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نتیجه جستجو - غرامت

تعداد مقالات یافته شده: 16
ردیف عنوان نوع
1 Effects of superiors’ compensation structures on psychophysiological responses and real earnings management decisions of subordinate managers
تأثیر ساختارهای جبران خسارت فوقانی بر پاسخهای روانشناختی و تصمیمات مدیریت واقعی درآمد مدیران فرعی-2020
This study examines the effects of executive compensation structures and research and development (R&D) reporting methods on subordinate managers’ psychophysiological responses and decisions to engage in real earnings management. Results from one 2×2 between-participants experiment indicate that when R&D expenditures are capitalized, relative to expensed, managers are less willing to abandon a failing project in favor of a superior project. Importantly, executive compensation structures can effectively reduce this form of real earnings management by subordinates. When executives are paid with restricted stock, relative to when executives are compensated with unrestricted stock, their subordinate managers are less willing to continue a failing R&D project when R&D expenses are capitalized. A second experiment that employs pupillometry, eye tracking and facial analysis in order to capture participants’ psychophysiological responses to incentive structures reveals that subordinates exhibit increased arousal and more intense negative emotions when they encounter supervisor pay structures that conflict with their personal incentives. Increases in negative emotion lead to reductions in earnings management behavior. The results indicate that compensation structures for superiors, such as executives, can significantly mitigate subordinate managers’ tendency to engage in real earnings management. In addition, from a methodological perspective, the second experiment indicates that hypothetical incentives are internalized by experiment participants, and hypothetical incentives lead to predictable psychophysiological responses and related decisions.
Keywords: Executive compensation | Emotion | Eye tracking | Facial expression | Incentives | Pupillometry | Real earnings management
مقاله انگلیسی
2 Sustainable expatriate compensation in an uncertain environment
غرامت پایدار خارج از کشور در یک محیط نامشخص-2020
This study examines an important area of strategic global human resource management - ex- patriate managers compensation in times of global business uncertainty. While expatriation has numerous well-documented benefits for multinational corporations (MNCs), it is incredibly costly. In consequence, when global business conditions become uncertain, the expatriate pro- gram in MNCs is typically one of the first budget centres to be targeted for cost savings. The MNC typically radically restructures expatriate remuneration. The resultant effect of these actions is a negative impact on the relationship between the expatriate and the MNC, ultimately reducing expatriate performance and thereby abating the many advantages that the expatriate program brings to MNCs. Social Exchange Theory and Real Options theory help to provide a theoretical framework to understand how expatriate compensation decisions can help to create a desirable sustainable expatriate program in MNCs.
Keywords: Expatriate manager | Compensation | Uncertainty | Sustainability | Social exchange theory | Real options theory
مقاله انگلیسی
3 Shareholder protection and bank executive compensation after the global financial crisis
حمایت سهامداران و غرامت اجرایی بانک پس از بحران مالی جهانی-2019
tWe use a hand-collected international database to analyze the change in the risk-taking incentivesembedded in bank executive compensation after the onset of the global financial crisis. Our results reveala reduction in both the risk sensitivity of stock option grants (vega) and total and cash pay-risk sensi-tivities in countries suffering systemic banking crises. This reduction is greater in countries with strongshareholder protection, especially in banks with good corporate governance, solvent banks, and banksthat suffered a reduction in their specific investment opportunity set. The regressions control for govern-ment intervention, banking development, and crisis intensity. Our results confirm that the contractinghypothesis is more relevant in countries with stronger shareholder protection, and provide support formeasures improving shareholder rights in the approval of bank executive compensation.
Keywords:Executive compensation | Banking crises | Bank risk | Bank performance | Shareholder protection
مقاله انگلیسی
4 Taxation and executive compensation: Evidence from stock options
مالیات و غرامت اجرایی: شواهدی از گزینه های بورس-2018
Understanding the effects of taxes on executive compensation provides insight into the process determining this compensation and is a key input to top income tax rate policy. A 2010 tax reform in Canada, which greatly increased the effective tax rate on stock option compensation for a subset of firms, provides a natural experiment with which to address this issue. Difference-in-differences estimates suggest that this tax increase resulted in an immediate reduction in both stock option grants and the fraction of total compensation made up of stock options with limited, if any, substitution towards other components of compensation.
keywords: Executive compensation |Taxation |Stock options
مقاله انگلیسی
5 Coordinating manufacturers innovation and retailers promotion and replenishment using a compensation-based wholesale price contract
هماهنگ سازی نوآوری سازنده و تبلیغ و تجدید تدارکات خرده فروش با استفاده از یک قرارداد قیمت عمده فروشی مبتنی بر غرامت-2018
In this paper, coordination of a manufacturer-retailer chain is investigated where the manufacturer innovates in manufacturing process and the retailer applies promotional efforts. The market demand is assumed to be stochastic dependent on the retailers promotional and the manufacturers innovation efforts. The retailer uses a periodic review inventory system for replenishing items and decides on order-up-to level, review period and promotional efforts level. On the other hand, it is possible for the manufacturer to boost the market demand by innovation in manufacturing process. The retailers promotional and manufacturers innovation efforts not only affect their profits, but also impress their mutual profits and the supply chain performance in an indirect manner. Firstly, we develop the decentralized and centralized decision-making models along with solution procedures and concavity analysis to solve the models. Although the centralized model improves the profitability of the whole supply chain, it may reduce the profitability of either the retailer or the manufacturer. Therefore, we propose a new compensation-based wholesale price contract for encouraging actors to take part in the joint decision-making scheme. Moreover, a profit sharing strategy based on the bargaining power of members is proposed for distributing the surplus profit between members. Finally, the results of the decentralized, centralized and coordination models are compared using test problems and some sensitivity analyses are presented.
keywords: Supply chain coordination |Promotional and innovation |Periodic review |Inventory system |Compensation |Wholesale price contract |Profit sharing
مقاله انگلیسی
6 Research note: Investor perceptions of comparable-to-industry versus higher-than-industry pay ratio disclosures
نکته تحقیقاتی: برداشت های سرمایه گذار از نرخ پرداخت های قابل قیاس با صنعت دربرابر بالاتر از صنعت-2018
The usefulness of the CEO-to-employee pay ratio disclosure to investors is subject to significant debate. Our experiment examines participant responses to higher-than-industry and comparable-to-industry pay ratio disclosures in a company. A prior experiment by Kelly and Seow (2016) (hereafter KS) found that incrementally disclosing a higher-than-industry pay ratio on top of higher-than-industry CEO pay had indirect negative effects on the company’s perceived investment potential, via negative perceptions about the fairness of the CEO pay and workplace climate. We find that the negative indirect effects of pay ratio disclosures on perceived investment potential in KS are replicable in our study, and for a less extreme comparable-to-industry pay ratio. We do not find evidence that the effects of incremental pay ratio disclosure on investor perceptions are stronger when the pay ratio is higher-than-industry than when it is comparable-to-industry. Our study suggests that the ability of pay ratio disclosures to impact investor perceptions extends across a range of pay ratios.
keywords: CEO compensation disclosure| CEO-to-employee pay ratio| Investor perceptions
مقاله انگلیسی
7 The optimal timing of CEO compensation
زمان بندی بهینه غرامت CEO-2018
We extend a standard principal-agent model of CEO compensation by modeling the progressive attenuation of information asymmetries about firm value by shareholders in continuous time. The dynamics of the stock price process are affected by the continuous accumulation of exogenous shocks, and by the progressive resolution of information asymmetries. The optimal timing of compensation is the point in time at which the stock price is most informative about the manager’s action. When exogenous shocks accumulate at a constant rate over time and information asymmetries are resolved at a decreasing rate, the optimal timing of compensation is the point in time at which these two rates coincide.
keywords: Deferred compensation| Executive compensation| Principal-agent model
مقاله انگلیسی
8 Corporate social responsibility and CEO compensation structure
مسئولیت پذیری اجتماعی شرکتی و ساختار پرداخت غرامت CEO-2018
We examine how firms corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance affects CEO compensation structure. Traditional agency theory suggests that CEOs engage in CSR for their own interests at the expense of shareholders. A competing argument is that CEOs consider firms social performance as a business strategy to increase firm value and align their interests with those of shareholders. Our results support the latter prediction. We find that a firms social performance is negatively associated with the proportion of cash-based compensation, while it is positively associated with the proportion of equity-based compensation. These results are robust to the degree of corporate governance, and they are more pronounced for firms with high levels of inside director ownership and long director tenure. Overall, our findings highlight the positive impact of CSR performance on CEO compensation packages, implying that CEOs fiduciary behavior of engaging in CSR leads to mitigating agency problems and maximizing firm value.
keywords: Corporate social responsibility (CSR)| CEO compensation| CEO compensation structure| Equity-based compensation| Cash-based compensation| Corporate governance
مقاله انگلیسی
9 Quality management standards, institutionalization and organizational implications: A longitudinal analysis
استانداردهای مدیریت کیفیت، سازمانی سازی و دلالت های سازمانی: یک تحلیل طولی-2018
We explore longitudinally how the institutionalization of quality management standards would lead to paradoxical performance implications. Specifically, we examine the organizational consequences of ISO 9000 adoption when the standard was increasingly institutionalized in the manufacturing industry in the early years. Based on hierarchical linear modeling of panel data of manufacturing firms, we find that the sales revenues of ISO 9000 certified firms increased steadily when the standard is increasingly institutionalized. However, operational efficiency significantly deteriorates at the same time, so as the shareholder value (measured by Tobins q). We further reveal that the institutionalization of ISO 9000 leads to higher CEO compensation, despite deteriorating operational efficiency. We argue that when process systems like ISO 9000 are institutionalized, they lead to certain negative consequences. To make management standards less susceptible to institutional forces, we believe that a fact-based, result-oriented approach in the implementation should be stressed.
keywords: Institutional theory |Quality management |Sales revenue |Operational efficiency |Compensation
مقاله انگلیسی
10 The effectiveness of clawback adoptions in mitigating over-investments – Does board governance play a role?
مفید بودن بازپرداخت هزینه دادرسی در کاهش سرمایه گذاری های بیش از حد - آیا نظارت بر هیئت ایفای نقش می کند؟-2018
The adoption of clawbacks purports to mitigate harmful behavior to firms operation induced by incentive-based executive compensation contracts. While strong corporate governance is necessary to maximize the utility of clawback provisions, the current clawback literature does not sufficiently consider the impact of board governance on the effectiveness of clawback adoptions in improving corporate conduct (Addy, Chu, & Yoder, 2014). In this study, we examine the effect of board governance on the relation between firm-initiated clawback adoptions and firms propensity to over-invest. We first show that the presence of clawback provisions is significantly associated with a decreased level of corporate over-investments. More importantly, we find that the decrease in over-investments for clawback adopters is materially diluted in the presence of a weak board governance structure. Overall, our findings suggest that strong board governance is necessary to ensure the effectiveness of clawback provisions in mitigating over-investments.
keywords: Clawback| Over-investment(s)| Investment efficiency| Compensation| Board governance
مقاله انگلیسی
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