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1 |
Coordinating a closed loop supply chain with fairness concern by a constant wholesale price contract
هماهنگی یک زنجیره تامین حلقه بسته با رعایت انصاف توسط یک قرارداد ثابت قیمت عمده فروشی-2021 The literature on closed loop supply chains (CLSCs) has ignored advantageous inequality aversion while
modelling the fairness concern of channel partners and demonstrated that coordinating a decentralised
channel requires complex price contracts. In this paper, we show that a constant wholesale price contract
can coordinate a decentralised channel in a manufacturer-led CLSC if the retailer’s advantageous inequality aversion is sufficiently strong. The result is valid for a range of equitable shares of the channel profit,
such that the allocated share of the manufacturer is larger than that of the retailer, and the retailer’s
share is greater than a minimum threshold. Used product collection rate and channel profit are higher
when the retailer is inequality averse compared to when she is a profit maximiser. The results are independent of whether the end-of-use products are collected by the manufacturer or the retailer. We also
show that the collection rate is higher, and both channel partners are better-off, under the manufacturer
collection model. To obtain these results, we solve multistage sequential move games under the two collection models. We apply Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions for constrained optimisation, to determine the
boundaries for the existence of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Keywords: Pricing | Channel coordination | Fairness | Inequality aversion | Wholesale price contract |
مقاله انگلیسی |
2 |
Coordinating manufacturers innovation and retailers promotion and replenishment using a compensation-based wholesale price contract
هماهنگ سازی نوآوری سازنده و تبلیغ و تجدید تدارکات خرده فروش با استفاده از یک قرارداد قیمت عمده فروشی مبتنی بر غرامت-2018 In this paper, coordination of a manufacturer-retailer chain is investigated where the manufacturer innovates in manufacturing process and the retailer applies promotional efforts. The market demand is assumed to be stochastic dependent on the retailers promotional and the manufacturers innovation efforts. The retailer uses a periodic review inventory system for replenishing items and decides on order-up-to level, review period and promotional efforts level. On the other hand, it is possible for the manufacturer to boost the market demand by innovation in manufacturing process. The retailers promotional and manufacturers innovation efforts not only affect their profits, but also impress their mutual profits and the supply chain performance in an indirect manner. Firstly, we develop the decentralized and centralized decision-making models along with solution procedures and concavity analysis to solve the models. Although the centralized model improves the profitability of the whole supply chain, it may reduce the profitability of either the retailer or the manufacturer. Therefore, we propose a new compensation-based wholesale price contract for encouraging actors to take part in the joint decision-making scheme. Moreover, a profit sharing strategy based on the bargaining power of members is proposed for distributing the surplus profit between members. Finally, the results of the decentralized, centralized and coordination models are compared using test problems and some sensitivity analyses are presented.
keywords: Supply chain coordination |Promotional and innovation |Periodic review |Inventory system |Compensation |Wholesale price contract |Profit sharing |
مقاله انگلیسی |
3 |
Online-offline fashion franchising supply chains without channel conflicts: Choices on postponement and contracts
زنجیره تامین زنجیره امتیازی مد اینترنتی آفلاین و بدون درگیری کانال: انتخاب های تعویقی قراردادها-2017 Online-offline operations are known to induce channel conflicts if the same products are offered by them. Under
many franchising arrangements in the fashion industry, to avoid channel conflicts and cannibalization between
the franchisee and the brand owner, the brand owner will first supply the product for the franchisee to sell offline
in the first period. After that, the brand owner will sell the product online directly in the second period. We
explore this online-offline model with the focal points on the choice of franchising contract and the ordering time.
By modelling the choices under four different scenarios, we derive the analytical conditions in which one scenario
is preferred to another scenario with respect to contract type and ordering time option. We examine the problem
from the perspectives of the brand owner, the franchisee and the supply chain. We identify the situations in which
the optimal choices of the brand owner and the supply chain are the same, as well as the conditions when Pareto
improvement is achievable.
Keywords: Online-to-offline operations | O2O | Franchise | Supply chain management | Wholesale pricing contract | Profit sharing royalty | Choice of contracts | Information updating |
مقاله انگلیسی |