دانلود و نمایش مقالات مرتبط با قدرت چانه زنی::صفحه 1
بلافاصله پس از پرداخت دانلود کنید

با سلام خدمت کاربران در صورتی که با خطای سیستم پرداخت بانکی مواجه شدید از طریق کارت به کارت (6037997535328901 بانک ملی ناصر خنجری ) مقاله خود را دریافت کنید (تا مشکل رفع گردد). 

نتیجه جستجو - قدرت چانه زنی

تعداد مقالات یافته شده: 5
ردیف عنوان نوع
1 Bargaining power as moderator of the “delay costs effect” in supply chain negotiations
قدرت چانه زنی به عنوان تعدیل کننده "اثر هزینه تأخیر" در مذاکرات زنجیره تامین-2021
This paper explores the extent to which bargaining power asymmetries among supply chain members moderate the effect that the delay costs of the setting exert on negotiation outcomes. First, we propose that the influence of delay costs on the initial gap between the bargaining demands of sellers and buyers (i.e., initial bargaining gap) decreases when buyers have a bargaining power advantage over sellers. Second, we posit that this moderation effect reduces the indirect effect that the delay costs have on negotiation outcomes (via the initial bargaining gap). To test these notions, we conduct a 2 × 2 between-subjects experiment with undergraduate students from a large European university in which we manipulate the relative bargaining power and delay costs of the setting. We conduct our analysis with 292 observations. Our findings support our theoretical predictions. Specifically, results indicate that bargaining power moderates (i.e., reduces) the effect of the delay costs on negotiation processes by reducing their influence on the initial bargaining gap. Likewise, our analysis shows that because more powerful buyers are less likely to modify their behavior as a result of the delay costs, they face a higher risk of obtaining suboptimal bargaining profits.
Keywords: Relative bargaining power | Delay costs | Initial bargaining gap | Supply chain negotiations
مقاله انگلیسی
2 How to select a Supply Chain Finance solution?
چگونه می توان یک راه حل تامین مالی برای زنجیره تامین را انتخاب کرد؟-2021
In the complex picture of Supply Chain Finance (SCF), there is still a need for a model supporting managerial decisions in selecting the most suitable financing solution. The objective of the presented exploratory work is to bring together the relational aspects between buyers and suppliers, and the characteristics of SCF solutions. Based on expert interviews and a focus group, the main result consists of a classification model of buyer-led SCF solutions, according to the characteristics of the relationship between a buyer and its suppliers, in terms of bargaining power and cumulative transaction value. The model thus describes the logics behind the adoption by a buyer firm of one or more SCF solutions to be implemented with different suppliers.
Keywords: SCF | Decision making | Bargaining power
مقاله انگلیسی
3 Collective bargaining power and corporate cash policy
قدرت چانه زنی جمعی و سیاست نقدی شرکت-2020
This paper provides novel evidence on the role of labor unions in firms’ corporate cash policy. Examining the unionization rates of firms across 29 countries for the period 2004–2015, we show that firms respond to an increase in unionization rate by decreasing their corporate cash holdings. The reported effect is symmetric, in that firms respond to increases (decreases) in unionization rate by decreasing (increasing) their cash buffers. These results are consistent with the bargaining hypothesis, namely, that firms strategically decrease their cash level to counter the rise in employees’ bargaining power due to increased unionization. Additionally, we find that the negative effect of unionization on cash holdings is more pronounced in labor-intensive, large, high-growth, high profitability, and low labor productive firms. The countries’ quality of institutions intensifies the documented relationship, what is in line with the cost economies theory. Moreover, we exploit shocks to the economies and show that increase in the unionization following a banking crisis influence negatively firm’s cash levels. These findings are robust to different unionization variable constructions, alternative dependent variable definitions, controlling for potentially correlated time-variant firm characteristics, saturation of a dense set of fixed effects, and endogeneity concerns.
Keywords: Corporate finance | Labor Unions | Cash | Institutions
مقاله انگلیسی
4 Who is the king of the hill? On bargaining power in private equity buyouts
سلطان تپه کیست؟ در مورد قدرت چانه زنی در خرید سهام خصوصی-2020
Advancing the literature on Private Equity (PE) buyout negotiations and family-business decision making, we theorize and empirically confirm that sources of bargaining power (i.e., PE expertise advantage and sellers time pressure) interact differently with perceived PE bargaining power, depending upon whether the seller is a family or a non-family business. Additionally, we demonstrate that, for family businesses with an increased family team complexity, the effect of bidder competition becomes weaker, whereas the relationship of PE expertise advantage on PE bargaining power becomes stronger. Hence, team complexity reduces a family business decision power and increases a PEs comparative bargaining advantages. These findings contribute to several research streams: first, to that of family businesses by advancing knowledge on heterogeneity, operationalized as team complexity, that negatively affects a family business bargaining power; second, to that on PE buyouts, with a finding that a PE firms bargaining power differs significantly depending upon the type of seller (family vs. non-family business) due to a family business unique socio-emotional wealth considerations; and third, to the general strategic management literature on upper echelons and top-management teams (TMT), with a finding that team complexity reduces the family business teams behavioral integration and hence its ability to use potential bargaining advantages.
Keywords: PE buyout deals | Family business | Sources of bargaining power | Team complexity
مقاله انگلیسی
5 Learning pareto optimal solution of a multi-attribute bilateral negotiation using deep reinforcement
یادگیری راه حل بهینه پارتو یک مذاکره دوجانبه چند شاخصه با استفاده از تقویت عمیق-2020
This paper aims to design an intelligent buyer to learn how to decide in an incomplete information multiattribute bilateral simultaneous negotiation. The buyer does not know the negotiation strategy of the seller and only have access to the historical data of the previous negotiations. Using the historical data and clustering method, the type of seller is identified online during the negotiation. Then, the deep reinforcement learning method is utilized to support the buyer to learn its optimal decision. In the complete information case, we prove that the negotiation admits a unique Nash bargaining solution with possibly asymmetric negotiation powers. In comprehensive simulation studies, the efficiency of the proposed learning agent is evaluated in different scenarios and we show that the learning negotiation with incomplete information is converged to a Pareto optimal solution. Then, using the concept of the Nash bargaining solution, the negotiation power of the buyer is assessed in negotiation.
Keywords: Multi-attribute negotiation | Deep auto encoder | Actor-critic | Nash bargaining solution | Bargaining power
مقاله انگلیسی
rss مقالات ترجمه شده rss مقالات انگلیسی rss کتاب های انگلیسی rss مقالات آموزشی
logo-samandehi
بازدید امروز: 2514 :::::::: بازدید دیروز: 3084 :::::::: بازدید کل: 5598 :::::::: افراد آنلاین: 58