با سلام خدمت کاربران در صورتی که با خطای سیستم پرداخت بانکی مواجه شدید از طریق کارت به کارت (6037997535328901 بانک ملی ناصر خنجری ) مقاله خود را دریافت کنید (تا مشکل رفع گردد).
ردیف | عنوان | نوع |
---|---|---|
1 |
Optimal pay regulation for too-big-to-fail banks
مقررات پرداخت بهینه برای بانک های نزدیک به شکست بزرگ-2018 This paper considers optimal executive pay regulations for banks that are too-big-to-fail. Theoretically, we
map the consequences of a series of commonly-used pay schemes, describing their relative optimality and
ultimate societal consequences. We argue that in a world of too-big-to-fail policy, simple equity-linked
remuneration schemes maximise shareholder value by incentivising executives to choose excessively risky
projects at the expense of the taxpayer. We find that paying the executive partly in debt fails to mitigate
the project choice distortion when debt markets are informed. By contrast, both clawback rules and link
ing pay to interest rates can incentivise the executive to make socially optimal risk choices, but only
if they are accompanied by appropriate restrictions on the curvature of pay with respect to the bank’s
market value. Pay curvature can be generated by tools such as equity options and promotion policy. The
policy implication is that unless regulators can enforce restrictions on pay curvature, bank shareholders
can undermine the effectiveness of these pay regulations.
Keywords: Clawback ، Executive compensation ، Bankers’ bonuses ، Too-big-to-fail ، Risk taking ، Financial regulation |
مقاله انگلیسی |