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Matching-game approach for green technology investment strategies in a supply chain under environmental regulations
رویکرد بازی تطبیقی برای استراتژی های سرمایه گذاری فناوری سبز در یک زنجیره تأمین تحت مقررات زیست محیطی-2021 Facing increasingly severe environmental problems, green technology (GT) innovation has become an effective way to achieve the sustainable development of firms. Many manufacturers often choose and invest in appropriate GTs from GT-suppliers to improve the environmental impact of production. But others
abandon GTs because they are too expensive to invest in. This paper thereby studies the dynamic investment strategy of GT in a manufacturer-supplier supply chain and explores the optimal government
subsidy incentive and its impact on investment and sustainable production decisions. Firstly, an original
two-sided matching game model (including two-sided matching analysis and Nash equilibrium analysis)
is presented to study the matching process between a manufacturer with a limited investment budget
and a GT-supplier with GTs and to determine the optimal GT investment-production strategy. Then, a
government-manufacturer Stackelberg game model integrating differential game is constructed to determine the optimal government subsidy strategy and to investigate the effect of government subsidy on
investment-production decisions. The results show that stable matching between the manufacturer and
GT-supplier can be obtained. Numerical simulations verify the feasibility and rationality of the proposed
matching game mechanism and demonstrate that GT investment profit is higher than non-investment
profit, and subsidy profit is better than non-subsidy profit. The increase in the carbon price leads to an
increase in the GT investment intensity. The increase in the carbon price can cause an increase in product greenness and green demand. The contributions of this paper are in providing an infrastructure for
studying how managers can obtain the optimal GT investment-production strategy in the supply chain,
and how the government formulates the optimal subsidy strategy to stimulate managers’ GT innovation
behavior. Keywords: Two-sided matching | Game theory | Green technology investment | Government regulation | Sustainable supply chain |
مقاله انگلیسی |
2 |
Supply chain coordination with green technology under cap-and-trade regulation
هماهنگی زنجیره تامین با تکنولوژی سبز تحت مقررات معامله و تجارت-2017 Cap-and-trade regulation is generally accepted as one of the most effective market-based mechanisms to
curb carbon emissions. In this paper, we study the production and emission abatement decisions of a
Make-To-Order supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer under cap-and trade regulation.
Specifically, the manufacturer can reduce unit product carbon emission by using green technology, with
the cooperation of a retailer by certain contracts, who sell the products to environment-concerned
consumers. Wholesale price and cost sharing contracts are considered in the supply chain. We list some
main conclusions here. First, as carbon trading price increases, the optimal production quantities (the
optimal abatement levels) firstly decrease (increase) and then remain constant. Second, both wholesale
price and cost sharing contracts can coordinate the supply chain. Last, combining the optimal operational
decisions under the two contracts with two-part tariff agreement, we design a contract in which the
retailer pays a lump fee to the manufacturer, and find that there is an interval of the lump fee to achieve
Pareto improvement for the two firms.
Keywords: Cap-and-trade | Production | Green technology | Supply chain coordination | Wholesale price contract | Cost sharing contract |
مقاله انگلیسی |