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نتیجه جستجو - نظارت شرکتی

تعداد مقالات یافته شده: 17
ردیف عنوان نوع
1 The consequences of managerial indiscretions: Sex, lies, and firm value
پیامدهای بی احتیاطی های مدیریتی: جنسیت، دروغ ها و ارزش شرکت-2018
Personal managerial indiscretions are separate from a firms business activities but provide information about the managers integrity. Consequently, they could affect counterparties’ trust in the firm and the firms value and operations. We find that companies of accused executives experience significant wealth deterioration, reduced operating margins, and lost business partners. Indiscretions are also associated with an increased probability of unrelated shareholder-initiated lawsuits, Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission investigations, and managed earnings. Further, chief executive officers and boards face labor market consequences, including forced turnover, pay cuts, and lower shareholder votes at re-election. Indiscretions occur more often at poorly governed firms where disciplinary turnover is less likely.
keywords: Managerial indiscretions |Management quality |Integrity |Class action lawsuits |Fraud |Earnings management |Corporate governance |Managerial labor markets |Director elections |CEO turnover |Poor monitoring index
مقاله انگلیسی
2 Capital gains lock-in and governance choices
درونی بودن بهره های سرمایه ای و انتخاب های نظارتی-2018
Differences in accrued gains and investors’ tax-sensitivity induce variation in a capital gains lock-in effect across mutual funds even for the same stock at the same time. Exploiting this variation, we show this effect influences funds’ governance decisions: higher capital gains decrease the likelihood a fund exits prior to contentious votes and increase the likelihood a fund votes against management. Consistent with tax motivation, these findings are concentrated among funds with tax-sensitive investors. Further, high aggregate capital gains across funds holding a stock predict a higher likelihood management loses a vote and a lower likelihood a contentious vote is proposed.
keywords: Mutual fund |Proxy voting |Corporate governance |Capital-gains tax |Lock-in effect
مقاله انگلیسی
3 Pay me now (and later): Pension benefit manipulation before plan freezes and executive retirement
همین الان به من پرداخت کن (و بعدا"): اجرای سود بازنشستگی قبل از سرد شدن برنامه و بازنشستگی اجرایی-2018
Large US firms modify top executives’ compensation before pension-related events. Top executives receive one-time increases in pensionable earnings through higher annual bonuses one year before a plan freeze and one year before retirement. Firms also boost pension payouts by lowering plan discount rates when top executives are eligible to retire with lump-sum benefit distributions. Increases in executive pensions do not appear to be an attempt to improve managerial effort or retention and are more likely to occur at firms with poor corporate governance. These findings suggest that in some circumstances managers are able to extract rents through their pension plans.
keywords: Corporate governance |Executive annual bonuses |Defined benefit pension plans |Pension freezes |Executive retirement
مقاله انگلیسی
4 Does CEO bias escalate repurchase activity?
آیا تمایل CEO فعالیت بازخرید را متشنج می کند؟-2018
We propose and test the hypothesis that overconfident-CEOs, with upwardly-biased estimates of own firm-value, are more predisposed to repurchasing stock. An implication is that the stock-market, recognizing overconfident-CEO behavior, will react less positively to repurchase announcements. The hypothesis is strongly supported: Overconfident managers repurchase stock at lower levels of cash holdings, and respond more to stock-price declines. Entrenchment exacerbates this behavior. Interestingly, institutional investors appear to encourage repurchases, perhaps to curb excessive investment. Overconfident-CEOs are also more likely to substitute repurchases for dividends or capital expenditure. Consistent with our hypothesis, the stock-market reaction to these share repurchase announcements is less positive.
keywords: Overconfidence |Repurchases |Dividend-repurchase substitution |Investment-repurchase substitution |Corporate governance
مقاله انگلیسی
5 Agency problems in firms with an even number of directors: Evidence from China
مشکلات عامل در شرکتهایی با یک تعداد مدیران زوج: شواهدی از چین-2018
To avoid a tie in voting, most boards have an odd number of directors. We argue that boards with an even number of directors are more likely to be weak monitors because of inefficient decision making and being captured by controlling shareholders. Consistent with this argument, we find that in China boards with an even number of directors have fewer meetings and are more likely to have board members absent from board meetings. Firms with an even number of directors have more tunnelling through intercorporate loans and related party transactions, lower financial reporting quality and higher incidence of accounting irregularities. This evidence is stronger in firms with weaker external monitoring and for directors with weaker incentives to monitor. Finally, we show that firms with an even number of directors are associated with lower market valuation of equity. Our results suggest that corporate boards with an even number of directors in emerging markets are associated with more agency problems.
keywords: Board of directors |Corporate governance |Agency problems |Monitoring |China
مقاله انگلیسی
6 Industry expert directors
مدیران کارشناس صنعت-2018
We analyze the valuation effect of board industry experience and channels through which industry experience of outside directors relates to firm value. Our analysis shows that firms with more experienced outside directors are valued at a premium compared to firms with less experienced outside directors. Additional analyses, including a quasi-experimental setting based on director deaths, mitigate endogeneity concerns. The association between having directors with more industry experience and higher firm value is more pronounced for firms with larger investment programs, larger cash reserves, and during crises. In contrast, it is weaker in more dynamic industries, i.e., industries that rank high in terms of sales growth, R&D expenditures, merger activities, competitive threat, and product market changes, where the value of previously acquired experience is likely to be diminished. Overall, our findings are consistent with board industry experience being a valuable corporate governance mechanism.
keywords: Board of directors |Director skills and experience |Corporate governance |Corporate investments
مقاله انگلیسی
7 Corporate social responsibility and CEO compensation structure
مسئولیت پذیری اجتماعی شرکتی و ساختار پرداخت غرامت CEO-2018
We examine how firms corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance affects CEO compensation structure. Traditional agency theory suggests that CEOs engage in CSR for their own interests at the expense of shareholders. A competing argument is that CEOs consider firms social performance as a business strategy to increase firm value and align their interests with those of shareholders. Our results support the latter prediction. We find that a firms social performance is negatively associated with the proportion of cash-based compensation, while it is positively associated with the proportion of equity-based compensation. These results are robust to the degree of corporate governance, and they are more pronounced for firms with high levels of inside director ownership and long director tenure. Overall, our findings highlight the positive impact of CSR performance on CEO compensation packages, implying that CEOs fiduciary behavior of engaging in CSR leads to mitigating agency problems and maximizing firm value.
keywords: Corporate social responsibility (CSR)| CEO compensation| CEO compensation structure| Equity-based compensation| Cash-based compensation| Corporate governance
مقاله انگلیسی
8 The effect of the interplay between corporate governance and external monitoring regimes on firms tax avoidance
تاثیر برهم کنش بین نظارت شرکتی و رژیم های نظارت خارجی روی اجتناب از مالیات شرکتها-2018
This study investigates how the interplay between internal corporate governance and the changes in the tax and corporate governance environment in the U.S. during the early 2000s affected firms tax avoidance levels. Analyses use a panel of U.S. firms for the period 1997–2005 and permanent book-tax difference and cash effective tax rates as proxies for tax avoidance. Results suggest that, relative to other firms, firms with weak-governance during the low-regulation period (years 1997–2000) exhibited lower tax-avoidance levels during the high-regulation period (years 2003–2005) in response to the tighter external monitoring regime. The study adds to the corporate tax avoidance literature by providing evidence regarding the importance of considering external monitoring regimes in the study of the relationship between corporate governance and tax avoidance.
keywords: Tax avoidance |Corporate governance |Cash effective tax rates |Book-tax differences |Tax environment |Regulation
مقاله انگلیسی
9 An examination of real activities management and corporate cash holdings
یک بررسی روی مدیریت فعالیتهای واقعی و هلدینگ های نقدی شرکتی-2018
I examine the relation between aggressive income increasing real activities management (RAM) and corporate cash holdings. Motivated by Jensens (1986) concerns about free cash flows, I investigate whether aggressive cuts in discretionary expenditures are associated with higher levels and changes of cash holdings. Using empirical models from prior research, I document that aggressive income increasing RAM is associated with higher cash holdings and this positive association is stronger in weakly governed firms. I also find that weakly governed firms with aggressive income increasing RAM and high levels of cash tend to spend more on future investments, suggesting an effort to reduce accumulated cash and increase real assets under control. My results are robust to endogeneity, additional control variables, and alternative design choices. Evidence in this study provides a link between corporate cash holdings and aggressive cuts in discretionary expenses that allow managers to report higher earnings, indicating that efforts to achieve financial reporting objectives have implications for cash management.
keywords: Real activities management |Cash holdings |Corporate governance
مقاله انگلیسی
10 Fair value measurement and accounting restatements
سنجش ارزش مطلوب و بازنویسی گزارشات حسابداری-2018
This study investigates the association between accounting restatements and reporting different levels of fair value measurements as defined by SFAS No. 157. We find that firms with higher ratios of Level 3 fair value assets (i.e., financial assets which fair values are determined by unobservable, firm-generated inputs) to total assets are more likely to subsequently restate their financial statements. Further analysis shows that this association is driven by the restatements caused by errors and managerial manipulation. Overall, our results suggest that use of less reliable (Level 3) fair value measurements may reduce financial reporting quality.
keywords: SFAS No. 157 |Accounting restatements |Level 3 fair values |Corporate governance
مقاله انگلیسی
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