاله انگلیسی |
5 |
Supply chain coordination with green technology under cap-and-trade regulation
هماهنگی زنجیره تامین با تکنولوژی سبز تحت مقررات معامله و تجارت-2017 Cap-and-trade regulation is generally accepted as one of the most effective market-based mechanisms to
curb carbon emissions. In this paper, we study the production and emission abatement decisions of a
Make-To-Order supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer under cap-and trade regulation.
Specifically, the manufacturer can reduce unit product carbon emission by using green technology, with
the cooperation of a retailer by certain contracts, who sell the products to environment-concerned
consumers. Wholesale price and cost sharing contracts are considered in the supply chain. We list some
main conclusions here. First, as carbon trading price increases, the optimal production quantities (the
optimal abatement levels) firstly decrease (increase) and then remain constant. Second, both wholesale
price and cost sharing contracts can coordinate the supply chain. Last, combining the optimal operational
decisions under the two contracts with two-part tariff agreement, we design a contract in which the
retailer pays a lump fee to the manufacturer, and find that there is an interval of the lump fee to achieve
Pareto improvement for the two firms.
Keywords: Cap-and-trade | Production | Green technology | Supply chain coordination | Wholesale price contract | Cost sharing contract |
مقاله انگلیسی |
6 |
Pricing and replenishment policies in a supply chain with competing retailers under different retail behaviors
سیاست های قیمت گذاری و دوباره پر کردن در یک زنجیره عرضه با خرده فروشان رقیب تحت رفتارهای مختلف خرده فروشی-2017 This paper develops game models for a two-echelon supply chain with one supplier and multiple com
peting retailers. We study the pricing decision and the replenishment policy for each member under both
the decentralized channel and the centralized channel, and examine the impacts of retail behaviors on
them. Compared with the centralized operation, the decentralized operation with linear wholesale price
obviously inflates the holding cost for each retailer, which results in the inefficiency for the whole chan
nel. For the decentralized system, both retail-competition and retail-cooperation models are considered.
The comparative analysis illustrates how the retail pricing and replenishment decisions are affected by
the retail behaviors. We find that the retail cooperation is not stable since each self-interested retailer
has an incentive to lower his retail price unilaterally. Finally, in order to improve the performance of
the channel and each member, a Groves wholesale price contract is designed to achieve the perfect coor
dination between the supplier and the retailers. Meanwhile, this coordination model can also be used in
the case of a supply chain with independent retailers.
Keywords: Supply chain management | Market competition | Replenishment policy |Game theory |
مقاله انگلیسی |