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ردیف | عنوان | نوع |
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1 |
Who will take on green product development in supply chains? Manufacturer or retailer
چه کسی توسعه محصول سبز را در زنجیره های تامین به عهده خواهد گرفت؟ تولید کننده یا خرده فروش-2021 : This paper investigates the optimal decisions, profits and social welfare in a green supply chain (GSC) when the manufacturer or retailer conducts green product development. Two Stackelberg game models are constructed here: the manufacturer-led green product development model (MD model) and retailer-led green product development model (RD model), and it is assumed that the green product developer is risk-averse. Then the optimal decisions and members’ profits under two models are obtained. Through comparing them, the results show that the product greenness and leader’s profit are always higher in MD model, but in which model the retail price, wholesale price and follower’s profit are higher/lower is related to the cost coefficient of green product development, the leaders’ risk aversion, and demand uncertainty. Moreover, the risk aversion and demand uncertainty have a negative impact on most decisions and profits, but their impact on followers’ profits under two models and the wholesale price of RD model are still affected by the cost coefficient of green product development. Finally, numerical experiments are used to compare the total profits and social welfare under two models. The results indicate that in most cases, the GSC’s total profit under RD model is higher, but the social welfare under MD model is higher. Keywords: Green product development | Green supply chain management | Stackelberg game | Risk aversion |
مقاله انگلیسی |
2 |
Implications of green optimism upon sustainable supply chain management
پیامدهای خوش بینی سبز بر مدیریت پایدار زنجیره تأمین-2021 In recent years, managers have increasingly integrated sustainability into their business models. However,
they might overestimate the premium that average consumers are willing to pay for the environment. In
this paper, we formulate a game-theoretical model that illustrates the impacts of green optimism which
refers to managers’ optimistic bias about consumer environmental awareness. We consider a sustainable
supply chain in which one manufacturer invests in green product development and sells the green product through one retailer. Each firm within the supply chain is operated by one manager who is either
realistic or optimistic. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that managers’ optimistic bias might
discourage investment in green product development. We also find that green optimism is always detrimental to the upstream manufacturer, but might be beneficial to the downstream retailer. Surprisingly,
under certain conditions, green optimism can be detrimental to all stakeholders, i.e., firms in the supply chain, consumers, and the environment. This study suggests an interesting link between supply chain
management and human resource management; that is, within a sustainable supply chain those managers who are optimistic about the future of green business might be an obstacle to the success of green
business. Keywords: Supply chain management | Sustainability | Optimism | Game theory | Green product development |
مقاله انگلیسی |
3 |
Green product design in supply chains under competition
طراحی محصول سبز در زنجیره تامین تحت رقابت-2017 In this paper, we investigate the green product design issues in supply chains under competition. Our
research questions address how supply chains’ decisions on the “greenness” of products are affected
by factors such as supply chain structures (centralized and decentralized), the green product types
(development-intensive product or marginal-cost intensive product), and the types of competition (price
competition and greenness competition). With a game-theoretic approach, our model starts with a simple
supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer. Then the model is expanded to include a horizon
tal retailer competition case and six cases of competing supply chains. Our results indicate that, 1. the
distortion from a non-coordinated supply chain (the double marginalization effect) has counter-intuitive
impact on the degree of product “greenness”; 2. supply chain price competition at the retailer level may
positively influence the equilibrium greenness while the product greenness competition reduces the equi
librium greenness, and the joint impact from price and greenness competition on equilibrium greenness
depends on the relative strength of the two types of competition.
Keywords: Development-intensive green product | (DIGP) | Marginal-cost intensive green product |(MIGP) |Green product development |Green supply chain design |
مقاله انگلیسی |