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نتیجه جستجو - تئوری بازی

تعداد مقالات یافته شده: 44
ردیف عنوان نوع
1 Price and quality decisions in a vertically-differentiated supply chain with an “Online-to-Store” channel
تصمیمات قیمت و کیفیت در یک زنجیره تأمین کاملاً متمایز با کانال «فروشگاه از طریق فروشگاه»-2021
Because of the prevalence of “Online-to-Store (OS)” channel, customers can purchase differentiated products online and pick up in-store. We develop a Stackelberg game-theoretic model to study the impact of an OS channel on quality levels, demands, prices, and profits of a manufacturer and a retailer in a supply chain. We assume that the retailer acts as a Stackelberg leader, and the manufacturer acts as a Stackelberg follower. The manufacturer produces and sells two products with vertically-differentiated quality levels to the retailer who in turn sells the products to customers through a Store channel, an Online channel, or an OS channel. The retailer incurs a handing cost if the OS channel is available, and consumers bear a shipping cost and a transaction cost when the products are purchased from the Online and Store channels, respectively. We find that the manufacturer should reduce both products’ quality levels and wholesale prices, whereas the retailer can increase the selling prices for a relatively small shipping cost and a not too small handling cost. When the products are available both online and in-store, however, the quality levels, wholesale prices and selling prices might increase for a small shipping cost and a not too small handling cost. Compared to the case in which both products are available online only with the OS channel, adding the Store channel is always beneficial for both parties. The intuition behind these results hinges on the trade-off between the handling cost and the increased market demand for the retailer. Moreover, the quality levels, the wholesale prices of both products, and the selling price of the low-quality product would decrease, while the selling price of the high-quality product increases for a sufficiently low transaction cost and a not too small shipping cost.
Keywords: Game theory | Online-to-store | Vertically-differentiated supply chain | Pricing | Quality
مقاله انگلیسی
2 Shareholding strategies for selling green products on online platforms in a two-echelon supply chain
استراتژی های سهامداری برای فروش محصولات سبز در سیستم عامل های آنلاین در یک زنجیره تأمین دو طبقه-2021
Observing the practical vertical shareholding phenomena in platform retailing, this paper con- siders two shareholding rates (forward and backward) and proposes three shareholding strategies (forward, backward and cross-shareholding) in a supplier-lead green supply chain to investigate the operation mechanism behind it. Shareholding’s impacts on green investment, prices and profits are provided and the players’ strategy preferences are discussed. We interestingly find that cross-shareholding can be joint optimal when the two shareholding rates are both sufficiently low and thereby Pareto region goes with it. Meanwhile, both the players’ performances can be further improved through certain coordinated ways.
Keywords: Green supply chain | Game theory | Platform retailing | Shareholding strategy | Pareto region
مقاله انگلیسی
3 Effects of demand uncertainty reduction on the selection of financing approach in a capital-constrained supply chain
اثرات کاهش عدم قطعیت تقاضا در انتخاب رویکرد تأمین مالی در یک زنجیره تأمین محدود سرمایه-2021
This study investigates how demand uncertainty reduction (DUR) affects the decisional dynamics within a supply chain, which comprises a supplier and a capital-constrained retailer, who chooses between bank credit and trade credit financing. A comprehensive scenario analysis suggests the retailer should accept trade credit when DUR is high, trade credit risk premium is moderate, and wholesale price is exogenous and low. However, the retailer should adopt trade credit only when both DUR and production cost are not high, and wholesale price is set endogenously. We further relax the assumption on the bank’s risk attitude and find most results still hold.
Keywords: Capital constraint | Demand uncertainty reduction (DUR) | Game theory | Financing approach | Supply chain finance
مقاله انگلیسی
4 Game-theoretic analysis of partner selection strategies for market entry in global supply chains
تحلیل تئوری بازی از استراتژی های انتخاب شریک برای ورود به بازار در زنجیره های عرضه جهانی-2021
In this study, we provide a game-theoretic analysis to investigate an entrant firm’s partner selection for offering its new product to a market, particularly to a foreign market. The entrant has either a brand advantage or technological superiority over incumbent firms. We analyze the strategic interaction between one entrant and three incumbent firms that include one major firm (or a firm offering a popular product) and two local firms (or firms offering niche products). We explore the impact of such asymmetric demand structures on the entrant’s partner selection. Our equilibrium analysis indicates that forming a partnership with a firm that currently has the largest market share because of its superior product is not necessarily optimal for the entrant. When the value offered by the entrant is significantly high, it is more beneficial for the entrant to ally with the major firm, even if that firm currently has a smaller market share than the local firms because of its inferior product. We also demonstrate that when the entrant can add technological superiority to the partner’s product, the entrant’s optimal partner selection may change non-monotonically in the degree of this superiority. Furthermore, in response to the entrant’s optimal partner selection, the relative profitability between incumbent firms can reverse discontinuously and drastically according to the degree of the value offered by the entrant.
Keywords: Entry | Licensing | Global supply chain | Game theory | Marketing-operations interface
مقاله انگلیسی
5 Biomass supply chain coordination for remote communities: A game-theoretic modeling and analysis approach
هماهنگی زنجیره تأمین زیست توده برای جوامع از راه دور: رویکرد مدل سازی و تحلیل نظری بازی-2021
Biomass, as one of the most available renewable energies, could reduce dependency on fossil fuels and the consequent environmental impacts. There is a need for biomass supply chain management, which is managing bioenergy production from harvesting feedstock to energy conversion facilities. In case of remote communities, bioenergy adoption requires dealing with dispersed geographies of suppliers and places of consumption with small scales of energy demand. As such, coordination plays a key role in increasing the efficiency of the biomass supply chain network through bundling of demand and thus improving the economy of scale. This paper employs a game-theoretic approach to formulate a coordinated biomass supply chain with three echelons including suppliers, hubs, and energy convertors. To investigate the strategic interactions of participants, three decision making structure scenarios have been considered under Stackelberg game providing insights into the impact of power distribution, the role of side payments in enforcing the flow of decisions, and the resulting efficiency and performance improvements. In doing so, a case study bioenergy supply chain for three northern Canadian communities is explored to demonstrate the application of the proposed formulation, solution methods, and the practicality and significance of the adopted approach and outcomes for remote communities.
Keywords: Bioenergy | Supply chains | Coordination | Remote communities | Game theory | Mathematical Program with Equilibrium | Constraints (MPEC)
مقاله انگلیسی
6 Shared warehouse as an inter-supply chain cooperation strategy to reduce the time-dependent deterioration costs
انبار مشترک به عنوان یک استراتژی همکاری بین زنجیره تامین برای کاهش هزینه های زوال وابسته به زمان-2021
Deterioration is one of the main concerns of many food and drug products. To reduce the effects of this phenomenon, various strategies have been proposed so far. In this paper, the collaboration of distributors in two different supply chains using a shared warehouse and its impacts on the deterioration of products which is time- dependent are investigated. Moreover, innovative algorithms are proposed to extract the solution of the models in the non-integrated and integrated supply chains. Next, the cooperative game theory is used to share the benefits of the cooperation between distributors. The numerical results of the paper indicate the efficiency of the proposed strategy in reducing the cost and deterioration of the supply chains. Furthermore, to demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed model in different real-world problems, four possible categories of the deterioration rate are scrutinized. The results of this investigation denote that the strategy has high effectiveness in all categories while in the category that the deterioration rate is a linear function of the time, the saving in the deterioration cost using the strategy is greatest. Also, conducting a sensitivity analysis, it is revealed that the greater the difference in the ordering cost of distributors, the greater the effectiveness of the strategy in reducing supply chain costs.
Keywords: Time-sensitive deterioration | Inter-supply chain cooperation | Shared distribution warehouse | Cooperative game theory
مقاله انگلیسی
7 Matching-game approach for green technology investment strategies in a supply chain under environmental regulations
رویکرد بازی تطبیقی برای استراتژی های سرمایه گذاری فناوری سبز در یک زنجیره تأمین تحت مقررات زیست محیطی-2021
Facing increasingly severe environmental problems, green technology (GT) innovation has become an effective way to achieve the sustainable development of firms. Many manufacturers often choose and invest in appropriate GTs from GT-suppliers to improve the environmental impact of production. But others abandon GTs because they are too expensive to invest in. This paper thereby studies the dynamic investment strategy of GT in a manufacturer-supplier supply chain and explores the optimal government subsidy incentive and its impact on investment and sustainable production decisions. Firstly, an original two-sided matching game model (including two-sided matching analysis and Nash equilibrium analysis) is presented to study the matching process between a manufacturer with a limited investment budget and a GT-supplier with GTs and to determine the optimal GT investment-production strategy. Then, a government-manufacturer Stackelberg game model integrating differential game is constructed to determine the optimal government subsidy strategy and to investigate the effect of government subsidy on investment-production decisions. The results show that stable matching between the manufacturer and GT-supplier can be obtained. Numerical simulations verify the feasibility and rationality of the proposed matching game mechanism and demonstrate that GT investment profit is higher than non-investment profit, and subsidy profit is better than non-subsidy profit. The increase in the carbon price leads to an increase in the GT investment intensity. The increase in the carbon price can cause an increase in product greenness and green demand. The contributions of this paper are in providing an infrastructure for studying how managers can obtain the optimal GT investment-production strategy in the supply chain, and how the government formulates the optimal subsidy strategy to stimulate managers’ GT innovation behavior.
Keywords: Two-sided matching | Game theory | Green technology investment | Government regulation | Sustainable supply chain
مقاله انگلیسی
8 Implications of green optimism upon sustainable supply chain management
پیامدهای خوش بینی سبز بر مدیریت پایدار زنجیره تأمین-2021
In recent years, managers have increasingly integrated sustainability into their business models. However, they might overestimate the premium that average consumers are willing to pay for the environment. In this paper, we formulate a game-theoretical model that illustrates the impacts of green optimism which refers to managers’ optimistic bias about consumer environmental awareness. We consider a sustainable supply chain in which one manufacturer invests in green product development and sells the green product through one retailer. Each firm within the supply chain is operated by one manager who is either realistic or optimistic. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that managers’ optimistic bias might discourage investment in green product development. We also find that green optimism is always detrimental to the upstream manufacturer, but might be beneficial to the downstream retailer. Surprisingly, under certain conditions, green optimism can be detrimental to all stakeholders, i.e., firms in the supply chain, consumers, and the environment. This study suggests an interesting link between supply chain management and human resource management; that is, within a sustainable supply chain those managers who are optimistic about the future of green business might be an obstacle to the success of green business.
Keywords: Supply chain management | Sustainability | Optimism | Game theory | Green product development
مقاله انگلیسی
9 Could Chapter 11 redeem itself? Wealth and welfare effects of the redemption option
آیا فصل 11 می تواند خود را بازخرید کند؟ اثرات ثروت و رفاه گزینه رستگاری-2020
A redemption option granted to junior creditors has been advocated to accelerate Chapter 11 negotiations and rebalance junior recovery with respect to senior claims. We develop a game-theoretic, continuoustime model of the leveraged firm under Chapter 11 to assess the wealth transfers and welfare impacts of such an amendment to the bankruptcy procedure. After fitting the model to Chapter 11 current outcomes, we show that the redemption option design overcompensates junior creditors, leading to different, but not less frequent, Absolute Priority Rule violations. Since the reform shifts negotiations from a threeto a two-player game, it reduces the scope for concessions in the bargaining process and raises the risk of liquidation. Importantly, the redemption option aligns junior creditors’ interests with those of shareholders, thereby increasing the incentives for risk-shifting prior to bankruptcy.
Keywords: Chapter 11 | Bankruptcy | APR violation | Recovery | Game theory | Dynamic programming
مقاله انگلیسی
10 Hierarchical system model for the energy management in the smart grid: A game theoretic approach
مدل سیستم سلسله مراتبی برای مدیریت انرژی در شبکه هوشمند: یک رویکرد تئوری بازی-2020
Nowadays, Demand Side Management (DSM) in the Smart Grids (SG) opens new perspectives on the management of the prosumers’ demands. The use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) empowers SG with the capability of supporting two-way energy and information flows, facilitating the integration of renewable energy into the grid and empowering the consumer with tools for optimizing energy consumption and costs. Many researches have highlighted on the active role of consumers in the DSM. However, they limited their role to either negotiating with the providers about the unit energy price, or trading their surplus of energy, if any, with other prosumers or providers. In this paper, we introduce a hierarchical system model where multiple providers and prosumers interact to define the best price and demands. We highlight the capacity of a prosumer to produce energy and minimize the dependency on the providers in the overall proposed energy management. The latter will be able to maximize his satisfaction by trading energy, first, with other prosumers with a suitable price, and by interacting with the providers, if any remaining energy needed, in a distributed way. Hence, we optimize the price and demands while considering multiple constraints and different providers and prosumers by establishing a Stackelberg game to model two types of interactions: (1) prosumer–prosumer and (2) provider–consumer. We prove that a unique equilibrium solution exists and simulation results show that our proposed approach optimizes energy consumption and price.
Keywords:Demand side management | Energy trading | Prosumers | Providers | Game theory
مقاله انگلیسی
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