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ردیف | عنوان | نوع |
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1 |
Optimal pricing policies for differentiated brands under different supply chain power structures
سیاست های قیمت گذاری مطلوب برای مارک های متفاوت تحت ساختارهای قدرت زنجیره تامین متفاوت-2017 We investigate a supply chain in which a retailer is supplied by two manufacturers with differentiated
brands, a good brand and an average brand. The customers in the market are segmented based on value
and brand preference, namely the customer acceptance of the average brand and the customer surplus for
each brand. Both horizontal competition (between the two competing manufacturers) and vertical com
petition (between the manufacturers and the retailer) are considered through an exploration of different
power structure combinations. Multiple-stage game models are developed to examine the impact of dif
ferent power structures on the pricing decisions and the profits of the manufacturers and the retailer. We
find that intensified competition between the two manufacturers hurts the manufacturers and benefits
the retailer. No dominance among supply chain members (the two manufacturers and the retailer) leads
to the highest profit for the entire supply chain. We also find that for the two competing manufacturers,
being first to announce the pricing decision results in lower profit – the second to announce benefits
from knowing the rival’s price. This explains why rivals prefer not to reveal decisions on prices, bid rates,
and contracts, as this information represents bargaining power. The impact of customer acceptance of the
average brand is also analyzed.
Keywords: Retailing | Pricing | Customer’s value | Brand preference| Power structure |
مقاله انگلیسی |
2 |
Optimal pricing policies for differentiated brands under different supply chain power structures
سیاست های قیمت گذاری مطلوب برای مارک های متفاوت تحت ساختارهای قدرت زنجیره تامین مختلف-2017 We investigate a supply chain in which a retailer is supplied by two manufacturers with differentiated
brands, a good brand and an average brand. The customers in the market are segmented based on value
and brand preference, namely the customer acceptance of the average brand and the customer surplus for
each brand. Both horizontal competition (between the two competing manufacturers) and vertical com
petition (between the manufacturers and the retailer) are considered through an exploration of different
power structure combinations. Multiple-stage game models are developed to examine the impact of dif
ferent power structures on the pricing decisions and the profits of the manufacturers and the retailer. We
find that intensified competition between the two manufacturers hurts the manufacturers and benefits
the retailer. No dominance among supply chain members (the two manufacturers and the retailer) leads
to the highest profit for the entire supply chain. We also find that for the two competing manufacturers,
being first to announce the pricing decision results in lower profit – the second to announce benefits
from knowing the rival’s price. This explains why rivals prefer not to reveal decisions on prices, bid rates,
and contracts, as this information represents bargaining power. The impact of customer acceptance of the
average brand is also analyzed.
Keywords: Retailing | Pricing | Customer’s value | Brand preference | Power structure |
مقاله انگلیسی |