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نتیجه جستجو - مقررات بانکی

تعداد مقالات یافته شده: 23
ردیف عنوان نوع
1 The impact of banking regulations and accounting standards on estimating discretionary loan loss provisions
تأثیر مقررات بانکی و استانداردهای حسابداری بر برآورد ذخایر زیان وام اختیاری-2021
Loan loss provisions (LLP) are relatively large accruals for commercial banks (Ahmed et al., 1999), and therefore, have a significant impact on banks’ earnings and regulatory capital. Moreover, LLP are one of the leading accounting disclosure items that offer a substantial scope of discretion to managers (Moyer, 1990). The discretionary nature of LLP makes them particularly useful in examining the impact of regulations on managerial behaviour (Kim and Kross, 1998). The main objective of LLP is to modify the banks’ loan loss reserves to reflect the expected future losses in the banks’ loan portfolio. However, prior evidence suggests that managers employ LLP to (a) manage earnings (b) manage regulatory capital, and (c) as a signal to communicate their private information to investors about future prospects (Bushman and Williams, 2012; Elliott et al., 1991; Moyer, 1990; Scholes et al., 1990). Several models have been proposed in the banking literature to estimate the expected LLP and identify the discretionary component. These models include Wahlen (1994), Beatty et al. (1995), Beaver and Engel (1996), Kim and Kross (1998), Ahmed et al. (1999), Liu and Ryan (2006), Kanagaretnam et al. (2010), Bushman and Williams (2012), Beck and Narayanmoorthy (2013), Bouvatier et al. (2014),
keywords: تامین ضرر وام | ارائه اختیاری | دارایی غیرفعال | اقلام تعهدی | رفتار مدیریتی | رویکرد متحمل ضرر | Loan loss provision | Discretionary provision | Nonperforming asset | Accruals | Managerial behaviour | Incurred-loss approach
مقاله انگلیسی
2 Credit expansion, bank liberalization, and structural change in bank asset accounts
گسترش اعتبار، آزاد سازی بانک، و تغییر ساختاری در حسابهای دارایی بانک-2021
This paper studies the links among credit supply expansion, commercial bank asset ac- count structures, and the housing boom preceding the 20 07–20 09 financial crisis. We propose a real business cycle model with a housing market and financial intermediaries (banks) subject to leverage constraints. In our model, banks channel funds to firms for production and provide collateralized loans to mortgage borrowers; thus, banks determine their asset account structures endogenously. We show that a credit supply expansion to banks can account for four key facts that characterize the housing boom: (1) an increase in real house prices; (2) an increase in the mortgage-to-GDP ratio; (3) a decrease in the real mortgage interest rate; and (4) an increase in the ratio of mortgages to firm loans in commercial bank asset accounts. In our model, a credit supply expansion to banks can also generate a boom-bust cycle through the collateral value channel via mortgage borrowers. Asset-side bank regulations that reduce excessive mortgage issuance during a credit boom can help to dampen the subsequent economic downturn.
keywords: گسترش اعتبار | لیبرال سازی بانک | ورق بانکی | چرخه کسب و کار | Credit expansion | Bank liberalization | Bank balance sheet | Business cycle
مقاله انگلیسی
3 Drivers of systemic risk: Do national and European perspectives differ?
گردانندگان ریسک سیستمیک: آیا دیدگاه ملی و اروپا متفاوت است؟-2019
With the establishment of the Banking Union, the European Central Bank has been granted the power to impose stricter regulations than the national regulator if systemic risks are not adequately addressed at the national level. We ask whether there is a cross-border externality in the sense that a bank’s systemic risk differs when applying a national versus a European perspective. On average, banks’ contribution to systemic risk is similar at the two regional levels, and so is the ranking of banks. Generally, larger banks and banks with a lower share of loans are more systemically important. The effects of these variables are qualitatively but not quantitatively similar at the national versus the European level.
Keywords: Systemic risk | Bank regulation | Banking Union
مقاله انگلیسی
4 Accounting standards and banking regulation: Some effects of divergence
استانداردهای حسابداری و مقررات بانکی: برخی از اثرات واگرایی-2019
This paper examines the impact of divergence between accounting standards and banking regulation – for example, when banks’ assets are marked-to-market for regulatory purposes but not for accounting purposes. I build a model that examines divergence in connection with riskmanagement by banks. The model shows that divergence results in a risk-management trade-off – using derivatives to hedge has regulatory benefits but accounting costs, or vice versa. Banks thus hedge to a lesser extent. Hence, a negative shock is more likely to make banks insolvent. More generally, the model identifies a mechanism by which divergence can have undesirable “real effects.”
Keywords: Banks | Banking regulation | Accounting standards | Risk-management | Derivatives
مقاله انگلیسی
5 The Regulations–Risk Taking Nexus under Competitive Pressure: What about the Islamic Banking System?
مقررات - ریسک پذیری Nexus تحت فشار رقابتی: سیستم بانکی اسلامی چیست؟-2019
Does market power condition the effect of bank regulations and supervision on bank risk taking? We focus on three regulatory tools: capital requirements, the restriction of activities, and official supervisory powers. Employing 10 years of unbalanced panel data on 123 Islamic and conventional banks operating in the Middle East and Asia, we arrive at the following conclusions. First, banking market power strengthens the negative impact of capital regulation on bank risk taking. Second, our empirical results suggest that the negative effect of activity restrictions on stability is diminished when banks have greater market power. Finally, we do not find strong evidence that the negative effect of supervisory power on banks’ risk taking is conditioned by their competitive behavior. In further analysis, we differentiate between Islamic and conventional banks regarding their competition, as well as their risk behavior. The results differ according to the banking business model. These findings could be useful for bank regulators in light of the accomplishment of Islamic banks’ regulatory framework. Indeed, the adoption of Basel III represents a significant regulatory challenge, given that it does not take into account the specificities of Islamic bank
Keywords: Market power | Z-score | nonperforming loans | banking regulations | Islamic banks | JEL Classification: G21 | G32
مقاله انگلیسی
6 Capital regulation and banking bubbles
تنظیم سرمایه و حباب های بانکی-2019
This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model in infinite horizon with a regulated banking sector. We borrow the methodology of Miao and Wang (2015) to analyse how Basel capital requirement recommendations may generate and affect banking bubbles and macroeconomic key variables. We show that when banks face capital requirements based on credit risk, as in Basel I, bubbles cannot exist. Alternatively, under a regulatory framework where capital requirements are based on Value-at-Risk, as in Basel II and III, two different equilibria emerge and can coexist: the bubbleless and the bubbly equilibria. Bubbles can be positive or negative, depending on the tightness of capital requirements based on Value-at-Risk. We find a maximum value of capital requirement below which bubbles are positive and provide a larger welfare compared to the bubbleless equilibrium. Our results also suggest that a change in banking policies might lead to a crisis without external shocks
Keywords: Banking bubbles | Banking regulation | Dynamic general equilibrium | Infinitely lived agents | Value-at-risk | Capital requirements
مقاله انگلیسی
7 Enforcement of banking regulation and the cost of borrowing
اجرای مقررات بانکی و هزینه استقراض-2019
We show that borrowing firms benefit substantially from important enforcement actions issued on U.S. banks for safety and soundness reasons. Using hand-collected data on such actions from the main three U.S. regulators and syndicated loan deals over the years 1997–2014, we find that enforcement actions decrease the total cost of borrowing by approximately 22 basis points (or $4.6 million interest for the average loan). We attribute our finding to a competition-reputation effect that works over and above the lower risk of punished banks post-enforcement and survives in a number of sensitivity tests. We also find that this effect persists for approximately four years post-enforcement
Keywords: Bank supervision | Enforcement actions | Syndicated loans | Loan pricing
مقاله انگلیسی
8 A comparison of community bank failures and FDIC losses in the 1986-92 and 2007-13 banking crises
مقایسه عدم موفقیت بانکهای جامعه و ضررهای FDIC در بحرانهای بانکی 1986-92 و 2007-133-2019
Failures and FDIC losses for community banks during the banking crises of the late 1980s and late 20 0 0s are compared. Despite increases in risky commercial real estate (CRE) lending and more severe economic shocks in the recent crisis, failure rates were lower. We find that other changes in bank characteristics, like higher capital, made community banks more resilient to shocks. In contrast, FDIC losses on failed banks were higher. These are not explained by changes in CRE exposure or economic shocks. We find that an interest-receivable variable is predictive of failures and FDIC losses. Implications for prompt corrective action are discussed .
Keywords: Bank regulation | Bank failures | Prompt corrective action | FDIC losse
مقاله انگلیسی
9 Justifying the logic of regulatory post-crisis decision-making – The case of the French structural banking reform
توجیه منطق تصمیم گیری نظارتی پس از بحران - مورد اصلاح ساختار بانکی ساختاری فرانسه-2019
Relying on the theories of institutional logics (Friedland and Alford) and French pragmatist sociology (Boltanski and Thévenot), this study aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of the dynamics of the regulatory rule-making processes in the aftermath of the financial crisis. It focuses on a national post-crisis financial market reform, namely the French structural banking reform of 2013, which is characterized by a remarkable discrepancy between the ambitious announcements that accompanied the reform and its actual impact on banks’ structure. By analysing the justifications put forward by policy-makers in support of their decisions on the amendments to the bill, this paper investigates how policy-makers succeeded in maintaining and defending the historically dominant logic (i.e., market) in a situation of controversy by actively mobilizing different orders of worth. Complex mechanisms of reconciliation between orders of worth are revealed. In particular, the study identifies the strategy of symbolization of the competing order as a means of supporting the dominating logic in the context of a national post-crisis financial market reform. The technique of balancing different measures with diverging impacts on the banking sector enables the policy-makers to refer to a (symbolic) equilibrium solution, which shields their actions against criticism and helps them to achieve legitimacy
Keywords: Banking regulation | Institutional logics | Orders of worth | Justification
مقاله انگلیسی
10 Loan loss provisioning by Italian banks: Managerial discretion, relationship banking, functional distance and bank risk
تأمین ضرر وام توسط بانکهای ایتالیایی: اختیارات مدیریتی ، روابط بانکی ، فاصله عملکردی و ریسک بانکی-2019
This paper investigates the loan loss provisioning behaviour of Italian banks during the period 2006–2013. We examine the main discretionary and non-discretionary determinants of loan loss provisions (LLPs) and explicitly investigate the role of banks functional distance, geographic diversification and risk. Empirical results suggest that LLPs by Italian banks are mainly driven by non-discretionary factors related to expected credit risk. Moreover, we find that distantly managed banks adopt a more prudent provisioning approach, whereas small local cooperative credit banks have a lower level of LLPs. We also show that LLPs are higher in regional banking systems with higher loan concentration and lower degree of competition. Finally, we find that banks facing increasing levels of risk are not only characterised by higher LLPs, but also have a higher tendency to engage in earnings management practices to stabilise their income flows over time.
Keywords: Loan loss provisions | Income smoothing | Bank regulation | Functional distance | Earnings volatility | Italian banks
مقاله انگلیسی
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